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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes a new analytical framework by which to assess electoral 
democracy and tests this theory in three world cities. Asserting that any investigation 
of electoral democracy requires a tight coupling of philosophical concepts and 
measurement methods, the first section shows that very few studies genuinely attempt 
to accommodate both elements and those that do contain significant normative and 
empirical inconsistencies. Combining this preferred ‘tip-to-taif approach with the 
contractualist writings of Thomas Scanlon and Brian Barry produces a new theory by 
which to evaluate electoral fairness. The theory o f persistent losing argues that 
electoral rules can be reasonably rejected if they consistently impose higher 
participation costs for some-and-not-other community members committed to 
collective action. The theory is operationalized and tested on local election results in 
Stockholm, London and New York. Detailed statistical measures show that some 
small parties can reasonably reject the electoral formula in all three cities as these 
parties are permanently or almost permanently disadvantaged in how votes are 
converted to seats. Voting stage tests reveal that where persistent losing is unlikely in 
Stockholm, it is probable in New York and is shown to exist in London boroughs 
where participation costs are frequently higher for some geographically-based groups. 
Finally, prevoting stage results show that where women are persistent losers in 
Stockholm, their disadvantage is very slight and likely to go unchallenged. Although 
women’s absence from New York City Council is persistent, this absence cannot be 
directly linked to discriminatory rules. The rules by which parties select candidates in 
London can be reasonably rejected as women’s persistent absence is tied to 
institutional bias.
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INTRODUCTION
Those living in large communities elect leaders to disperse decision-making power. 
Choosing to replace lineage- or privilege-based appointments with elected officials 
marks a critical first step away from monarchy or oligarchy toward democracy. But it 
would be a mistake to believe that elections and democracy are synonymous as the 
first is only one means by which the latter, however defined, can be facilitated. In 
addition, since there are an infinite number of possible regulatory arrangements by 
which representatives can be selected, each with the potential to produce different 
effects, it follows that some electoral systems will promote democracy better than 
others. Thus those interested in electoral democracy face two key challenges: to 
define democracy in a convincing and measurable way and to use this definition to 
identify electoral arrangements that promote or inhibit democracy.
Political theorists devote considerable thought to what democracy means, the 
values democratic institutions ought to promote and the reasons why certain 
institutions should be supported over others. Their empirical colleagues demonstrate 
how different rules and processes affect human behaviour and condition and develop 
generalized ideas about how different electoral systems work. But one of the major 
flaws in the modem studies of electoral democracy is that there is often gap between 
norms and numbers. Many political theorists have written why particular actions and 
efforts may be considered more or less democratic, but while often illustrated and 
informed by anecdotal evidence, these ideas are rarely measured in any systematic 
way. On the other side of the divide, hundreds of social scientists have explained, for
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example, how accurately electoral formulae translate votes into seats, what proportion 
of legislative seats are held by women or minorities or levels of voting turnout, and 
further, what institutional or social factors cause variation between cases.1 However 
underspecified questions, definitions, and explanations often leave readers 
directionless and wondering how these results should be interpreted. It might be, for 
example, possible to discover which variables most impact a person’s tendency to 
vote, but these discoveries can only be fully understood when convincingly linked to 
deeper reasons why low voter turnout may or may not be problematic.
The weakest point in many studies of electoral democracy is where normative 
ideas are operationalized for empirical study. It is during this crucial phase that 
foundational principles are defined in such a way as to allow for meticulous testing. A 
study where the core definition of democracy is properly operationalized to 
accommodate investigation of electoral democracy not only requires a thorough 
understanding of philosophical concepts, but also of empirical theories regarding the 
intricacies of elections and electoral systems. Normative works often provide 
thorough discussion of competing meanings and reasons for democracy, but leave 
thoughts of evaluating actual electoral systems to the final chapter if they are included 
at all. Empirically-dominated studies often borrow simple definitions of democracy, 
dedicate a few introductory paragraphs explaining how concepts can be measured, 
and then proceed to conduct elaborate qualitative or quantitative assessments.
Few scholars treat normative theory, operationalization and empirical measure 
with equal regard and those interested in electoral democracy are often forced to 
choose between general philosophical discussions of democracy with some vague
1 According to Richard Katz, by 1989 1500 studies of electoral systems had been published. This number had risen 
to 2500 by 1992. See Katz, R. (1989), ‘International Bibliography of Electoral Systems’, International Political 
Science Association, Comparative Representation and Electoral Systems Research Committee and Katz, R. (1992), 
‘International Bibliography of Electoral Systems’, International Political Science Association, Comparative 
Representation and Electoral Systems Research Committee.
connection to voting or complex, yet mostly undeciphered, statistical accounts of 
electoral processes. However a few scholars offer ‘tip-to-tail’ investigations in which 
comprehensive normative and empirical components are linked by rigorous attempts 
to ensure measurement matches the philosophical concepts. Perhaps the most famous 
such study is Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics in which the author 
methodically connects well-argued normative concepts with detailed statistical 
calculations. Another is the Democratic Audit o f  the United Kingdom, a study based 
on extensive collaboration between some of the country’s top normative and 
empirical researchers. While still open to criticism on a number of points, these 
studies provide a path to follow.2
One other problem with the election literature is that it mostly concerns 
national elections with only a handful of scholars investigating electoral democracy in 
even the largest cites. This is unfortunate, but perhaps understandable. Municipal 
governments are often portrayed as ‘creatures’ of central or state governments 
beholden to the whims of their political masters.3 While in many cases upper-tier 
governments have formal power lower lower-tier governments, there is much 
evidence to suggest that the ability of local governments to generate policy 
independent of senior governments through the use of informal powers and 
convention is often underestimated.4 In addition to this policy "flexibility, the largest 
cities have budgets and populations many times the size of small nation states. For 
example, at USD $52 billion, the City of New York’s operating budget is
2 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, New Haven: Yale. Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power 
and Democratic Control in Britain, London: Routledge.
3 See, for example, Crawford, K. G. (1954), Canadian Municipal Government, Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press.
4 Smith, P. & Stewart, K. (forthcoming), ‘Beavers and Cats Revisited: Creatures and Tenants vs. Municipal 
Charter(s) and Home Rule, in Young, R. & Lazar, H. (eds.), The State o f  the Federation 2004, Kingston: Institute 
of Intergovernmental Relations at Queen's University.
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approximately 25 times that of Iceland -  a country often included in comparative 
studies of democracy.5
Although local level democracy has been investigated in some cities, in others 
voting records have never even been compiled, let alone rigorously scrutinized or 
compared.6 Not only can investigating elections in some of the world’s most 
important cities -  deemed ‘world cities’ from herein -  help inhabitants decide whether 
to opt for electoral change, these new data sources can help shed light on how all 
electoral systems operate. From a normative perspective, the size of community or 
governmental power should not affect how electoral systems are viewed as the 
fundamental principles underlying democracy ought not be circumstantial, or at least 
not to the extent that local and national elections are judged by very different 
standards.
In sum, this study of electoral democracy in world cities presents and 
operationalizes a definition of democracy on which empirical measure is strictly 
based. Not only is a consistent analytical framework constructed and defended, but 
also employed to evaluate actual electoral systems. Where possible, normative ideas 
and measurement techniques have been borrowed from existing studies, but 
innovation is offered when necessary. It is hoped that the study will not only 
illuminate the quality of electoral systems in world cities, but also how electoral 
democracy can be understood in other environments. The rest of the introduction 
provides an overview of each chapter and a brief summary of findings.
5 See, for example, Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns o f Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Press.
6 The lack of data is especially acute in federal countries where local government records are not centralized. On 
this, see Darcy, R., Welch, S. & Clark, J. (1994), Women, Elections & Representation, Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska, p. 30.
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Chapter Structure and Findings
In searching for an appropriate framework by which to evaluate electoral democracy 
Chapter 1 reviews a number of leading studies in this field. The chapter begins by 
explaining that since electoral democracy contains normative and empirical 
components, both elements are essential to any proper study of this topic. However, it 
is shown that most studies are either normative- or empirical-leaning, and few provide 
tip-to-tail investigations where philosophically sound definitions are operationalized 
to facilitate rigorous measurement. The few existing tip-to-tail investigations of 
electoral democracy are shown to have a number of flaws that prevents their direct 
application to evaluating elections in world cities.
Chapter 2 provides the analytical framework used in the rest of the study. The 
chapter builds the framework from the ground up, starting by examining the moral 
foundations on which a definition of democracy can be built, moving through 
matching concepts from political philosophy, and ending with a the core evaluatory 
rule by which electoral systems are later judged. Siding with a number of prominent 
democratic theorists who reject utilitarianism as the core premiss by which the key 
democratic principle of political equality can be assessed, this thesis adopts the 
alternate views of Thomas Scanlon and Brian Barry. The new framework builds from 
Scanlon’s idea that an act is wrong if the process by which it is generated could be 
reasonably rejected by community members committed to collective action, and 
Barry’s addition that it is ‘reasonable’ for community members to reject processes 
under which they are subject to systematic disadvantage. The theory of persistent 
losing asserts that community members committed to collective action can reasonable 
reject electoral rules that place them at a permanent or almost permanent disadvantage 
during the process through which candidates are elected to office.
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Subsequent chapters move from the normative to the empirical -  testing this 
idea in Stockholm, London and New York City Council elections. Chapter 3 justifies 
why these three cases have been chosen for this study as well as describes the 
demographic, structural and electoral process details of each city. Chapter 4 
examines how political parties fare during the postvoting stage where votes are 
translated to seats. Starting by calculating deviation from proportionality scores, it is 
shown that small parties in all there cities can reasonably reject the electoral formula 
as they are continuously placed at a disadvantage. That small parties are subject to 
systematic disadvantaged under plurality systems in New York and London matches 
findings by other scholars, but that the same occurs under Stockholm’s much more 
proportional system may surprise some.
Chapter 5 moves to examine voting stage results in the study cities, with 
particular focus on voter participation. An overview of turnout in all cities shows that 
only Stockholm can be nearly certain that persistent losing does not occur, where this 
condition is likely in New York. A much more detailed investigation of voter turnout 
32 London boroughs demonstrates that the system can be reasonably rejected by some 
geographically-based groups as the incentives created by the electoral formula places 
those in some wards at a disadvantage. In combination with the theory of persistent 
losing, the multivariate regression analysis counters of the traditional claims made 
about the multi-member plurality electoral system in the UK capital.
The fate of women in world city elections is examined in Chapter 6. Where 
women’s disadvantage is only slight in Stockholm, the bulk of the chapter attempts to 
identify why women are persistently absent from local councils in New York and 
London. In New York it is shown that the current system allows neither parties nor 
voters to discriminate against women candidates, but demonstrates that it is women’s
11
reluctance to enter local political contests that causes their persistent absence. 
However in London, it is suggested that women are absent because the current 
electoral rules allow sometimes biased local selection committees to discriminate 
against women candidates. As such, women can reasonably reject the current method 
by which candidates are selected to run in London borough elections. Chapter 7 
provides a summary and final thoughts about empirical findings and the new 
framework though which they were generated.
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1 -  ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY
In building and using indicators of democracy we necessarily move from the 
language of orientation of justification and evaluation -  in the jargon of 
contemporary political science, normative theory -  toward more empirical 
discourse.7
This study seeks to create a comprehensive framework by which to analyze the 
selection of officials in world cities, with the larger goal of providing new ideas about 
how normative theories can be operationalized to facilitate empirical investigations of 
elections. It is argued that because normative discussions and empirical testing inform 
each other, the most effective studies of electoral democracy adopt a ‘tip-to-tail’ 
approach in which both components are given adequate attention. Chapter 1 illustrates 
the merits of the tip-to-tail approach by critiquing well-known national-level studies 
of electoral democracy including those by Charles Beitz, Pippa Norris and Joni 
Lovenduski, the United Kingdom’s Democratic Audit Team and Robert Dahl. It is 
shown that normative-leaning scholars often fail to provide ideas as to how their 
essential foundational definitions and principles can be effectively measured while 
empirical-leaning studies are often ambiguous because the reasons why particular 
results might or might not be considered significant have not been adequately 
explained. The reviewed tip-to-tail studies have normative and empirical 
inconsistencies that undermine their effectiveness, but provide the basic form for the 
new analytical framework developed in Chapter 2.
1 .1 -  S tu d y in g  E l e c t o r a l  D e m o c ra c y
Most modem political scholars would probably admit that Harold Laswell only got it 
partly right when he described politics as the study of ‘who gets what, when and
7 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 6.
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how’.8 In addition to these descriptive elements, those of an empirical bent now seek 
to discover why resources were allocated in such a way, while normativists investigate 
whether or not the distribution was just. In fact, because norms and measures are 
intertwined, contemporary researchers must not only describe who gets what and why 
during collective decision-making, but also explain whether the distribution is morally 
defensible. The most sophisticated statistics lose significance if no direction has been 
given to determine whether results can be seen as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. The most logical 
definition becomes irrelevant if core ideas are immeasurable. These two core elements 
of any study are connected by a third -  how core principles are operationalized in a 
way directly relevant to the study subject.
Figure 1: Electoral Democracy Study Components
Normative Operationalization Empirical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moral —► Political —► Democratic —► Electoral <—  Electoral —► Hypotheses —► Data
Philosophy Philosophy Theory Democracy Theory
As shown in Figure 1, the normative, operationalized and empirical elements 
of a study of electoral democracy can be further broken down into seven distinct sub­
components -  all of which are necessary to generate an effective understanding of this 
topic. The normative element contains explorations of (1) moral philosophy, or 
general discussions about what is right or wrong or good or bad. Moral principles 
provide boundaries for (2) political philosophy, through which it is established 
whether or not collective actions are or are not legitimate. Building on the work of 
political philosophers, democratic theory (3) attempts to outline specific processes by 
which communities should make binding collective decisions. On the empirical side, 
(5) electoral theory represents generalized observations about how the institutions
8 Lasswell, H. (1936), Politics: Who Gets What, When and How, New York: McGraw-Hill.
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associated with elections affect individual or group behaviour. This theory is 
developed by. proposing and testing (6) falsifiable hypotheses by gathering (7) 
qualitative or quantitative data. Electoral democracy (4) marks the point where 
normative ideas about democracy and empirical theories about how electoral systems 
intersect and are operationalized for systematic testing.
As illustrated in this chapter, to some extent all studies of elections define, 
operationalize and measure, but rarely are all three elements given adequate attention. 
Normative-leaning studies often leave readers wondering what to do with concepts 
and definitions as attempts to operationalize these ideas for systematic measurement 
are almost completely absent. In their rush to crunch numbers, many empirical- 
leaning scholars undermine the significance of their findings by paying mere lip- 
service to normative ideas and their operationalization. As Richard Katz laments, 
‘[democratic theory and the study of elections are two fields of inquiry that ought to 
be connected intimately but that, in fact, have tended to proceed independently, each 
acknowledging the importance of the other and then blithely ignoring it.’9
The following sections use the work of well-known authors to demonstrate the 
gap between normative- and empirical-leaning studies of electoral democracy, but 
also- how a few authors have attempted to provide tip-to-tail investigations that 
include at least parts of all seven sub-components shown in Figure 1. Charles Beitz’s 
Political Equality provides good example of a normative-leaning study of electoral 
democracy, where Lovenduski and Norris’ Political Recruitment is an equally strong 
empirical-leaning effort. The UK Democratic Audit Teams’ Political Power and
9 Katz, R. (1997), Democracy and Elections, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 4.
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Democratic Control in Britain and Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics offer two 
of the most comprehensive attempts in this field.10
1.2 -  N o r m a tiv e -L ea n in g  S tud ies
While informed and prompted by real world events, normative-leaning studies of 
democracy are often almost completely devoted to discovering foundational aspects 
of this topic. The most common approach is for theorists to explore different streams 
of thought about democracy in order to convince the reader why a particular 
definition should be accepted. Normative-leaning authors usually defend their 
preferred definition and corresponding set of principles after dissecting the assertions 
of a sometimes large range of authors. Perhaps the most well known contemporary 
writers in this field are Charles Beitz, Tomas Christiano, G.D.H. Cole, Robert Dahl, 
John Dryzek, David Held, Paul Hirst, James Hyland, C.B. Macpherson, Carole 
Pateman and Joseph Schumpeter.11
There are very few comprehensive normative-leaning studies specifically 
devoted to electoral democracy, as political theorists tend include both electoral and 
extra-electoral mechanisms and processes in their discussions about democracy. 
Perhaps the most well known work in this field is Charles Beitz’s Political Equality: 
An Essay in Democratic Theory. Political Equality sits between works such as James 
Hyland’s Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations and, say, Robert Dahl’s
10 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), 
Political Recruitment: Gender Race and Class in the British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 
Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics', Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power and Democratic 
Control in Britain.
11 See, Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality', Christiano, T. (1996), The Rule o f  the Many: Fundamental Issues in 
Democratic Theory, Colorado: Westview Press; Cole, G. (1921), Guild Socialism: A Plan for Economic 
Democracy, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company; Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory, 
Chicago: Chicago University Press; Dryzek, J. (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, 
Contestations, New York: Oxford University Press; Held, D. (1996), Models o f  Democracy, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press; Hirst, P. (1994), Associative Democracy: New Forms o f  Economic and Social Governance, 
Cambridge: Polity Press; Hyland, J. (1995), Democratic Theory: The Philosophical Foundations, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press; Macpherson, C. (1977), The Life and Times o f  Liberal Democracy, New York: 
Oxford University Press; Pateman, C. (1970), Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: University Press; 
and, Schumpeter, J. (1996), Socialism Capitalism and Democracy, London: Routledge.
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A Preface to Democratic Theory. While rich and enlightening, Hyland’s work makes 
almost no effort to operationalize his philosophical constructs, where Dahl’s Preface 
focuses on operationalizing a less rigorously justified account of democracy with 
heavy emphasis on elections. No empirical data is systematically tested in any of 
these three studies.12 Beitz’s work is reviewed below not only to provide a high- 
quality normative-leaning example, but also because of his general contribution to the 
understanding of electoral democracy.
1.2.1 -  Charles Beitz’s Political Equality
In the preface of Political Equality, Beitz refers to a host of (what were in 1989) 
recent Supreme Court-ordered changes to US electoral law. He states his while these 
changes have been defended on the basis that they promote political equality, there is 
little ‘no consensus about the meaning of this principle’. Thus his book aims to arrive 
at a systematic theory of political equality designed in a way that ‘illuminates matters 
about which people actually argue...’. For Beitz, any adequate philosophical theory 
‘should at least identify central values at issue and provide a structure that informs 
their application,’ and to this end he seeks to show ‘how the dispute about the 
meaning of political equality is reflected in contemporary disagreement about how the 
institutions of democratic politics should be arranged and to illustrate how the theory 
of political equality that I set forth would influence our judgment about these 
questions.’13 As discussed below, the aims set forth in his preface mark a course from 
the normative to empirical discovery.
12 As is shown later, Dahl’s (1989) Democracy and Its Critics is one of the only true tip-to-tail accounts of 
electoral democracy, much of which stems from the ideas contained in Dahl, R. (1956) A Preface to Democratic 
Theory.
13 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, pp. x-xi.
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Normative Definition
The first half of Political Equality contains the definition and analytical framework 
used for Beitz’s second-half empirical investigations. For Beitz, the role of a theory of 
political equality is to serve ‘as the chief regulative principle of democratic 
competition by defining fair terms of participation in it’, where its content is to 
identify and justify ‘fair terms of participation.’14 In order to construct the content of
his theory of political equality Beitz critiques four ideas about fairness used by other
authors: ‘simple view’, ‘best result’, ‘popular will’ and ‘procedural’. After showing 
why he finds all to be lacking in one way or another, Beitz offers reasons why readers 
should accept his ‘complex proceduralism’ as the core meaning of political equality 
and the rule by which different types of electoral arrangements should be judged.
Beitz begins his theoretical journey by dismissing what he deems the ‘simple 
view’, or the idea that ‘political preferences as expressed by each citizen should 
receive equal weight in the decision making process.’15 The view is ‘simple’, ‘generic’ 
or even ‘nai’ve’ as there is no attempt by authors to further reduce of this initial 
concept. ‘Political equality’ is seen as synonymous with ‘procedural equality’, a 
position Beitz rejects because ‘it too readily identifies the abstract idea of political 
equality with the more precise, institutional standard of procedural equality and 
because it wrongly portrays the latter as an unambiguous and univocal requirement.’16 
Beitz argues that because different electoral mechanisms produce different effects, 
some criterion is necessary for selecting among them because ‘not all of the 
possibilities are equally acceptable.’17 Thus the simple view is inadequate because it 
does not provide a general rule for selecting between competing institutional
14 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 17.
15 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 5.
16 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 16.
17 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 17.
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configurations and it is not attached to more complex moral or philosophical 
principles.
Beitz’s substantive definitional efforts begins with a critique of ‘best result’ 
theories that associate ‘fair terms of participation with those likely to produce the 
most desirable outcomes -  that is, outcomes that maximize social welfare, however 
understood.’18 Drawing on the work of John Stuart Mill, Beitz characterizes those 
promoting best result visions of political equality as endorsing governmental 
structures that allow communities to realize the highest possible overall utility. Beitz 
largely rejects outcome-oriented, best result theories because ‘in proceeding from the 
point of view of society at large rather than from that of each individual affected, all 
such views adopt a standpoint that is inappropriate to the subject of political 
fairness.’19 However he does admit that ‘the propensity of the procedure to yield 
desirable results is a relevant consideration in determining the procedure’s fairness 
without being the only consideration.’20
As described by Beitz, ‘popular will’ theorists maintain that the collective 
preferences of all citizens are sovereign and together make up the ‘general will’ of the 
people. Proponents of this idea argue that because a general will already exists within 
any given community, ‘the goal of decision-making institutions is to identify it as 
closely as possible.’21 When individual preferences stand in conflict, ‘the conflict 
ought to be resolved in a way that counts each person’s preference equally.’22 In this 
sense then, outcomes are the key gauge of fairness where political procedures are only 
of instrumental significance -  and only valuable in that they produce some 
‘predictable and consistent relationship to the array of individual preferences that
18 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 31.
19 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p 40.
Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p.48. Emphasis in original.
21 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p.50
22 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 49.
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come to exist in society and that are actually expressed in the political process.’23 But 
Beitz asserts that procedural qualities other than preference aggregation are important 
to consider including: the conduct and quality of public debate; the prospects for 
political stability; the coherent administration of policy; the transparency of the 
procedure; and, the degree to which citizens find decision-making processes 
accessible. More strongly, he argues that to ignore these other qualities is to embrace 
a ‘dogmatic belief, induced by unreflective acceptance of a technical conception of 
social choice that has no clear normative justification.’24 Beitz concludes that popular 
will theories are inadequate as ‘the fairness of democratic procedures must consist in 
something other than their tendency to yield outcomes that give equal weight to the 
political preferences of citizens.’25
It is through a review of ‘procedural’ ideas that Beitz establishes a base from 
which he builds his own vision of political equality. Proceduralists ‘identify equal 
treatment with the provision of equal opportunities to influence outcomes, whatever 
these outcomes turn out to be like.’26 In seeking to find an account of the demands 
which community members are justified on making on one another during the process 
of decision binding-making, Beitz further defines proceduralism by breaking the idea 
into.two separate two streams: ‘fairness as compromise’ and ‘fairness as impartiality’. 
Fairness as compromise between community members is rejected as it ‘allows 
judgments about procedural fairness to be influenced by the initial demands and 
power relations of the parties.’27 Beitz then moves to build on the work of political 
philosopher John Rawls who provides a rationale for justifying decision making 
procedures that provide ‘a mechanism for adjudicating among contending views of
23 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p.74.
24 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p.74.
25 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 50.
26 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p 75.
27 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 84.
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social good without presupposing the truth of any,’ by ensuring that procedures are
‘justifiable to each person affected by them.’28 Borrowing heavily from the moral
philosophy of Thomas Scanlon, Beitz explains his conception of political equality as
‘complex proceduralism’:
Institutions for participation should be justifiable to each citizen, taking into 
account the interests that arise from both aspects of citizenship. We should be 
able to regard the terms of participation as the object of agreement that it 
would be reasonable to expect every citizen to accept. Institutions that satisfy 
this condition can be said to be egalitarian in the deepest sense: being equally 
justifiable to each of their members, they recognize each person’s status as an 
equal citizen.29
Operational ization
Beitz’s adaptation of Thomas Scanlon’s Rawlsian-based alternative to utilitarianism 
represents an innovation in the study of democracy. Beitz’s ideas about political 
equality and democracy stand in stark contrast to the other four reviewed by earlier. 
Offering more detail than the ‘simple view’, complex proceduralism incorporates the 
consequentialist arguments of ‘best result’ and ‘popular will’ theory with ‘procedural’ 
ideas. But as discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, Beitz does little to elaborate on 
Scanlon’s core idea of ‘reasonableness’ stating that deciding whether or not a 
particular institution or set of institutions violates the principle of complex 
proceduralism ‘must be treated as a freestanding moral issue to be worked out more or 
less intuitively in a way that takes account of the historical circumstances...’.30 
Instead, Beitz introduces what he describes as three ‘regulative interests of citizens’ 
that must be considered when evaluating decision-making process: ‘recognition’, 
‘equitable treatment’ and ‘deliberative responsibility’.
Recognition involves identity conferred by mechanisms of participation. For 
Beitz, the rules which frame participation are reasonable if they do not directly
28 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, pp. 87-95.
29 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 99. By ‘both aspects of citizenship’ Beitz is refereeing to citizens as both 
‘makers’ and ‘matter’ of politics.
30 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 106.
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exclude or confer inferior status on a specific group of people. Political institutions 
satisfy equitable treatment if ‘over time, they promote (or do not systematically 
detract from) a distribution that accords with the requirement of justice, which are 
themselves to be worked out from a point of view in which each person’s prospects be 
taken equally into account.’31 By this Beitz infers that acceptability is related to 
outcomes, and not the procedures by which they are generated. Institutions are 
deemed unfair not because they fail to maximize social welfare or efficiently 
aggregate preferences, but rather because they foster and perpetuated ‘serious and 
recurring injustices’ when alternative arrangements would not have so done.32
Finally, deliberative responsibility refers to two elements of institutions by 
which citizens resolve political issues. In the first instance, ‘deliberation should not be 
constrained by the exclusion of positions that would gain substantial support if  they 
were sufficiently exposed to public scrutiny.’33 Not only is this exclusion not 
acceptable to those whose views are suppressed, but also those denied information 
about alternative courses of action. The second element refers to the quality of the 
deliberation in that citizen should make informed and reflexively generated decisions 
and institutions are only acceptable to the degree that they foster these two 
deliberative elements.
Beitz proposes that there may be times when all three regulative interests 
cannot be upheld and balance must be struck. However, much like the definitional 
component of his study, Beitz provides few ideas as to what this balance might be. 
Thus, the three regulative interests and the theory of complex proceduralism only 
provide general guidelines, as opposed to specific requirements, by which real-world 
decision-making procedures can be evaluated. While important to consider, the three
31 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 112.
32 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 113.
33 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 115.
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regulative interests and the reliance on individual researchers’ intuition about how 
complex proceduralism should be applied provides little in the way of specific 
guidance as to how the electoral system should be evaluated in the United States, and 
this failure to properly operationalize the core definition renders empirical 
measurement difficult.
Empirical Measurement
According to Beitz, a theory of political equality should ‘provide a persuasive 
philosophical interpretation of the ideal of democratic equality and it should be 
capable of illuminating controversial matters of institutional design.’34 To this second 
end, Beitz devotes four chapters of Political Equality to exploring various 
components of the US electoral system. His three sub-themes of recognition, 
equitable treatment and deliberative responsibility are used to evaluate the electoral 
formula, legislative districting, the political agenda and campaign finance. How Beitz 
investigates the US electoral formulae demonstrates the general approach by which he 
suggests others draw conclusions about electoral arrangements. Of specific interest to 
Beitz in the matter of fair legislative representation is the ‘proportionality principle’, 
or the tendency for proportional representation (PR) to afford ‘every voter an equal 
share of control over legislative seats’ in a way that a single-member plurality (SMP) 
system does not.35 Although he explores PR using all three normative sub-themes, his 
discussion of recognition -  or whether the rules which frame participation directly 
exclude or confer inferior status on a specific group of people -  provides an adequate 
example of Beitz’s overall approach.
Relying on secondary sources, many of which are based on evidence from 
other countries, Beitz dismisses the importance of generating equal opportunity for
34 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 123.
35 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 132.
23
each citizen to vote for a winning candidate by making the empirical claim that even
if prospects are unequal, ‘public expression will be given the equal status of all voters
as participants in decision making, each will have procedural opportunities to
overcome the exactly the same amount of resistance.’36 However, Beitz admits that it
is possible to imagine circumstances where PR would be superior for ‘ensuring
representation for significant positions otherwise unlikely to be represented at all or
for groups that have been objects of particularly invidious treatment,’ although
‘districting systems might be manipulated to accomplish substantially the same
ends.’37 Despite this caveat, Beitz concludes that ‘the interest in recognition combined
with considerations arising from a society’s peculiar circumstances obviously will not
strengthen any general conclusion about the relative fairness of proportional
representation.’38 Further:
.. .although it may be true that proportional representation achieves one kind 
of equality that will not normally obtain in district systems (sic), it is a kind 
of political equality in which there is no general reason to take interest. Hence 
there is no reason to reject a system of representation simply because it does 
not adhere to the proportionality principle. Of course, it does not follow that 
district systems are always to be preferred. In many cases, the most that can 
be said may be that either type of system could be fair... We have only 
established the negative conclusion that considerations of fairness do not 
always favour proportional systems.39
There are a number of fundamental problems with this conclusion. First, Beitz 
rejects the proportionality principle -  equal control over legislative seats -  as one in 
which there is no general reason to take interest except perhaps when under­
represented groups are oppressed. One does not have to drift too far back in US 
history to find examples of states and national legislatures in which few if any 
women, African-Americans or those of low income held legislative seats -  all groups 
that could be said to have suffered ‘invidious treatment’ at one time or another. This
36 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 133.
37 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, pp.133-4.
38 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 134.
39 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 140.
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evidence alone should open a general challenge to SMP. In addition, even the most 
elementary empirical research into US electoral history shows that there are ‘safe 
districts’ in which either Republican or Democrats are almost guaranteed to win over 
the long-term because of the high percentage of supporters contained therein. It could 
be argued that minority dissenters rarely (or sometimes never) have an opportunity to 
elect a member who better represents their views and that voters’ ability to overcome 
resistance is not equal as it is dependent on levels of party support with individual 
constituencies.
However, the point here is not to dispute Beitz’s argument against PR, but 
rather to stress the flaw in Beitz’s approach to empirical investigation. The above 
illustration shows that Beitz is not reviewing whether current patterns of legislative 
representation in the United States could be ‘reasonably rejected’ by citizens, but 
rather using broad and hypothetical evidence to explore whether or not a general case 
can be made for PR over SMP. While he does so using his operationalized definition, 
the omission of hard empirical evidence and failure to test if citizens of the United 
States can reasonably reject the institutions through which they currently elect 
representatives is faulty. Working to establish ‘the negative conclusion that 
considerations of fairness do not always favour proportional systems’ tells us nothing 
about whether or not the current electoral system is reasonably rejectable by US 
citizens. Where Beitz has hinted at how his theory could be applied, his explanation 
does not provide enough detail to guide how data can be systematically gathered and 
assessed either over time or comparatively.
1.2.2 -  Summary
In presenting political equality as complex proceduralism, Beitz draws on recent 
trends in moral and political philosophy to develop a new theory by which to evaluate
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electoral democracy. These efforts represent a significant and welcome contribution 
to what is as an under-theorized field. Moreover, Beitz’s attempt to operationalize the 
definition moves the idea closer to empirical testing. However, the power of his study 
fades in the later chapters as his operationalization does not provide enough detail to 
construct a framework by which actual election systems can be convincingly assessed. 
While Beitz does bridge the normative and the empirical divide by offering a 
workable theory of electoral democracy, it is a bridge that at the very least needs 
reinforcement. In addition, the empirical segment of his study does little to 
incorporate actual US electoral data, but rather relies on mostly a non-systematic 
review of (mostly foreign) secondary literature. As the next section shows, there is a 
rich array of data and assessment techniques available in this field that could be 
adopted to better evaluate Beitz’s core normative ideas.
1.3 -  E m p ir ic a l -L e a n in g  S tud ies
Compared to those of a normative bent, empirical-leaning studies of electoral 
democracy are plentiful. In these works analysts attempt to demonstrate how the rules 
of the game and/or social characteristics affect collective action by examining patterns 
of behaviour under varying conditions. Hundreds of articles and books attempt to 
explain, for example, why some people vote and some do not, why some groups are 
under-represented in legislatures, and the effect of various electoral formulas on party 
competition. All rely on systematic measurement and comparison of data, including 
those gathered by survey, interviews or electoral results. More well-known authors 
include Gary Cox, Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart, G. Bingham Powell, Rein
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Taagepera & Matthew Shugart, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski.40 The rest of this 
section provides a comprehensive review of one such study to demonstrate the general 
strengths and weaknesses of empirical-leaning studies of electoral democracy. As 
with Beitz’s work, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski’s Political Recruitment has been 
chosen because of its popularity as well as relevance to the rest of this study. The 
purpose of the review is to show how the authors define, operationalize and measure 
their initial concepts. Political Recruitment also serves as typical example of an 
empirical-leaning study of electoral democracy -  a quality that allows for 
generalization about similar works.
1.3.1 -  Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski’s Political Recruitment
At the heart of Norris and Lovenduski’s study lies the issue of legislative recruitment 
in Britain, or, more specifically, who gets selected to sit in the British legislature and 
why; who selects these representatives and how; and whether or not social bias 
matters to democracy. The authors state that there are several reasons why such 
questions need answering. First, there is very little examination of how recent changes 
to electoral rules and internal party selection processes have affected political 
recruitment. Second, examination of the attitudes of those engaged in the process of 
selecting, and being selected as candidates has been sparse. Finally, few studies have 
established whether social backgrounds of politicians has a significant effect on their 
behaviour within the legislature -  a link that would seem critical to understanding 
whether institutional arrangements are furthering or stymieing democracy. After 
undertaking a thorough investigation of these problem areas, Norris and Lovenduski
40 Cox, G. (1997), Making Votes Count, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Grofman, B. & Lijphart, A.
(eds), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, New York: Praeger; Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns o f  
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New Haven: Yale University Press; 
Powell, G. (2000), Elections as Instruments o f  Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions, New Haven: 
Yale University Press; Taagepera, R. & Shugart, M. (1989), Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f  
Electoral Systems, New Haven: Yale University Press; and, Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political 
Recruitment.
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conclude ‘until Westminster includes greater social diversity, reflecting the electorate 
at large, it will fail to be a parliament of all talents.41 The rest of this section examines 
how the authors came to this conclusion in terms of their normative definition, 
operationalization and empirical measurement.
Normative Definition
As Political Recruitment is primarily an empirical study it is perhaps unfair to 
demand detailed normative discussion of the reasons why legislatures should reflect 
society. Nonetheless, this type of discussion is crucial to constructing and interpreting 
empirical efforts. To their credit, Norris and Lovenduski do provide a brief glimpse as 
to why their key theme ‘demographic representation’ -  that each relevant sub-group 
of society gains a corresponding share of legislative seats -  might be normatively 
important. In briefly referring to Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarians it appears that 
the authors’ belief in demographic representation is related to the idea that legislative 
outputs adequately or accurately reflect the demands of the community. However it is 
unclear whether the in the end Norris and Lovenduski are concerned that under­
representation distorts what in the last section Beitz called ‘best result’ or ‘popular 
will’. Norris and Lovenduski avoid offering an explicit explanation why demographic 
under-representation might be important by stating that work on this topic is needed 
because, ‘the concept of demographic representation is a pervasive one which 
permeates much popular thinking, and therefore deserves full examination.’42
To illustrate the seriousness Norris and Lovenduski’s normative omission it is
/
perhaps fruitful to guess how the authors’ would justify their calls for reform if they 
found that no women were being elected to the British parliament because of 
prohibitive institutional or social conditions. For example, would reforms be justified
41 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, pp.247-8.
42 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p.95.
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because policy outcomes are not reflective of women’s preferences? Or perhaps 
measures like quotas should be instituted because overall social welfare is not being 
maximized? This core reasoning for these reforms is never made clear, nor is a 
proposition made as to what percentage of women and minorities is or is not enough. 
In failing to address these basic matters it is difficult to decide if the analytical 
framework accurately reflects core concerns or how the results should be interpreted. 
It would appear that Norris and Lovenduski share the concerns of Beitz and other 
normative theorists in that legislative representation is linked to democracy and 
political equality, but beyond this general link the reader is left to guess as to the 
deeper significance of their empirical findings.
Operationalization
Despite a virtually non-existent normative justification, Norris and Lovenduski 
provide some ideas of how their mostly intuitive concept of democracy can be 
measured. As suggested by the earlier quote, the authors suggest that if  various social 
groupings do not receive their fair share of seats in the legislature then the system is 
not fair and must be changed. But it is here that the lack of a strong normative base is 
most apparent. If, for example, systems are to be judged by ‘best result’ then is would 
seem that what should be measured is not if the proportion of seats held by women, 
ethic minorities, or people of low socio-economic status is equal to their proportion of 
the population, but rather whether social welfare is being maximized. If ‘popular will’ 
is the basis for assessment, then what should be measured is if the preferences of the 
afore mentioned groups are fairly translated to policy outcomes. However neither of 
these concepts is discussed by the authors and little attention is paid to 
operationalizing key concepts for measurement.
29
Empirical Measurement
If indeed there are reasons to study demographic under-representation it would be 
hard to find a more thorough study of such phenomenon. Norris and Lovenduski use 
data from the 1992 British Candidate Survey in which participants were asked up to 
75 questions about political background, selection experience, political attitudes and 
personal background. Interviewees included: 1634 Labour and Conservative activists; 
1,320 Members of Parliament and prospective parliamentary candidates from a wide 
range of parties; 361 failed candidates; 39 hour-long interviews with Members of 
Parliament and failed candidates. In addition, the authors reviewed official 
documents, observed meetings, and included data from the British Election Survey, 
the national census and actual election results.
After providing a detailed explanation of the process through which members 
of the community move from candidates to elected members, the authors track who 
gets elected and then test why certain groups are under-represented. For example, they 
claim that while 63 British MPs elected in 1992 were from the working class, 249 
were needed if the House of Commons is supposed to reflect society at large.43 In 
terms of educational representation, the authors conclude that ‘[i]f parliament were as 
ill-educated as the nation, it would include only 46 university educated MP’s, not 
426.44 Regarding gender equality, ‘[i]f women were represented in proportion to their 
numbers in the electorate, after the 1992 general election there would have been 339 
women in the House, not 60.45 Finally, they demonstrate that visible minorities are 
also under-represented, ‘if today’s parliament reflected the social balance in the 
electorate we would expect the Commons to include at least thirty six MPs of black or
43 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 99.
44 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 101.
45 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 102.
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Asian origin, not six.’46 After extensive analysis to why this deficit occurs, authors
conclude that:
Parliament includes a social bias toward the younger, better educated and 
those in brokerage occupations, in large part because this reflects the pool of 
applicants. This mirrors the well-established socio-economic bias in political 
participation in other forms of political activity. If other types of applicants 
came forward, this suggests probably more would be selected.47
Through extensive survey work and other data Norris and Lovenduski go on to
examine the causes of under-representation including investigations of the attitudes of
party ‘gatekeepers’, candidate resources and candidate motivation. These
investigations demonstrate that ‘ [i]mputed rather than direct discrimination is the
main barrier facing black and Asian candidates’, and further that ‘gatekeepers
attitudes are not the main reason for the lack of women in parliament...’.48 The
authors also found that financial resources made no difference in who was recruited
by political parties, although in some cases time spent contributing to political parties;
political experience; and, the extent of social networks played some role in
determining who was selected.49 Finally, the authors note that the strategy chosen by
candidates to gain party endorsement is more important than personal drive to reach
office.50 In reviewing this and other information, the authors suggest a way forward:
.. .adopted candidates usually reflect the pool of entrants who come forward.
The gap between the lives of grassroots party members and applicants is far 
greater than the difference between the applicants and candidates. This is 
clearest with the class and educational bias of the legislative elite, which can 
be attributed to the way well-educated, professional ‘brokerage’ jobs provide 
the career flexibility, financial resources, occupational security, and work 
conditions which facilitate the pursuit of a political career.
The pattern is more complex in terms of gender and race. Older 
women are the backbone of activists in the Conservative party but.. .few 
come forward as applicants. In contrast, in the Labour party more younger 
and middle-aged women are seeking candidacies, although they face 
difficulties securing inheritor seats. There are few black activists within the 
Conservative ranks...while in the Labour party applicants from the ethnic
46 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 106.
47 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 122.
48 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 142.
49 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 164.
50 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, pp. 176-182.
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minorities may face problems from selectors, largely because of concerns 
about their electability. The power to pick the real winners who get into 
parliament ...lies largely in the hands of grassroots Conservative and Labour 
party members rather than the electorate. But these members exercise choice 
within constraints, with supply-side factors [the reasons why candidates do or 
do not come forward] tending to drive the outcome.
It follows that policy options directed at changing the resources and 
motivation of potential applicants, which encourage party members to 
consider seeking a parliamentary career, will probably be most effective....51
1.3.2 -  Summary
Norris and Lovenduski’s work serves as a good representative of empirical-leaning 
studies of electoral democracy for two reasons. First, Political Recruitment 
demonstrates the depth of detail needed to conduct high quality empirical research. 
Not only does it uncover the extent to which Parliament is not reflective of British 
society, but based on extensive empirical research, the study presents convincing 
reasons why this may be so. Second, like many empirical studies of electoral 
democracy, the authors devote little discussion to the normative-side of the research 
equation or operationalizing key concepts. This omission is problematic as without an 
operationalized definition the study drifts. Not only might the indicators not match 
concepts of concern, but convincing interpretation is also thwarted. Readers of the 
Norris and Lovenduski study are still left to figure for themselves why Parliament 
should reflect society and whether the data is even normatively relevant. The lesson to 
be learned is that studies of electoral democracy need solid empirical and normative 
components that speak to one another, a demanding tip-to-tail requirement attempted 
by but a few scholars in this area.
1 .4 -  T ip -t o -T a il  Stud ies
As shown in the last sections normative- and empirical-leaning studies have can make 
a significant contribution to understanding electoral democracy, but their 
effectiveness is undermined by the absence of the other. This section reviews two tip-
Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 248.
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to-tail studies that attempt to link both normative justifications and empirical 
measurement through adequate operationlization of definitional foundations. As is 
shown below, this is accomplished either by assembling a team of researchers that 
include normative and empirical experts or a single scholar working over a long time 
period. Where the UK Democratic Audit Team’s Political Power and Democratic 
Control in Britain includes the work a large collection of normative and empirical 
academics, Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics is primarily the work of one 
person. Both are reviewed below to show how the effective combination of normative 
and empirical work can better illuminate problems associated with electoral 
democracy.
1.4.1 -  UK Democratic Audit’s Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain
As presented in Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain, the work of the 
UK Democratic Audit Team is an impressive and innovative endeavour. Conceived in 
1993 by Lord Smith of Clifton, Kevin Boyle, Stuart Weir and David Beetham make 
up the core of the team with contributions from scores of leading scholars and 
practitioners. At the core of the research sits an attempt to perform a systematic 
assessment of democracy in the UK by rating institutional performance against agreed 
standards. This audit is not aimed only at evaluating electoral system performance, 
but also includes a review of extra-electoral mechanisms and processes -  such as 
Parliament, courts, public audit, the ombudsman, civil liberties, political rights -  and 
aspects deemed important to a democratic society including social capital and 
inclusion, and the accountability of economic institutions. Thus, the Democratic Audit 
Team offers a comprehensive account of democracy in the UK, not just electoral 
democracy. However, because the audit has been constructed using a tip-to-tail
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approach and the fact that electoral democracy makes up a large part of their study 
renders it appropriate for review.
Normative Definition
The Democratic Audit Team bases its empirical work on a definition of democracy 
that rests on the ideas of popular sovereignty and political equality -  with public 
control of decision-makers and equal distribution of power between citizens being the 
key criteria for determining the extent to which a country is more or less democratic. 
Hence democratic performance centres on the idea that ‘everyone should be given 
equal consideration in public policy, and equal opportunity to influence it’. For the 
authors democracy does not automatically mean majority rule, but rather that ‘the 
conditions for popular control over government and for political equality should be 
secured on an ongoing basis.’ Demanding that democracy requires ‘popular 
authorization, public accountability, government responsiveness, the 
representativeness of public bodies, reflecting and promoting equality of citizenship’, 
adds meat to the theoretical bones, as does the statement that one of the core 
indicators of political equality is ‘the degree of representativeness to which political 
institutions and of public bodies of all kinds, and in degree to which they reflect the 
diversity of pluralism of society, not just in respect to political opinions, but of social 
composition and identities.’52
The definitional section of the Political Power is more robust than that offered 
by Lovenduski and Norris, but lacks the philosophical depth of Beitz’s work. In fact, 
the normative basis of this work represents only a slightly more vigorous version of 
what Beitz deems ‘the simple view’. Because a more refined direction is offered 
readers know that a wide variety of institutions and processes will be evaluated in
52 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power and Democratic Control in Britain, pp. 7-9.
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terms of who participates and the effects of this participation. However, because 
‘democracy’ is still mostly left open for interpretation it is more difficult to 
definitively assess whether British institutions could be made more democratic. In 
other words, the definitional premiss of the study is not effectively connected to 
deeper ideas about moral or political philosophy. As shown below, the under­
specified nature of the Audit Team’s core definition causes operational and 
measurement problems.
Operationalization
The Democratic Audit Team moves from the normative to the empirical by 
operationalizing its definitional concepts. This is done by constructing 30 key 
questions, six of direct concern to electoral democracy:
1. How far is appointment to legislative and governmental office determined 
by popular election, on the basis of open competition, universal suffrage and 
secret ballot: and how far is there equal effective opportunity to stand for 
public office, regardless of what social group a person belongs to?
2. How independent of government and party control and external influences 
are elections and procedures of voter registration, how accessible are they to 
voters, and how free are they from all kinds of abuse?
3. How effective a range of choice and information does the electoral and 
party systems allow the voters, and how far is there fair and equal access for 
all parties and candidates to the media and other means of communication 
with them?
4. To what extent do the votes of all voters carry equal weight, and how 
closely does the composition of Parliament and the programme of 
government reflect the choices actually made by the electorate?
5. What proportion of the electorate actually votes, and how far are the 
election results accepted by the main political forces in the country?
6. How far is there systematic opportunity to vote on the measures of basic 
constitutional change?53
While these questions form the basis of measurement, they are fairly open- 
ended in terms of expectations. That is, the reader is left to more or less intuitively 
gauge how these questions can be answered and what are and are not acceptable
53 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, pp. 11-12.
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answers. Asking, for example, ‘what proportion of the electorate actually votes?’ 
gives an indication that voter turnout might be important for electoral democracy, but 
not what might be an appropriate level. This ambiguity affects what attributes are 
measured and how results are interpreted.
Empirical Measurement
The authors generate their assessment of the six electoral questions from a wide range 
of statistics, interviews and a large number of reports by academic experts in various 
fields from across the country over a six-year period. Rejecting aggregation of various 
scores into a single score as an arbitrary and contestable exercise, they instead choose 
to present their findings on a point-by-point basis. Of particular relevance to electoral 
democracy are assessments of: representing ‘natural communities’ in Britain; the 
influence of party on fixing boundaries; making votes for parties equal in the effect; 
measuring the distortions of British elections; measuring the electoral squeeze on 
third parties; wasted votes; marginal seats and tactical voters; the choice between 
single member plurality and proportional representation systems; and the 
representation of social groups.
The most extensive empirical review of electoral democracy in Political 
Power relates to Question 4 -  ‘the extent to which votes carry equal weight, and how 
closely the composition of Parliament and the programme of government reflect the 
choices actually made by the electorate’. ‘Equal weight of votes’ is tackled by tracing 
the number of votes needed to elect candidates in different geographic regions, from 
different political parties, and under different competitive circumstances. ‘Parliament 
reflecting the choices of the electorate’ is addressed by tracing how votes shares are 
translated into parliamentary majorities and by calculating ‘deviation from
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proportionality’ scores. ‘Government policy reflecting the choices of the electorate’ is 
audited by examining data related to manifesto promises.
The ‘equal weight of votes’ is substantiated by assessments of: (a) deviations 
from electoral quotas in UK constituencies and, (b) the average support needed to 
elect candidates from the three main political parties. On (a), it is demonstrated that in 
1997 ‘four constituencies are either 30 percent above or below an aggregate electoral 
quota for the UK as a whole; 52 deviate by 20 percent or more; and 226...are adrift 
by 10 percent or more.’ This deviation means that certain constituencies include either 
thousands more or less voters than average, diluting or inflating a individual voters 
ability to influence the election outcome. On (b), the authors demonstrate that it 
sometimes takes more votes to elect candidates from certain parties than it does from 
others. In 1997, an average of 32,370 votes were requires to elect a Labour MP, 
58,185 to elect a Conservative and 113,729 to elect a Liberal Democrat. Based on this 
statistical evidence and a short discussion of party tactics provided from a single 
newspaper article, the authors to claim that British electoral system is flawed and 
‘encourages the parties to concentrate their electoral platforms and on a minority of 
perhaps half a million voters out of an electorate of 43 million in the 100-120 
marginal seats on which the elections in Britain normally turn. They are therefore 
likely to have more influence on the content of manifestos than other electors.’54
‘Parliament reflecting the choices of the electorate’ is measured by (a) the 
quality of first-past-the-post elections in the UK and (b) deviation from 
proportionality. Measure (a) uses examples to illustrate the sometimes perverse 
effects of the current UK electoral system. For example, in 1951 Labour won 250,000 
more votes than the Conservatives but was awarded 26 fewer seats, resulting in an
54 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, pp. 49-76.
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overall Conservative majority of 17 seats. Likewise, while winning 225,789 fewer 
votes than the Conservatives in 1974, Labour emerged with four more seats and a 
minority government. This perversity is explained in more detail by calculating 
deviation from proportionality (DV). Calculated by the totaling the percentage of 
vote-to-seat deviations for all parties within a single election, DV represents the 
percentage of elected members ‘not entitled to their seats in terms of their party’s 
actual share of the national vote.’ For example, with a DV score of 21 percent, one in 
five MPs did not deserve their seats in the 1997 British General Election. In national 
elections since 1945, DV scores have ranged from four percent in 1955 to 24 percent 
in 1983 -  scores which are ‘the largest on record among liberal democracies in the 
past 25 years.’55 Election results are even less proportional when examined on a 
regional basis. According to the Democratic Audit Team, this evidence proves ‘both 
that the electoral system fails to ensure that the composition of Parliament reflects 
voters’ party choices; and that it denies people votes of equal value.’56
Finally, the third sub-component of Question 4 examines ‘government policy 
reflecting the choices of the electorate’. This is measured by investigating whether or 
not various British governments have honored their manifesto promises. Mainly 
tested through a brief discussion of anecdotal evidence, the Audit Team declares 
‘[t]hat there is evidence that the contents of the manifesto do influence future 
government policies, but governments may also be “blown off course”.’ But, continue 
the authors, ‘even those governments which do honour their manifestos can by 
definition be sure of satisfying only a relatively large minority of the public who
voted for the governing party, and their policies will not generally reflect the choices
of the majority. Thus, under first-past-the-post elections, the mandate system cannot
55 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, p. 56.
56 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, p. 58.
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fulfill its democratic promise.’57 It is not clear what alternate arrangements, if any, 
would remedy this failing.
Summary
A comprehensive audit of democracy is ambitious, especially an audit that seeks to 
base measurement of operationalized normative principles. In terms of breadth, the 
project generates and compiles an impressive collection of information about a wide 
range of institutions and processes. However, the connections between the normative 
and the empirical leave something to be desired. As shown above through an 
exploration of Question 4, the links between the normative concept and 
operationalized definition and operationalized definition and the empirical measures 
are weak. For example, the authors provide no reason as to why it might be important 
that the composition of parliament reflect the choices of the electorate, but leave the 
connection to the reader’s intuition. Is the composition of parliament important 
because of it better maximizes social welfare, better manifests popular will or because 
it reflects fair procedures? No connection to these deeper ideas of political equality is 
made.
The link between the operationalized question and the empirical measures are 
also weak. Although DV scores effectively describe how much an electoral formula 
distorts how votes are translated into seats, it is difficult to interpret the generated 
figures. The question of ‘when is a system proportional enough?’ is never answered. 
So while the British electoral system is perhaps the worst in Europe, there is no 
connection with their normative idea that would allow a precise judgment of whether 
or not it is so bad to be discarded or which of the many available systems would be an 
adequate enough replacement. The lack of connection to the normative leaves much
57 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, p.115.
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to intuition and audit results would have more clout if the normative definition was 
more robustly operationalized. These criticisms aside, the overall scope and 
collaborative approach used by the UK Audit Team is groundbreaking and there is 
much that could be incorporated into future studies.
1.4.2 -  Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its Critics
While Robert Dahl’s contribution to the study of democracy can be traced back to his 
1940 Ph.D. dissertation, his most comprehensive work to date is Democracy and Its 
Critics.5* Written in 1989, Democracy and Its Critics contains a tip-to-tail exploration 
of democracy, much of which relates to elections. After explaining how the roots of 
his analytical framework correspond to various conceptions of justice, Dahl then 
operationalizes definition in order to empirically explain why some countries do or do 
not develop into polyarchies.59 As illustrated below, Democracy and Its Critics offers 
perhaps the most complete study of electoral democracy to date.
Normative Definition
In Democracy and Its Critics, Dahl uses four of the book’s Six sections to develop his 
idea of democracy. Based on the notions ‘the people’ and ‘rule’, Dahl constructs what 
he deems a ‘Strong Principle of Equality’ on which his whole notion of democracy 
rests:
If the good or interests of everyone should be weighed equally, and if each 
adult person is in general the best judge of his or her good or interests, then 
every adult member of an association is sufficiently well qualified, taken all 
round, to participate in making binding collective decisions that affect his or 
her good or interests, that is, to be a full citizen of the demos. More 
specifically, when binding decisions are made, the claims of each citizen as to 
the laws, rules, policies, etc., to be adopted must be counted as valid and 
equally valid. Moreover, no adult members are so definitely better qualified 
than the others that they should be entrusted with making binding collective 
decisions. More specifically, when binding decisions are made, no citizen’s
58 In an interview with Nelson Polsby, Dahl describes the various writings over 60 years of study as ‘all one book’ 
and ‘a kind of a soap opera’. Polsby, N. (1991), ‘Interview with Nelson W. Polsby’ in Toward Democracy: A 
Journey Reflections 1940-1997, Volume One, Berkeley: Institute of Governance Studies, pp. 17-32, p. 27.
59 Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl, R. (1971), Polyarchy, New Haven: Yale; Dahl, R. 
(1989), Democracy and Its Critics', and Dahl, R. (1998), On Democracy, New Haven: Yale.
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claims as to the laws, rules and policies to be adopted are to be counted as 
superior to the claims of other citizens.60
One its own the Strong Principle of Equality reads much like Beitz’s ‘simple
view’ in that political equality is associated with equal input into collective decision
making, but Dahl adds detail to this initial definition by using dialogues between
imagined political theorists. While agreeing with traditional utilitarians that a
democratic system should promote a common good based on ‘the good of all persons
affected’, he does not concur with their view as to what ‘common good’ substantively
means. Critically, Dahl states from a moral perspective that ‘it seems to me misguided
to search for the good exclusively in the outcomes of the collective decisions and
ignore the good that pertains to the arrangements by which they are reached.’61 This
argument that the common good should not be judged solely by outcomes marks a
clear break with tradition utilitarians. Dahl further detaches ‘common good’ from
assessments based on outcomes, arguing:
Our common good, then...consists of the practices, arrangements, institutions 
and practices that.. .promote the well-being of ourselves and others -  not, to 
be sure, of “everyone” but of enough persons to make the practices, 
arrangements, etc. acceptable and perhaps even cherished.62
Not only is this definition is similar to Beitz’ complex proceduralism, but like 
Beitz, Dahl also runs into the same problem of underspecificity. For example, 
nowhere does Dahl exactly specify the meaning of ‘enough persons’ or ‘acceptable’. 
This leaves the reader to guess whether ‘enough’ refers to a majority, minority or 
supermajority of community members, and whether it applies to all types of decisions 
or varies under particular circumstances and when a practice would or would not be 
not be ‘acceptable’. As Dahl himself admits, his normative definition is ‘much too
60 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 105.
61 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 306. Emphasis in original.
62 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 306.
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loose and nonphilosophical to convince political theorists and philosophers’.63 
Breaking with a strict utilitarianism interpretation of political fairness leaves Dahl in 
the difficult position of endorsing basic utilitarian principles but rejecting the general 
rule by which they judge decision-making processes.64 Because his alternate lacks 
detail consistent operationalization is difficult if not impossible.
Operational ization
In operationalizing his definition of democracy Dahl stresses that all decision-making 
processes are multi-staged and should be assessed as such. As far back as his 1956 
work A Preface to Democratic Theory Dahl describes the decision-making process as 
a four-staged. In chronological order, ‘Prevoting’ is the stage during which the agenda 
is set, ‘voting’ is when votes are cast and translated to seats, during the ‘postvoting’ 
stage governments are formed, and, finally, during the ‘interelection’ period all 
decisions are made by elected officials or referendum. Tied to his definition, in a fully 
democratic system any member is allowed to place items on the agenda, express their 
preference as to what option is superior, and have these expressions of preference 
considered equally when final decisions are made.65
Dahl’s multi-staged view of decision-making is reflected in the five criteria by 
which he evaluates all decision-making procedures. He states that the five criteria 
‘fully specify the democratic process’ and further, ‘to the extent that the criteria are 
not met, then persons could hardly be said to be politically equal.’66 They five include:
1. Inclusion -  The demos must include all adult members of the association except 
transients and persons proved to be mentally defective.
2. Control of the Agenda -  The demos must have the exclusive opportunity to decide 
how matters are to be placed on the agenda of matters that are to be decided by means 
of the democratic process.
63 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 84.
64 For more criticism of Dahl’s theoretical underpinnings, see Saward, M. (1998), The Terms o f  Democracy, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 16-18.
65 Dahl, R. (1956), A Preface to Democratic Theory, p. 84.
66 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 130.
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3. Enlightened Understanding -  Each citizen ought to have adequate and equal 
opportunities for discovering and validating (within the time permitted by the need 
for a decision) the choice on the matter to be decided that would best serve the 
citizen’s interest.
4. Voting Equality at the Decision Stage -  At the decisive stage of collective 
decisions, each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice that 
will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by other citizens. In 
determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, 
must be taken into account.
5. Effective Participation -  Throughout the process of making binding decisions, 
citizens ought to have an adequate opportunity, and an equal opportunity, for 
expressing their preferences as to the final outcome. They must have adequate and 
equal opportunities for placing their questions on the agenda and for expressing 
reasons for endorsing one outcome rather than another.
Not only does Dahl’s recognition that what options are available and who 
participates are as important as questions about how preferences are tabulated when 
evaluating a decision-making process, these factors add a richness that is sometimes 
missing from other accounts of democracy -  especially those that merely focus on 
how elections systems aggregate votes. Where his definitional foundation may not be 
fully convincing, it is hard to find fault with Dahl’s reasoning that all decision making 
stages should be included in a comprehensive evaluation of democracy.
Of more importance to this study is Dahl’s own recognition that his base 
definition is not suited for measurement. In order to determine whether government 
actions reflect the community’s ‘urgent political concerns’, policy outcomes must be 
compared ‘with evidence showing what citizens want their governments to do or not 
to do.’67 Instead of offering a method by which this might be achieved, Dahl offers a 
compromise solution suggesting comparisons of:
67 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 95.
...the opportunities that the democratic process (both in ideal form and in 
actuality) provides the majority of citizens for influencing the government to 
attempt to satisfy their urgent political concerns with the opportunities that a 
non-democratic government, both in ideal form and in actuality, would 
provide....Among other things we would need to specify the institutions that, 
in practice, the democratic process requires.68
Thus to empirically evaluate democracy Dahl chooses to measure 
opportunities for influence rather than actual influence. To do so he invents 
‘polyarchy’ -  a more practical version of his democratic principles that denotes a 
polity in which (1) that citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of adults 
and (2) the citizens have the right to oppose and vote out the highest officials in the 
government.69 Dahl claims polyarchy allows him to more easily ‘distinguish modem 
representative democracy from all other political systems, whether non-democratic 
regimes or earlier democratic systems.’70 In moving even closer to empirical measure, 
Dahl matches the previously discussed five conditions of democracy with seven (in 
earlier works eight) institutions that must exist for a country to be considered a 
polyarchy:
1. Elected Officials -  Control over government decisions about policy is 
constitutionally vested in elected officials.
2. Free and Fair Elections -  Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly 
conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively unknown.
3. Inclusive Suffrage -  practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of 
officials.
4. Right to Run for Office -  Practically all adults have the right to run for elective 
offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for 
suffrage.
5. Freedom of Expression -  Citizens have the right to express themselves without the 
danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism 
of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order, and the prevailing 
ideology.
68 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 95. Emphasis added.
69 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p.220.
70 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 218.
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6. Alternative Information -  Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of 
information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by 
laws.
7. Associational Autonomy -  To achieve their various rights, including those listed 
above, citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or 
organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
Dahl stresses that the seven statements must be more than written on paper, but rather 
they should characterize actual rights. In essence these seven institutions establish the 
threshold over which a polity must pass on the trip from non-democracy to polyarchy.
The difficulty in substituting the opportunities to have one’s interests 
considered for actually receiving equal consideration is that Dahl side-steps the core 
of his definitional base. As Dahl admits, what is presented is a listing of institutions 
required for what can be considered only a second-best assessment of political 
equality. If democracy is a process that facilitates a greater goal then the only way to 
proclaim whether or not a polity is democratic is to assess whether or not the specified 
goal has been reached.
There are also problems within the list of seven requirements. For example, 
while Dahl’s definition of democracy is active in that it demands that interests be 
equally considered, he offers mainly passive measures of decision-making. Dahl’s 
first four criteria -  inclusion, control of the agenda, enlightened understanding and 
voting equality -  are rights-oriented conditions which merely demands researchers 
identify whether or not specific rules defending these rights have been enacted, but 
not whether the rights conditions are actually met. This passive measurement stands 
in contrast to his core definition that requires measurement of institutional 
performance. That certain rights exist does not guarantee that they are respected or 
that other, less obvious rules are not interfering with people exercising their rights. 
The fifth condition -  effective participation -  demonstrates that Dahl himself is not
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altogether convinced that mere rights-oriented conditions are extensive enough to 
determine whether interests are being given equal consideration. As with the five 
conditions, the seven institutional traits require a mixture of passive and active 
measures: (1) constitutional vesting of power with elected officials, (3) inclusive 
suffrage, (4) the right to run for office, (5) freedom of expression, and (7) the right for 
groups to assemble, are all passive traits that could be established by simply 
examining the constitution or appropriate laws. But, (2) the absence of coercion 
during elections and (6) the existence of alternate forms of information require active 
measures. Dahl’s mixture of passive and active conditions to assess an active 
definition is problematic and, as shown below, the confusion spills over into his 
attempts to measure democracy.
Empirical Measurement
Over the years Dahl has broken a larger set of countries into groups of polyarchies 
and non-polyarchies and compared these lists with a number of other factors to 
determine why polyarchy develops in some countries and not in others. While his 
work on why some countries do or do nor develop and maintain democratic 
institutions is valuable, it is Dahl’s initial classification of countries that is of direct 
relevance to this study. Dahl generates little original data to classify countries, but 
instead bases his assessments on data sets borrowed from other scholars. Most 
recently Dahl has based his empirical assessments on information provided by Tatu 
Vanhanen.71 In Prospects o f  Democracy Vanhanen calculates levels of participation 
and competition in 119 (later 172) countries, combining these indicators into an 
overall Index of Democratization (ID). Participation is the percentage of the total
71 In Democracy and Its Critics (1989), Dahl uses data from Vanhanen, T. (1984), The Emergence o f  Democracy:
A Comparative Study o f  119 States 1850-1979, Helsinki: Finnish Society of Arts and Letters. Vanhanen later 
updated this work published as Vanhanen, T. (1997), Prospects o f  Democracy: A Study o f  172 Countries, London: 
Routledge.
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population that cast votes in a particular election, where Competition is ‘calculated by 
subtracting the percentage of votes won by the largest party from 100.’72 Participation 
and Competition calculation are multiplied and then divided by 100 to provide the ID 
index score. In using the ID Index for his work, Dahl equates his seven conditions of 
polyarchy with voter turnout and party competition.
These measures are problematic as they do not adequately capture the 
institutional traits Dahl wishes to assess. Where Dahl is primarily interested in 
constitutional (i.e. passive) structure, Vanhanen’s ID Index is based on two indicators 
of democratic performance -  voting turnout and party competition. Voting turnout 
statistics do not measure constitutional rules but rather how many people cast ballots 
in each election. Party competition does not indicate particular rights but rather how 
many parties contest each election. Thus Dahl’s conditions of polyarchy and 
Vanhanen’s data would appear mismatched. Dahl acknowledges this divergence and 
warns that Vanhanen’s ID Index, ‘does not necessarily reflect the legal and 
constitutional situation of a country or a satisfactory level of institutional achievement 
of polyarchy’, and confirms his preference for passive measures of democracy by 
stating he would rather assess countries ‘based on legal suffrage and the institutions of 
polyarchy’.73 Ironically Vanhanen’s own preference would be to assess passive traits 
of various countries.74
Summary
In sum, Dahl’s approach to defining and evaluating democracy is thorough, but it is 
undermined by inconsistencies and core problems. The first, and perhaps most serious 
problem for comparative study is that Dahl does not provide a consistent general
72 Vanhanen, T. (1997), Prospects o f  Democracy, p. 34.
73 Dahl, R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics, p. 240. (fn).
74 For Vanhanen democracy is ‘a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to compete for 
power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people.’ 
Vanhanen, T. (1997), Prospects o f  Democracy, p. 31.
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evaluatory rule by which it can be determined whether decisions are acceptable to 
‘enough people’. That Dahl’s assumption that any evaluation of democracy should be 
based on a combination of outcome and procedural factors is consistent with the work 
of Charles Beitz and a number of prominent political philosophers suggests Dahl is 
wise to avoid basing his assessment on traditional utilitarianism. However, not 
specifying how to evaluate outcomes and process leaves too much the discretion of 
individual scholars. While Dahl’s abandonment of one important components of 
traditional utilitarianism does not mean he rejects this school’s core belief in political 
equality, he does not provide an adequate substitute for those wishing to adequately 
operationalize his definition.
Dahl’s insistence that complete assessments of democracy require 
consideration of all stages of decision-making is a valuable contribution to 
operationalizing the concept of democracy as it serves as a reminder that collective 
choice is not just about outcomes but also includes agenda setting and participation 
during decision making. However, it is questionable whether the five conditions of 
democracy that he offers to make this assessment would prove an accurate measure of 
his key factor of ‘equal considerations of interest’. Although it would appear that 
‘consideration’ is an activity -  that is it would require measures of performance -  
Dahl suggests that consideration should be assessed through the almost exclusive use 
of passive measures -  by strictly considering constitutional and other legal 
arrangements.. This point is driven home when Dahl measures polyarchy in various 
countries. While he uses performance based data Dahl notes his discomfort with his 
measures and states he would prefer assessment based on more passive data. Where 
Dahl’s has made considerable contributions to the study of democracy, there is room 
to improve aspects of his analytical framework.
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1 .5 - S u m m ar y
In reviewing studies designed to facilitate a greater understanding of electoral 
democracy, Chapter 1 has uncovered a number of significant issues and details to be 
considered for future work in this area. In general terms, the chapter illustrates that a 
gap exists between normative concepts and empirical investigation. In failing to fully 
ready their definitions for measurement, the few existing normative-leaning scholars 
of electoral democracy risk being ignored as their work has little concrete to offer 
their empirical colleagues. For all their complex indicators and methods, empirical- 
leaning researchers who ignore normative concepts might well be measuring 
irrelevant concepts or at least risk generating uninterpretable results. Not only is there 
an issues of balancing these two aspects of any study of electoral democracy, but also 
ensuring that the two ends are firmly connected by a fully operationalized definition 
of democracy.
Charles’ Beitz’s Political Equality demonstrates the power of a high-quality 
normative-leaning study. Not only does Beitz set out the basic options that all who 
study electoral democracy must consider, his theory of political equality provides a 
convincing premiss by which to evaluate various electoral system components. But as 
shown above, because he falters in attempting to operationalize complex 
proceduralism his theory is not readily adaptable for systematic empirical measure. 
Not just apparent in Beitz’s work, this shortfall is common to many normative-leaning 
studies of electoral democracy.
Norris and Lovenduski’s Political Recruitment is an excellent example of a 
rigorous empirical-leaning study of electoral democracy and illuminates legislative 
underrepresentation in a way not seen before in the United Kingdom. The authors 
generate extensive and original descriptive data sources, and also take great care in
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explaining why trends might be occurring in a way that lends itself to generalization. 
However, because the authors give very few reasons why underrepresentation should 
be considered problematic, at the end of the book readers are still left wondering why 
reforms are necessary. More seriously, readers might even wonder if the Norris and 
Lovenduski’s indicators at all match with appropriate normative foundations. Norris 
and Lovenduski’s failure to fill the normative/empirical gap with an. adequately 
operationalized definition is a mistake common to many empirical studies of electoral 
democracy.
The lesson to be learned from the above examples is that the way forward 
would seem to lie with tip-to-tail studies of electoral democracy that include 
normative, operationalized and empirical components. Although few have been such 
projects have been undertaken, the UK Democratic Audit Team and Robert Dahl 
present some of the best work to date. In recognizing the difficulty in linking 
normative with empirical and setting their sights on a comprehensive audit of 
democracy in the United Kingdom, the founders of the audit opted for an innovative 
team approach. The amount and quality of the empirical information sets a high bar 
for all future studies of democracy in the UK or elsewhere. However, while some of 
the research is driven by the arguments set forth in the normative section, the links are 
often not strong enough to be convincing and much of the observed data is open to 
broad interpretation. In using a team to conduct a tip-to-tail study of democracy the 
UK Democratic Audit Team has broken new ground. However, in using an 
underspecified definition of democracy and failing to operationalize the definition 
more concretely the authors have repeated some of the same mistakes as their 
predecessors.
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The final study reviewed in this chapter was Robert Dahl’s Democracy and Its 
Critics. The originator of tip-to-tale research on electoral democracy, Dahl’s work is 
perhaps the best offered to date on this subject. While Dahl offers a detailed definition 
of democracy, extensive operationalization of this concept and matching measurement 
methods, some critical flaws exist with the work. These include a definition that does 
not provide a distinct evaluatory rule, a mismatching of concepts during 
operationalization and measurement methods that do not accurately gauge critical 
components of the philosophical premiss. Despite these shortcomings Dahl’s work is 
similar to other studies reviewed in this chapter in that it provides an abundance of 
ideas on which to build.
The purpose of this chapter was to review authors of note in order to discover 
how best to proceed with an analysis of electoral democracy in world cities. At the 
outset it was explained that because electoral democracy contains both empirical and 
normative components, an effective analytical framework must bring these two 
elements together by properly operationalizing the normative definition in order to 
evaluate elections and electoral systems. Thus the framework necessarily stretches 
from the realm of moral philosophy though political philosophy and democratic 
theory to systematic testing of empirical data. It was shown that without attention to 
all of these elements the best definitional efforts become irrelevant as they are 
immeasurable and the most elaborate data is rendered uninterpretable. It was also 
shown that although a few authors have attempted tip-to-tail studies of electoral 
democracy, these studies could be improved. Subsequent chapters adopt elements 
from all of these studies in order to develop and employ a more robust analytical 
framework.
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2 -  PERSISTENT LOSING AND ELECTORAL FAIRNESS
Chapter 1 provided a review of a number of contemporary works concerning electoral 
democracy. The chapter demonstrated that such studies require a tip-to-tail approach 
where well-defined normative premises are clearly operationalized for relevant 
empirical assessment. Not only does this approach provide consistency between 
principles and measures, but it also allows for more convincing interpretations of 
evidence. Problems in studies shown to have used this approach, such as the UK 
Democratic Audit Team and Robert Dahl, demonstrate that even these admirable 
efforts could be improved before they are used to construct a framework by which to 
study electoral democracy in world cities. The aim of Chapter 2 is to provide these 
normative and operationalizing improvements before moving onto measurement in 
later chapters.
Starting with the strongly supported notion that democracy and political 
equality are inextricably linked, this chapter pursues the normative arguments by 
Charles Beitz and Robert Dahl that procedures matter as much or more than outcomes 
in determining whether or not decision-making institutions promote political equality. 
After using the work of Thomas Scanlon, Thomas Nagel and Brian Barry to explore 
this idea in more detail, it is argued that a decision-making process is unfair -  and 
hence undemocratic -  if any who are bound by final policy outcomes can ‘reasonably 
reject’ the rules by which decisions are made. The core phrase of this definition is 
further elaborated by adding a new condition that rejection is only reasonable if it can 
be shown that decision-making processes produce ‘persistent losers’ -  community
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members who are permanently or almost permanently disadvantaged in any stage of 
the decision-making process because of institutionalized discrimination. The second 
half of the chapter operationalizes persistent losing by matching its key components 
with those inherent in electoral processes. Described as a filtration process where 
rules serve to narrow an infinite set of community preferences to a set of elected 
representatives, persistent losing provides the evaluatory rule by which to judge 
preference elimination in the prevoting, voting and postvoting election stages.
2.1 t R e a s o n a b l e  R e j e c t i o n ,  S y s t e m a t i c  D i s a d v a n t a g e  a n d  P e r s i s t e n t  
L o s in g
In the last chapter it was shown that empirical studies of electoral democracy are often 
based, whether explicitly or implicitly, on the notion that evaluations of fairness 
should be based on outcomes. That is, electoral systems should produce outcomes that 
either maximize social welfare or are based on accurate preference aggregation in 
order to reflect the community’s general will. It was also shown that two scholars who 
have written perhaps the most normatively-rich studies of electoral democracy, Beitz 
in Political Equality and Dahl in Democracy and Its Critics, feel that strictly 
outcome-based, consequentialist evaluations inaccurately captures the spirit of the 
core democratic notion of political equality. These authors argue that evaluations of 
elections and electoral systems need to be based on a truer theory of political fairness. 
Beitz and Dahl are not alone in their objections as ‘the goal of most contemporary 
political philosophers is to find a systematic alternative to utilitarianism.’75
Where the Dahlian alternative is somewhat ambiguous, Chapter 1 showed how 
Beitz’s complex proceduralism draws on the work of philosophers often most 
attached to developing an alternative to utilitarianism: John Rawls and Thomas 
Scanlon. Writing in 1989, Charles Beitz did not have the advantage of drawing upon
75 Kymlicka, W. (1990), Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 50.
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later works such as Brian Barry’s Justice as Impartiality, Thomas Nagel’s Equality 
and Partiality, and T.M. Scanlon’s later What We Owe to Each Other, all of which 
fortify the philosophical work underlying the evaluatory rule found in Beitz’s 
Political Equality. The rest of this section explores the writings of these authors who 
support the idea of justice as fairness in order to solidify the normative foundations of 
this study.
2.1.1 Justice as Fairness and Reasonable Rejection
In offering the first ‘systematic alternative to utilitarianism’ in A Theory o f  Justice 
John Rawls asserts that utility maximization is an insufficient rule by which to judge 
whether or not acts respect political equality.76 He instead argues that evaluations 
should focus on how fairly resources are distributed and forwards his idea of ‘justice 
as fairness’ -  an evaluatory rule requiring a resource distribution scheme that allows 
the worst-off to gain most benefit. For Rawls, ‘ [a]ll social and primary goods -  liberty 
and. opportunity, income and wealth and the bases of self-respect -  are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of all or any of these goods is to the
77advantage of the least favoured.’
Using an imaginary setting in which members draw up an agreement or social 
contract by which decisions will be made in their community, Rawls bases his 
argument for justice as fairness on his now famous ‘veil of ignorance’. This 
heuristical tool forces readers to envision what decision-making rules would be 
chosen in the ‘original position’ when community members are oblivious to their own 
and others’ defining characteristics and social positions. As the veil renders everyone 
equal when choosing the rules by which resources are later distributed, Rawls argues 
that under these conditions people would not endorse rules that allow inequitable
76 Kukathas, C. & Pettit, P. (1990), Rawls: A Theory o f  Justice and its Critics, Cambridge: Polity.
77 Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory o f  Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 303.
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distribution of resources because when the veil is lifted they may find themselves 
disadvantaged. For Rawls, the veil ‘ensures that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the 
contingency of social circumstances, and that rules are made to accommodate the 
least advantaged.’ Where, for example, some utilitarians evaluate political equality 
by assessing if the outcomes of a decision-making process produce the ‘best result’ by 
increasing overall utility, Rawls shifts the attention to the rules structuring how 
decisions are made. Thus political equality is not exclusively focussed on outcomes 
but rather built on considerations of fairness during the decision-making process.
A number of theorists have pointed out that while innovative, Rawls’ veil of 
ignorance is cumbersome as it is impossible to render ignorant all members of any 
existing community. Thomas Scanlon agrees with Rawls’ critique of traditional 
utilitarianism and premiss behind justice as fairness, but claims he is able to produce 
an evaluatory rule similar to Rawls’ without using the veil.79 In its place Scanlon 
substitutes a single paragraph explaining when an act is ‘wrong’ and how decision­
making processes should be judged:
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed by any rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.80
This passage indicates that a decision-making process is inequitable and the 
acts it produces wrong if the decision is generated using procedures that could be 
reasonably rejected by a community member motivated by the desire to participate in 
collective decision-making. Here the imaginary veil is replaced by the more practical 
idea that community members can reject rules that are unfair. Scanlon’s idea of
78 Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory o f  Justice, p. 15-18.
79 See Scanlon, T.M. (1982), ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in, Sen, A. & William, B. (eds.), Utilitarianism 
and Beyond, Paris: Cambridge, pp. 103-128. For further elaboration see Scanlon, T.M. (1998), What We Owe to 
Each Other, Cambridge: Belknap.
80 Scanlon, T.M. (1982), ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, p. 110.
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‘reasonable rejection’ not only simplifies Rawls’ explanation of justice as fairness, but 
because, as in life, the involved parties are aware of their identities and interests 
Scanlon has given Rawls’ heuristic argument the practical roots it needs to be 
developed into a general rule by which actual decision-making procedures can be 
evaluated. Scanlon’s work has received support from those who challenge 
utilitarianism as the base principle of justice, including Brian Barry, who states that 
Scanlon’s work is ‘a more effective realization of Rawls’ objectives than his own 
original position could ever be.’81
‘Reasonable rejection’ has been adopted by a number of authors such as Beitz, 
Barry and Thomas Nagel who seek develop an alternative to utilitarianism as the rule 
by which to evaluate decision-making fairness. Scanlon’s own purpose is not so much 
to provide specific ideas about how political institutions should be designed or even 
about justice in the broader sense, but rather to explain morality or, to be more 
specific, the ‘morality of right and wrong’.82 As demonstrated by the earlier review of 
Beitz’s work, further exploration and explanation Scanlon’s key phrase is required 
before the idea can be operationalized and used for practical assessment. Scanlon 
himself endorses this pursuit, suggesting that researchers ‘try to identify and describe 
more clearly what seem to be reasonable grounds for rejecting principles and, by 
doing this, to specify more fully the process of finding principles that no one could 
reasonably rej ect. ’83
In Equality and Partiality Thomas Nagel employs Scanlon’s moral philosophy 
to help devise solutions to political problems. In exploring Scanlon, Nagel adds detail 
to reasonable rejection in stating that ‘[w]hat makes it reasonable for someone to
81 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 67. See also Beitz, C. (1989), 
Political Equality, and Nagel, T. (1991), Equality and Partiality, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
82 Scanlon, T.M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, p. 6.
83 Scanlon, T.M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, p. 246.
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reject a system, and therefore makes it illegitimate, is either that it leaves him too 
badly off by comparison with others,... or that it demands too much of him by way of 
sacrifice of his interest or commitments by comparison with some feasible 
alternative.’84 While not providing a refined rule by which institutions could be 
empirically evaluated, Nagel injects into the discussion the idea of ‘feasible 
alternatives’, meaning that rejection is only reasonable if  a community member would 
be less badly off under some other set of rules. As shown below this idea has 
important consequences for understanding electoral fairness.
The most detailed adaptation of reasonable rejection to the political realm is 
found in Brian Barry’s Justice as Impartiality in which Barry opens the discussion of 
Scanlon’s work by stating that he thinks Scanlon is ‘on to something’ before further 
elaborating on the idea of reasonable rejection. Barry explains that he believes that 
Scanlon is not insisting that each person have a ‘veto on all proposed principles for 
regulating social life,’ but rather that situations are imaginable in which ‘under some 
proposed rule people would suffer burdens that under an alternative feasible rule 
nobody need bear. These people could reasonably reject the first rule because of the 
availability of the second.’ Thus, ‘the rule imposing burdens ought to be disallowed 
because it could be reasonably rejected.’85 Barry moves further, stating that it is 
crucial to establish how fairly community members are treated throughout a decision­
making process, with a process being fair:
84 Nagel, T. (1991), Equality and Partiality, pp. 38-39.
85 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, pp. 69-70. It is worth noting that Barry is not convinced that a 
distinction always be need be made between ‘acceptance and non-rejection’ and feels ‘reasonable agreement’ is 
sometimes more acceptable than ‘reasonable rejection’. However in this study of electoral system rejection is 
retained as community members are not seen to be operating under an existing set of rules that are either accepted 
as is or rejected for being unreasonable.
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.. .to the extent that all those concerned are all informed and have their 
interests and perspectives expressed with equal force and effectiveness. It is 
fair to the extent that what counts as a good agreement does not depend on 
the social identity o f  the person making it. And it is fair to the extent that it 
aims at consensus where possible, and where not possible it treats everybody 
equally (e.g. by giving everybody one vote) .86
These conditions are similar to Beitz’s ‘regulative interests’ as described in
Chapter 1, conditions that were earlier criticized as underspecified. But Barry’s more
than Beitz’s work provides extensive consideration of Scanlon’s core idea of
reasonable rejection. Critically, Barry explains that:
. . . i f  there is one thing that is straightforwardly contradicted by justice as 
impartiality, it is the creation o f  first- and second-class citizens according to 
ethnic identity. For it is manifestly unreasonable to expect those who are 
systematically disadvantaged in this way to accept their inferior status?1
This vital passage offers an important clarification as to how reasonable 
rejection can be used to evaluate political institutions. Barry insists that participation 
in decision-making processes cannot be contingent upon the particular community 
member’s core identity and each must have an equal voice during the proceedings 
regardless of their ancestry, etc. While second-class citizenship can be linked to 
characteristics other than ethnicity such as gender or income, more importantly, it is 
Barry’s connecting ‘systematic disadvantage’ and ‘reasonable rejection’ that a 
provides route by which Scanlon’s theory can be transformed into democratic theory 
and a general evaluatory rule by which to assess electoral democracy.
2.1.2 Systematic Disadvantage and Persistent Losing
For Barry, the rules by which decisions are made can be reasonably rejected if a 
community member’s input into the decision-making process is unfairly curtailed and 
would be less so under alternative institutional arrangements. By adding the idea of 
systematic disadvantage Barry suggests that institutions judgements should be based
86 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, p. 110.
87 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, p. 114. Emphasis added.
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on whether or not their rules and procedures inflict recurring bias on community 
members. Thus it follows that decision-making processes are assessed by examining 
behaviour of community members under a more or less static set of decision-making 
rules. While systematic disadvantage provides the detail needed to advance from 
moral to political philosophy, more explanation is needed to create a democracy 
theory by which elections can be evaluated.
Ironically, a problem that has consistently plagued utilitarianism adds detail to 
Barry’s systematic disadvantage. The core utilitarian decision-making mechanism of 
majority rule has been attacked by some as unjust as majorities often tyrannize 
minorities. That is, enacting the will of a majority may greatly disadvantage or even 
harm the losing minority. Even more serious is the problem of what Tomas Christiano 
and others have deemed persistent minorities -  minorities that are permanently or 
almost permanently denied their will over the long term because they either face a 
unified majority or entrenched discriminatory rules.88 More serious still is the problem 
of long-term minority tyranny -  such as under apartheid in South Africa -  as it is the 
majority of community members whose preferences consistently lose out because of 
systemic bias.
While causing so many troubles for majoritarians, the concepts of majority 
and minority tyranny provide a guide as to how systematic disadvantage can be 
further refined. Taking a step back, it is important to recognize that all collective 
decision making entails reducing a sometimes infinite number of policy possibilities 
to a more finite set of collective decisions, and ultimately, collective actions. Options 
are reduced by employing sets of rules that impose participation costs on community
88 For more on persistent minorities see Christiano, T. (1994), 'Democratic Equality and Persistent Minorities', 
Philosophical Papers, 23:3, pp. 169-90; Hyland, J. (1995), Democratic Theory, Barry, B. (1979) ‘Is Democracy 
Special?’ in Laslett, P. and Fishkin, J. (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Oxford: Basil Blackwell; and, Dahl, 
R. (1989), Democracy and Its Critics.
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members. Such rules might limit the agenda size, impose time limits, or prescribe
roles to certain community members. Thus all community members bear costs when
participating in collective decision-making processes. As no collective decision
process can be cost-free, it would unreasonable for community members to reject a
collective decision-making process simply because costs are imposed. But it seems
entirely reasonable for a community member to reject a decision-making process if
his or her voice is systematically subject to prohibitive or nearly prohibitive
participation costs when less costly alternatives are available.
It is proposed that community members subject to unfair costs over time be
deemed persistent losers. This designation allows the discussion of justice as fairness
to move from the realm of political philosophy to a distinct democratic theory. More
formally, the theory o f  persistent losing asserts:
Community members committed to collective decision-making are 
reasonable in rejecting the rules by which collective decisions are made if  it 
can be shown that they are permanently or almost permanently disadvantaged 
during the decision-making process because o f  institutionalised 
discrimination.
This definition combines the core of Scanlon’s theory with Barry’s 
refinement. What is described here are the conditions by which it can be assessed 
whether or not those who are committed to collective action within a specific 
community reasonably reject the processes by which decisions are made. 
Unreasonableness is directly related to systematic disadvantage over the long term 
due to biased rules, with persistent losing providing a general rule by which to judge 
whether or not a decision-making process does or does not promote political equality 
and democracy.
60
2.1.3 Understanding Persistent Losing
Undoubtedly questions will arise as to whether or not the theory of persistent losing is 
an appropriate rule by which to assess decision-making, and ultimately electoral, 
fairness. Some readers might ask, for example, whether reasonable rejection could be 
understood in a different way. Others may raise more practical issues such as whether 
or not this rule applies to groups or individuals, how many times someone might lose 
before their rejections are reasonable, if claims made by persistent losers are tied to 
economic or other types of disadvantage, if rejection requires subjective or objective 
evidence or what it means to reject a decision-making process. These questions are 
addressed below in addition to thoughts about how the theory of persistent losing 
relates to other major theories of democracy. In addition to the discussion below, the 
new theory’s effectiveness is demonstrated in later chapters when used to evaluate 
actual electoral systems.
As shown earlier, Scanlon suggests that the major challenge of his idea is to 
describe and test a number of possible reasons why rules might be rejected. Thus it is 
conceivable that reasonable rejection could be attached to evaluatory rules other than 
persistent losing. But where equating reasonable rejection with persistent losing might 
not be the only way to interpret Scanlon’s key phrase, it would seem to be an 
acceptable link especially in light of arguments put forward by Nagel and Barry. 
Persistent losing certainly makes more use of reasonable rejection than Beitz’s 
complex proceduralism which the author admits leaves 4 so much to be worked out by 
moral reasoning of the ordinary kind’. In referring the only existing empirically-aimed 
application of Scanlon’s take on contractualist theory, Beitz states that complex 
proceduralism might be seen ‘not to contribute anything on its own’ because his 
proposed regulative interests, not contractualism, does almost all the normative work
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in his theory.89 Thus while persistent losing might not be the only way to more fully 
explain when rejection is reasonable, it would seem to be the most fully developed 
practical interpretation of Scanlon’s idea to date and follows the course set forth by a 
number of prominent political philosophers.
Perhaps the most important practical consideration relating to persistent losing 
pertains to the base unit of analysis. According to Scanlon’s definition, it is 
individuals who reject unreasonable rules. But it may not be necessary to reduce every 
investigation of persistent losing to the individual level. Consider laws that 
discriminate against a single person. If it is explicitly stated that Sally Jones must take 
a literacy test before she is allowed to register to vote, than here rejection would be 
reasonable as this rule clearly impose higher participation costs her and no one else in 
her community. However such laws are rarely, if  ever, enacted. Instead, the vast 
majority of actual procedural laws affect a number people with similar characteristics. 
For example, statutes stating that women cannot vote not only affect particular 
individuals, but also a whole category of people. At its core this study holds that 
individuals hold the right to reject a rule or system, but persistent losing can be 
identified by investigating how laws affect community members of similar character.
Extending the unit of analysis from individuals to groups raises some 
additional considerations. Analysis based on individuals means that the period of time 
for which assessment would take place is be limited to no longer than that person’s 
lifetime. The situation changes with groups. Not only can a group outlive the 
individuals contained therein, but the membership of certain types of groups can also 
shift. For example, how women or minorities fare during elections could be traced for 
over a century in some countries, longer than the lifetime of the average member.
89 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 106.
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Group membership can also change during the course of a lifetime, say, as children 
grow into adults. The non-discrete nature of groups raises challenges for measurement 
as the composition all groups can change over time, sometimes to a significant 
degree. Perhaps the best way to overcome this challenge is to at initially assess well- 
established groups whose membership changes extremely rarely such as women, and 
various ethnicities and races. Analysis may be extended geographically based groups 
whose membership changes, but often infrequently or gradually over time. Groups 
eluding evaluation under the theory of persistent losing will be those that only form 
for a short time. These might include single-issue groups such as those protesting a 
particular piece of government legislation or policy. For members of these groups, 
whether or not a process is or is not fair will have to be judged on the basis other 
aspects of their persona fare through the process over the long term.
Readers might also raise the broad empirical question as to how many times 
losing might occur before disadvantage is considered ‘persistent’. As it is institutional 
effects that are being scrutinized, it would appear that a number of instances of 
discrimination be identified before the claim is made. In other words, as it is patterns 
of bias that are being sought, more than one instance need be identified. It is 
impossible to establish a pattern based on a single observation, and even adding one 
additional observation usually will not usually reveal whether the first is an anomaly 
or part of a larger trend. Thus, for a pattern to be established at least three instances of 
losing need be identified before a rule can be reasonably rejected as discriminatory, 
although more observations would more fully substantiate the claim.90 This more 
technical interpretation as to when patterns of losing legitimates reasonable rejection 
moves required evidence from subjective objections to possible unfairness to more
90 For a more detailed discussion of how many cases are enough see King, G. et al (1994), Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp.213-16.
objective measurement of such occurrences. That persistent losing can be detected by 
finding three or more instances where a procedural rule imposes unequal participation 
costs not only allows for a party other than potential persistent losers to judge the 
fairness of a decision-making process and speak out for change, it also allows those 
who are subject to the discriminatory rule to make a stronger case for its removal. 
Thus, what needs to be observed to establish losing persistent are instances where a 
static set of rules impose higher participation costs on one individual or group more 
than another. These costs, that might include efforts or resource expenditure, are 
defined more explicitly later in the chapter.
The above clarification also partially illuminates whether persistent losing 
needs to be tied to economic or other types of disadvantage to be valid. Returning to 
Scanlon, the purpose of introducing reasonable rejection is to make Rawls’ justice as 
fairness more practical by eliminating the veil of ignorance. Thus a groups’ current 
economic or political standing can, but does not have to be the starting point of any 
investigation of persistent losing as those who are worst off or oppressed are the most 
likely to be disadvantaged by the process by which decisions are made. It would also 
be totally valid for an individual not of immediately apparent economic or political 
disadvantage to test whether his or her participation is made more difficult than others 
in the community, although they may not as apt to do so as those suffering economic 
or other hardship.
It is possible to imagine a scenario where no matter how equally their voices 
are considered or how fairly participation costs are levied, some community members 
are consistently and obviously on the losing end of resource and rights distribution. 
As Brian Barry states, ‘[n]o constitution can prevent a majority coalition hell-bent on
64
oppressing the other citizens from attempting to do so.’91 Thus it is possible that
perfect procedural justice will not result in perfect distributive justice, a tension to
which reasonable rejection provides relief. Situations in which a specific community
groups have been systematically disadvantaged in terms of outcome can simply be
seen to undermine the desire the disadvantaged to live with those who are
discriminating. If this is indeed the case, then one of Scanlon’s key definitional
components has been violated and the dissatisfied must then decide between living
with the existing distribution or leaving the original group to form a community with
different preference patterns, but the choice remains in the hands of the
disadvantaged. Despite this example of outcome based considerations, the key to
persistent losing still lies in the way in which decisions are made, not the outcomes:
Justice, as the old saw has it, must not only be done but be seen to be done.
And that means that the decision must be arrived at fairly. Even i f  the 
decision itself is perfectly just, it is still tainted i f  the method by which it was 
arrived at was unfair...From an appropriate constituted original position then, 
fair procedures would be endorsed not only because o f  their tendency to bring 
about fair decisions but also because, where the justice o f  the decision is 
disputable (as may well quite often be the case), the fairness o f  the process 
leading to the decision will make it more acceptable.92
Finally, if persistent losing is shown to exist, and those suffering higher 
participation costs deemed reasonable in their objections, what does ‘rejection’ entail? 
In the first instance, this condition provides the moral ground for the persistent loser 
to formally call for the abolition of the offending rule through extra-electoral 
participation mechanisms such as committees, commissions, or court if these avenues 
are available. If this call is not heeded or no extra-electoral mechanisms exist by 
which such concerns can be raised, then public protest would seem the next step -  
although it is difficult to say, for example, if violent protest or terrorism would be 
justified. These more extreme actions would seem to indicate that the community has
91 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, p.102.
92 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, p .l 11.
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collapsed and Scanlon’s condition of ‘general agreement’ has been broken. But 
extreme forms of protest may still be justified if, as explained above, persistent losing 
was also tied to extreme coercion, resource deprivation or physical harm.
The above issues will become clearer when the theory of persistent losing is 
applied empirically. Before doing so, it is worthwhile explaining how it stands in 
relation to the work of other democratic theorists, especially those in the wake of what 
John Dryzek calls ‘a deliberative turn.’93 Because persistent losing is built on the work 
of authors offering an alternative to utilitarianism, there is little doubt that it stands in 
opposition to those who embrace this concept. But as shown earlier, some prominent 
democratic theorists such as Robert Dahl and Charles Beitz reject utilitarianism as the 
primary theory underpinning democracy such authors would perhaps endorse 
persistent losing or at least some facet of the idea. It is more difficult to gauge what 
deliberative democrats -  those asserting that decision-making processes only gain 
legitimacy to the degree which ‘democratic control is engaged through 
communication that encourages reflection upon preferences without coercion...’ -  
might say about persistent losing.94 The element of non-coercion has a ring similar to 
that of Scanlon, as does the belief of deliberative democrats like Jon Elster who argue
93 Dryzek, J. (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics and Contestations, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. v. See also, Bessette, J.M. (1980), ‘Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in 
Republican Government’, in Goldwin. R.A. and Schambra, W.A. (eds.) (1982), How Democratic is the 
Constitution?, Washington: AEI; Muir, Jr., W.K. (1982), Legislature: California’s School for Politics, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press; Bessette, J.M. (1994), The Mild Voice o f  Reason: Deliberative Democracy and 
American Government, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Elster, J. (1998), ‘Deliberation and Constitution 
Making’, in Elster, J. (ed.) (1998), Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Fishkin, 
J.A. (1991), Democracy and Deliberation, New Haven: Yale University Press; Gutmann, A. & Thompson, D. 
(1996), Democracy and Disagreement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Page, B.I. (1996), Who 
Deliberates?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Mansbridge, J. (1999), ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative 
System’ in Macedo, S. (ed.) (1997), Deliberative Politics, New York: Oxford University Press; Bohman, J. & 
Rehg, W. (eds.) (1997), Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge: MIT Press; and, 
Benhabib, S. (ed.) (1996), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
94 Dryzek, J. (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, p. 8.
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that democracy cannot be limited to mere preference aggregation as ‘the task of 
politics is not only to eliminate inefficiency, but also to create justice’.95
But it would be a mistake to try and generalize too much about the 
connections between deliberative democracy and persistent losing as there is 
considerable disagreement among deliberative democrats about how non-coercive 
discourse might be best facilitated. Whether, for example, deliberation should take 
place within traditional state institutions -  such as legislatures, courts, constitutional 
conventions and political parties -  or extra-state lobby groups competing in civil 
society.96 Some fully reject ‘the assimilation of deliberative democracy to liberal 
constitutionalism’ because ‘ [i]f we give up on the pursuit of more authentic 
democracy, then democracy itself is impoverished. The deliberative turn promised to 
bring new energy to democratic development, and especially to the pursuit of 
democratic authenticity. If indeed it is accommodating itself too comfortably to the 
existing liberal state, the promise is not being fulfilled.’97
However persistent losing would seem to be compatible with the ideas of most 
deliberative democrats as it is used to assess rules that structure any type of decision­
making process, which would presumably include those within or outside of the state. 
Whatever the goal or good distributed by through a particular process, all will have 
rules that reduce an infinite set of ideas to a smaller set of agreements. It is how this 
narrowing occurs, and the costs imposed on participation, which is being scrutinized 
for reasonability. As all deliberative processes will have rules, it is conceivable that 
all can be assessed by determining whether some of these rules render participation 
more expensive for some than others.
95 Elster, J. (1986), ‘The Market and the Forum’ in Elster, J. and Aanund, A. (eds.) (1986), The Foundations o f  
Social Choice Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
96 Klosko, G. (2000), Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 238-9.
97 Dryzek, J. (2000), Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, pp.27-29.
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2.2 -  O per a tio n a l iz in g  P e r siste n t  L osing
Chapter 1 explained that a concise definition, operationalized for measurement, is 
required for any complete study of electoral democracy. Operationalization requires 
matching key components of the normative definition with conditions characteristics 
of the empirical subject -  in this case elections and electoral systems. As described in 
the last section, the theory of persistent losing provides the core definition upon which 
rests this study of electoral democracy in world cities. As persistent losing is an 
original evaluatory rule, no existing studies can suggest how this normative concept 
can be made more conducive to empirical measures. This section outlines the 
structure of decision-making in large communities then offers a step-by-step 
explanation of how persistent losing can be empirically identified in any election 
stage. A summary provides the analytical framework used in the empirical chapters.
2.2.1 The Public Policy Process
As mentioned earlier, all political communities use multi-staged processes to reduce a 
finite number of potential collective actions to a more manageable set. Large political 
communities rely on a smaller group of officials to lead the policy process, with 
elections playing a large role in selecting these leaders. Revolving around elections, 
the policy-making process is composed of a number of connected sub-systems: party 
systems, electoral systems and legislative systems. The laws and conventions 
constituting these subsystems are the core factors to consider when determining 
whether the policy making process is or is not fair and democratic.
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F igure 2: Public Policy F orm ation  Process
Eliminated Policy Options
Initial
— ^
Policy ta# Party ^Electoral ^  Legislative C ollective
Option ' System \  System \  System
Set -  -
Eliminated Policy Options
As illustrated in Figure 2, through the party system a potentially unlimited 
number of policies and enormous number of candidates are narrowed to a more 
manageable set and presented to the public for consideration. Through the electoral 
system the set of candidates is narrowed to a smaller set of elected members. Finally, 
through the legislative system the demands o f elected members are narrowed and 
specific policy decisions are executed. All systems are important to the policy process 
and all inextricably linked as candidates represent policies during elections and 
elected members make up the coalitions that decide policy in legislative settings. Thus 
where an assessment of electoral fairness must obviously include an evaluation of 
electoral systems, as there is clear overlap between a party system and electoral 
systems and an electoral system and legislative systems some aspects of these systems 
must also be included.
Where one subsystem begins and another ends is the subject of debate within 
the academic community. While some limit the electoral system to include only 
considerations of formulae that convert votes to seats, noted election specialist Gary 
Cox claims that electoral systems are wider set of Taws and rules that regulate 
electoral competition between and within parties.’98 In acknowledging that electoral 
systems are more than just the formulae that convert votes to seats, Cox at least
Cox, G. (1997), Making Votes Count, p. 38.
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partially dips into the party system domain. Richard Katz stresses that electoral, 
systems are more than just formal laws ‘in that some aspects of the economy, culture, 
and social structure of a society bear directly on the real meaning of formal election 
provisions and so must be included in any complete description of electoral 
systems.’99 Following Cox and Katz’s lead, as the party system forms at least part of 
the platform on which other election institutions stand, it should be part of any 
comprehensive study of electoral fairness. In addition, what parties do or do not do, 
regardless of whether or not they are currently subject to state regulation, should be at 
least considered in any review of electoral fairness.
There is often an overlap between electoral systems and legislative systems -  
especially those with a tradition of consociational executives where coalition building 
is an important part of the post-electoral policy process.100 How legislative majorities 
are manufactured and maintained are critical factors to understand when attempting to 
discover what policies make it onto legislative agendas and are later passed into law. 
However, as with all academic projects limits have to be set, and this study does not 
examine elections beyond the point when votes are counted and seats distributed. 
These limits should no way imply that the theory of persistent losing is inapplicable to 
this segment of the policy making process, but rather that any proper investigation 
would require a separate study of its own as coalition building is so complex. In sum, 
this study considers electoral systems from the point where candidates come forward 
to when votes are translated into seats.
2.2.2 Election Stages
As shown in the last chapter, both Beitz and Dahl argue that like the policy process, 
electoral systems are also multi-staged. The most elaborate discussions of the
99 Katz, R. (1997), Democracy and Elections, p. 108. Emphasis the original.
100 For a discussion of consociational democracy see Lijphart, A. (1999), Patterns o f  Democracy.
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electoral system stages is offered by Robert Dahl throughout the body of his work. 
Appearing first in A Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl explains that ideal decision­
making can be broken into four distinct stages -  voting, prevoting, postvoting, and 
interelection:
During the voting period:
(1) Every member of the organisation performs the acts we assume to constitute an expression of 
preference among the scheduled alternatives, e.g., voting.
(2) In tabulating these expressions (votes), the weight assigned to the choice o f each individual is 
identical.
(3) The alternative with the greatest number of votes is declared the winning choice.
During the prevoting period:
(4) Any member who perceives a set of alternatives, at least one of which he regards as preferable to 
any of the alternatives presently scheduled, can insert his preferred altemative(s) among those 
scheduled for voting.
(5) All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives.
During the postvoting period:
(6) Alternatives (leaders or policies) with the greatest number of votes displace any alternatives 
(leaders or policies) with fewer votes.
(7) The orders of elected officials are executed
During the interelection period:
(8a) Either all interelection decisions are subordinate or executory to those arrived at during the 
election stage, i.e., elections are in a sense controlling 
(8b) Or new decisions during the interelection period are governed by the preceding seven 
conditions, operating, however, under rather different institutional circumstances 
(8c) Or both.101
When coupled with the above definition of electoral systems, Dahl’s elaborate 
description can be somewhat simplified to make empirical investigations more 
manageable. In keeping with the spirit of Dahl’s more elaborate outline, elections can 
be more concisely described as a three stage preference elimination process. In the (1) 
prevoting stage options are offered to the political community; in the (2) voting stage 
community members choose between available options and indicate their 
preference(s); and, in the postvoting stage preference selections are translated into 
outcomes.
101 Dahl, R. (1965), Preface to Democratic Theory, pp. 67-84.
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F igure 3: E lections as P reference F ilters
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As shown in Figure 3, each election stage contains sets of rules that constrain 
the behaviour o f participants in order to filter down a large number o f potential 
candidates and their respective policies to a smaller set of elected legislative 
members. In the prevoting stage the number o f candidates running for office is 
narrowed by rules that structure who may enter electoral contests and under what 
conditions. These rules include who is allowed to run for office, costs associated with 
candidacy and candidate endorsement processes by political parties. Voting stage 
rules include those structuring voting registration, distribution of information during 
elections, ballot structure and ballot box location, where postvoting rules mainly 
pertain to the electoral formula that directs how votes are translated into seats. These 
rules by which preferences are eliminated during elections form the focal point for 
any investigation of electoral fairness. As explained below, those rules that produce 
persistent losing can be challenged as violating the core democratic value of political 
equality and are open to rejection by those finding themselves at disadvantage.
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2.2.3 Identifying Persistent Losers
Operationalizing a theory of democracy for empirical study requires that normative 
principles be matched to the characteristics of the subject of study. To do so, a generic 
process by which persistent losing can be identified during any decision making 
process is offered before moving to customize this process for each of the three 
electoral stages described above. Specific measurement techniques are provided in 
later chapters.
Figure 4: Identifying Persistent Losers
Demands for change justified
Step 3 -  Causes of Persistent Absence
Question: Is the persistent absence caused by institutionalized discrimination?
Step 4 -  Alternative Arrangements
Question: Do less discriminatory institutions exist?
Step 2 -  Group Specific Analysis
Question: Is the persistent absence concentrated?
Step 1 - Overall Performance Evaluation
Question: Is there a possibility of persistent absence?
Figure 4 offers a four step process by which to identify persistent losers in any 
collective decision-making process. In evaluating a system’s overall performance 
during one of the three decision-making stages, Step 1 asks if there is any possibility 
of persistent absence. That is, is there evidence that a large proportion of the 
community is absent from the decision making process over the long term. This step 
is necessary because if  very few community members are absent then there is almost 
no chance that persistent absence will be concentrated among a particular group. If a
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large proportion of the community is found be absent, Step 2 seeks to identify 
whether persistent absence is randomly distributed or concentrated within a particular 
community group. If persistent absence is found to be concentrated, Step 3 asks if 
higher-participation costs are imposed on the persistently absent group. If so, superior 
institutional arrangements have to be identified in Step 4 before rejection of these 
discriminatory rules can be deemed reasonable.
A simple example may help add flesh out this skeletal framework. In this 
imaginary scenario a group of ten people commit to pool their money and use the 
same method of decision-making to decide where they will eat dinner over a number 
of weeks. In deciding whether the group has made their decisions democratically, the 
theory of persistent losing does not help determine whether utility has been 
maximised within the group, but rather if any of the diners can reasonably reject the 
rules that structure how they make their choices. The example is fleshed out below 
through an investigation of agenda setting during what has been identified above as 
the prevoting stage.
As the group has decided to eat together -  their monetary contribution 
signifying a commitment to collective action -  Step 1 demands investigation of the 
possibility of persistent absence when the collective initially compiles their list of 
possible restaurants. That is, evidence is sought to determine the overall participatory 
health during this stage of the decision-making process. If, say, only two venue 
suggestions are made on a particular evening, it is possible that 80 percent of the 
members have not had their preferences entered onto the list of possible choices. 
However this single instance of absence does not indicate the process is flawed, but 
only that the voice of some community members have been absent during the agenda- 
setting stage of a single decision.
74
Therefore before moving to Step 2 the investigation must be extended to three 
or more meetings as absence must be shown to be persistent. If during an 
investigation of the dining meetings the above pattern where eight of ten members are 
always silent is thrice repeated, then in the best-case scenario only six people (two 
people each week for three weeks) will have their suggestions entered on the agenda -  
leaving four who are permanently absent from this stage of the group’s decision­
making process. If, for example, nine or ten option were included each time options 
were presented then absence would not be persistent and investigations of procedural 
fairness in the prevoting stage could cease. In the worst-case scenario where the same 
two people make the suggestions every week, eight people are permanent absentees 
and the investigation would continue. Persistent absence does not on its own justify 
that.decision-making rules be changed, but rather indicates that further evaluation is 
required.
More-or-less random absence does not violate the general evaluatory rule of 
persistent losing. As such, Step 2 involves testing whether persistent absence is 
concentrated among a particular group. Imagining the worst-case scenario where the 
same two people suggest the venues for the dining collective -  meaning eight of the 
ten members never have their preferences considered -  indicates that the persistent 
absence is concentrated among the eight silent members. The result does not 
automatically suggest that the rules by which the collective decisions are made need 
to be changed as absence must be due to discriminatory rules. For example the eight 
absent members could be satisfied with the choices offered because the two dictators 
are gourmet chefs. However, acquiescence to superior knowledge must be confirmed 
and not just taken for granted.
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If the absence is concentrated, Step 3 assesses if the concentrated persistent 
absence is caused by institutionalised discrimination. In other words, this step 
examines whether identifiable disincentives to participation are imposed on the group 
of absentees. The idea here is that if the rules that frame the process raise participation 
costs to such a level that some struggle more than others to put forward their preferred 
options then rules have been identified that can be challenged as discriminatory and, 
hence, unreasonable. Returning to the example, if the eight members are silent 
because they defer to the expertise two gourmet chefs then the concentrated persistent 
absence is not caused by institutionalised discrimination but rather by deferment to 
expertise. In this case the system is not to blame and persistent losing is ruled out. 
However, if, the eight absentees do not enter alternative suggestions onto the 
collective’s agenda because, say, two fund-holders schedule meetings at a time when 
the voiceless members are unavailable, then the claim of persistent losing becomes 
more substantiated. In this scenario institutions are discriminatory as participation 
costs are unfairly higher for the eight than the two.
Step 4 demands that less discriminatory rules be identified before persistent 
absentees are declared persistent losers. Returning to the dining example one final 
time, there are many fairer methods by which restaurant suggestions could be made. 
For example, meetings could be held at a more accommodating time. If the money 
holding members refuse to institute a less discriminatory agenda setting process those 
whose preferences who are persistently absent from the agenda are reasonable in 
rejecting the process by which collective decisions are being made and the process 
can be declared to violate the principles of political equality and democracy. Whether 
the other stages of the dinner club decision-making process -  i.e. voting and 
postvoting stage -  are also unfair requires separate investigation, but all three stages
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must be free of persistent losing in order for the process to be considered fully fair and 
democratic.
2.3 -  U n d e r st a n d in g  H o w  to  A ssess  E le c t o r a l  F a ir n e ss  
The last two sections provided a detailed explanation of the normative premiss used in 
this study and linked the idea four steps by which to identify persistent losing to three 
election stages. This section adds detail to the operationalized definition in 
preparation for measurement. Although the last section portrayed the preference 
filtering process as a more-or-less linear nature, empirical investigation does not have 
to follow this path. For an electoral system to be considered fair, institutionalized 
discrimination must be absent from each of the three election stages. But during the 
process of investigation, each stage is first evaluated in isolation. As such, it makes no 
difference as to what stage the investigation begins or ends. Assessment can centre on 
a single stage, on all stages chronological or on all stages in whatever order is deemed 
easiest for empirical reasons.
As described above, during the prevoting stage members of the community 
present themselves as candidates for office. As these candidates personify various 
policy options, it is through them that the agenda for the election is set. Thus it is with 
great care that the rules that limit their entry into election campaign must be 
scrutinized. As shown in Norris and Lovenduski’s study reviewed in Chapter 1, of 
particular importance is the role played by political parties. How these organizations 
recruit, select, place and support candidates can critically impact what policy options 
are presented to the electorate. So not only do the state-based rules outlining what 
procedures must be followed during elections matter, so do the unregulated processes 
and procedures adopted by political parties. A proper assessment of electoral fairness 
will take into account the effect of rules in both settings.
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In using the four steps to evaluate persistent losing during the prevoting stage, 
Step 1 requires investigating whether the candidates coming forward reflect the 
overall composition of the community. If, for example, candidates are mostly male, 
white or of high income in a more diverse community, then the persistent absence is 
possible. Step 2 investigations centre on whether or not, for example, women or 
minority groups are under-represented among those securing candidacies. If persistent 
absence is found to be concentrated, then participation costs are assessed in Step 3. If 
barriers to participation biased against the persistent minority are identified, Step 4 
asks whether or less discriminatory rules exist. If all four steps are answered in the 
affirmative then the process by which candidates are selected can be rejected by those 
facing discrimination
Candidates cross into the voting stage as soon as their candidacies become 
official. Rules include those that determine access to the election marketplace by both 
candidates and voters. Not only do the rules control how information about candidates 
and their chosen policies is transferred to potential supporters, but also who is allowed 
to vote and how they do so. Both voting stage aspects require assessment in terms of 
electoral fairness, in that all none must be better-than-another able to promote their 
message or express their preference over the long-term. The theory of persistent 
losing can be applied to either candidates or potential voters during the voting stage. 
Whether or not rule favour certain candidates in terms of how they are able to get 
their message to potential voters, or if accessing the ballot box is more expensive for 
some rather than other community members are possible avenues to pursue. One the 
second possibility, Step 1 would assess overall voter turnout rates to determine if a 
large segment of the population does not vote. Step 2 identifies whether non-voting is 
concentrated among a particular segment of the population. Step 3 three investigates
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whether the participation costs are higher for this persistent absentees than the rest of 
the community. Finally, Step 4 asks whether or not other rules would relive any extra 
burden suffered by persistent absentees.
The main postvoting stage consideration pertains to the formula by which 
votes are translated into seats or how voiced preferences for particular policy options 
are aggregated. Persistent losers are those who suffer consistent disadvantage under a 
particular election formula whether because they are cheated as candidates or as 
voters. Candidates or voters can be cheated if they are individually discriminated 
against, or more commonly if they group to which they belong or support suffers over 
the long-term because of biases inherent in the electoral formula. Again, where no 
electoral formula will perfectly translate voters to seats, the key here is that no group 
consistently suffer more than another during this process. Evaluating persistent losing 
during the postvoting stage is requires investigating how fairly votes are translated 
into seats. Step 1 looks at the overall fairness by assessing, for example, deviation 
from proportionality. If it is discovered that the system significantly distorts how seats 
are distributed, Step 2 requires identifying whether or not this distortion affects one 
set of candidates more than another. If so, then Step 3 requires identifying the cause 
of the biased distortion, which will more than likely be the electoral formula. Step 4 
requires less discriminatory alternatives to be found before the status quo is 
reasonably rejected.
Before concluding the chapter, two issues of a generic nature should be 
mentioned. First, Step 1 investigations of all stages require a set of at least three 
observations in order to establish patterns of behaviour and institutional effect. A 
larger set of observations is helpful in establishing trends, but three is the minimum 
number. Second, it is important to remember that all three election stages are assessed
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by what could be broadly considered the theme of voice. Any electoral rule is only 
fair to the extent that it is unbiased in how it imposes costs upon those presenting or 
selecting policy options regardless of individual circumstances, characteristics or 
ideologies. If unfair costs are shown to exist and possibilities for their removal are 
established, then those subject to the bias are reasonable in rejecting the offending 
rules as the system has rendered their voice is less voluminous than others. As all 
community members are intrinsically equal, so too should be their access to the 
policy-making process.
2 .4  -  S u m m a r y
Chapter 1 demonstrated that the most thorough studies of electoral democracy contain 
robust normative . foundations operationalized to facilitate detailed empirical 
assessment. This chapter has outlined the normative and operationalized details by 
which the remained of this study will proceed. As shown in Figure 5, the concepts 
explained and discussed in Chapter 2 can be attached to the components explained at 
the outset of Chapter 1.
Figure 5: Investigating Electoral Fairness
Normative Operationalization Empirical
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Moral — ► Political — ► Democratic — ► Electoral <—  Electoral — ► Hypotheses — ► Data
Philosophy Philosophy Theory Fairness Theory
T.M. Scanlon’s Brian Barry’s ‘Persistent 3 Stages &
‘Reasonable ‘Systematic Losing’ 4 Steps
Rejection’ Disadvantage’
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, Thomas Scanlon’s idea of what 
constitutes a wrong act provides the moral foundation of which the rest of the study 
sits. Here it was explained that an act is wrong if it was derived through rules that 
could be ‘reasonably rejected’ by any member of the community committed to
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collective action (shown as ‘1’ in Figure 5). The idea of reasonable rejection was 
brought closer to the political realm by discussing the work of a number of political 
philosophers including Charles Beitz, Thomas Nagel, but especially Brian Barry. It is 
Barry’s key idea o f ‘systematic disadvantage’ (2) that facilitated ‘persistent losing’ (3) 
to be developed as the way in which it is determined whether or not a collective 
decision-making process is or is not democratic. A process is unfair if some absent 
community members are subject to higher participation costs than non-absentees over 
the long-term. When combined with characteristics and stages of electoral systems, a 
method by which electoral fairness (4) can be determined. What remains is to use this 
method to test electoral fairness in world cities, a task undertaken in the proceeding 
chapters. Chapter 3 describes the world city cases that will be tested for persistent 
losing. Chapter 4 pursues the four evaluative steps in the postvoting stage, Chapter 5 
does the same in the voting stage and Chapter 6 in the prevoting stage. Chapter 7 
examines the results from a number of different perspective, evaluates the analytical 
framework and offers thoughts for future research.
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3 -  NEW YORK, LONDON AND STOCKHOLM
The first two chapters set out an analytical framework by which to examine electoral 
democracy in any setting. Built on Thomas Scanlon’s reasonable rejection and Brian 
Barry’s systematic disadvantage, the theory of persistent losing provides a general 
rule by which to assess electoral fairness. This new theory was further operationalized 
by breaking the evaluatory rule into a four stage testing process to be conducted in the 
prevoting, voting and postvoting election stages. This chapter describes the cases to 
which the new framework is applied. The first section explains how the normative 
aspects of the analytical framework affect the case selection and why New York, 
London and Stockholm were chosen as cases. The remainder of the chapter provides 
relevant demographic and institutional details for each world city.
3.1 -  C a se  S elec tio n
There are three approaches by which electoral systems have been studied at the 
national level. The first is to rank all possible cases from best to worst according to 
specific criteria. Studies of this nature include Tatu Vanhanen’s Prospects for  
Democracy and Freedom House’s Freedom in the World annual listings. The second 
approach is to select a smaller number of cases for ranking, such as used in Arend 
Lijphart’s Patterns o f  Democracy. Finally, as shown earlier during in the exploration 
of the UK Democratic Audit Team’s work, there is the option of exploring a single 
case. Where comparison may be used to better illuminate the quality of electoral 
democracy within the single case, there is no specific intent to provide an overall 
ranking of all or a sub-set of cases.
82
The framework used to identify persistent losing falls into the third category. 
The first three of four steps outlined in Chapter 2 seek to identify the rules that impose 
higher participation costs on community members shown to persistently absent from 
any of the three election stages. This process takes place within a single case and no 
reference to other cases is necessary. However the fourth step needed to complete the 
claim of persistent losing and make the case for reasonable rejection demands less 
discriminatory rules to be identified, and, as such, is necessarily comparative. So 
while the analytical process used in this study is of an auditory nature, comparison is 
needed to fully realize the evaluation. This is much the approach used by the UK 
Democratic Audit in which the UK was the primary case, although comparisons with 
other countries was sometimes used to show how well or badly the system performs. 
The general implication of the framework is that it is unlikely to generate empirical 
theory that can be generalized. That is, the purpose of this study is not to determine 
whether one set of electoral rules is categorically more fair that another, but rather 
whether disadvantaged community members can call for discriminatory rules to be 
replaced by those that have been shown to be less discriminatory. While there is a 
chance that empirical theory may be realized along the way, it is not core aim of this 
study.
Using an analytical framework designed to evaluate a single case with limited 
comparative requirements implies that almost any world city could be selected. 
However, the theory of persistent losing does impose some additional constraints. 
First, and obviously, the city must actually elect officials, so places like Baghdad or 
Pyongyang would not qualify. Secondly, as the analysis must include at least three 
elections under the same set of rules the electoral system must be stable as significant 
variations in rules undermine a researcher’s ability to track persistent trends. This
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consideration is similar to that made by Arend Lijphart in that he does not evaluate
democracy in a particular country, but rather is discrete electoral systems that he
defines as ‘sets of essentially unchanged election rules under which one or more
successive elections are conducted.’102
Even taking into account these minor conditions still leaves huge range of
large, important cities which to consider. According to the United Nations, in 2000
there were 387 urban agglomerations with a population of over 1 million with that
number set to grow to 554 urban agglomerations by 2015.103 The detail required by the
analytical framework limits the number of cities that could be covered by this study,
but the large number of possible cases does not suggest a natural study set. As such
while the case selection of New York, London and Stockholm is somewhat arbitrary,
it is defensible. As shown later in the sections where each city is described in detail,
New York and London are perhaps the most important urban centres in the world. As
Paul Taylor and Peter Knox state in World Cities in a World System:
Cities such as New York, Tokyo and London are the centres of transnational 
corporate headquarters, of international finance, transnational institutions and 
telecommunications. They are the dominant loci in the contemporary world 
economy, and the influence of a relatively small number of cities within 
world affairs has been a feature of the shift from an international to a more 
global economy which had taken place during the 1970s and 1980s.104
Thus it is worth understanding how decisions are made in these two cities, not 
only because they house large populations, but also set trends which other cities 
follow. The third study city, Stockholm, has not been chosen for its size or even overt 
influence on world affairs, although it has had more impact than one might initially 
suspect. Instead, Stockholm was chosen because it is often seen as one of the more
democratic cities in the world. Thus the city serves as a potential bench mark by
102 Lijphart, A. (1994), Electoral Systems and Party Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pg. 7.
103 Population Division Department o f Economic and Social Affairs United Nations Secretariat (2001), World 
Urbanization Prospects The 2001 Revision Data Tables and Highlights, p. 172.
104 Paul 1. Knox and Peter J. Taylor (eds.) (1995), World Cities in a World System, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, forward.
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which to gauge the New York and London electoral systems. In sum, New York and 
London have been selected because they are big and influential, and Stockholm 
because it has the potential to serve as a high water mark against which these two 
other cities can be measured, although this potential is uncertain and needs to be 
established.
Before moving to describe the details of the four cities the reader should be 
made aware because the basic structure of each system varies there exists an 
opportunity to examine elections for a variety of different posts in each city. For 
example, in New York the study could concentrate on mayors, public advocates, 
comptrollers, city councillors or other elected positions. However to keep 
comparisons consistent local councils are the centrepieces of this investigation. In 
addition, because of the multi-layers of government found in some cities -  such as in 
New York where an individual citizen can find him or herself subject to federal, state, 
county or municipal law (which itself might be broken down further into local council 
and quasi-govemmental regulation), this study focuses on the lowest level unit in each 
urban area (i.e. New York City Council, London Boroughs and Stockholm City 
Council). Institutional details of each city -  including those key to the prevoting 
voting and postvoting election stages -  are provided in the next four sections.
3 .2 - N ew  Y o r k
In the historical collection of urban dwellings, New York City is one of the most 
famous. Spread over an area of 322 square miles, almost 7.5 million people reside in 
the boroughs of Manhattan, the Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island. The 
intellectual and cultural centre of the East Coast, New York plays vital role in the 
economic and social development of the United States. One only need recall the 
catastrophic events of September 11, 2001 to gain an understanding of how the city
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stands on the world stage. In short, New York is the archetypical world city because 
of its size and national and international importance. Anyone vaguely familiar with 
urban politics will be already acquainted with the early history of New York civic 
politics. For some, the mere mention of Tammany Hall still evokes images of 
machine politics and widespread corruption. However, things have moved a long way 
in New York over the last 125 years. This section briefly traces the more recent 
institutional history of New York City government, focusing on changes to the local 
legislative process then moving to discuss the local election process.
Figure 6: New Y o rk ’s Five Boroughs
3.2.1 -  Governance Overview
The New York City Charter outlines the basic governmental structure of New York 
City. As with almost all municipalities, the Charter must conform to state law 
rendering the city a ‘creature’ of the state legislature, although as discussed earlier 
cities such of New York have significant informal power. For example, while fully 
within their jurisdiction, the New York State legislature has not amended the Charter 
since 1960, although the Charter has been locally altered through voter-approved
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initiatives in 1961, 1975, 1983 and 1989. Other than the abolition of the Board of 
Estimate and instatement of campaign election finance legislation in 1989, the past 40 
years has only brought minor changes to the scope and distribution of formal powers. 
Starting with the mayor, these changes are touched upon as they affect the various 
components of New York City government.
Unlike many cities where mayors are merely one member of a larger council, 
the Mayor of New York acts relatively independently of other bodies in a 
‘presidential’ style arrangement. Elected city-wide, the chief power of the mayor is to 
prepare and administer the budget that in 2002 totalled $52 billion.105 The mayor also 
bargains with municipal employee unions and appoints commissioners and board 
members. Although New York had a ‘strong’ mayor before 1961, the charter revision 
of that year added additional power to this position. For example significant control 
over the preparation and administration of the capital and operating budgets from the 
Planning Commission was granted to the mayor, as well as increased power of 
appointment.106
While the mayor has a very significant say over revenue 
collection/expenditure and appointments, other bodies and positions do check these 
powers and there have been numerous struggles for control since the 1960s. For 
example, the city also has a public advocate, a comptroller and a council president and 
each of the five boroughs has an elected president. There are also elected judges, 
district attorneys and school boards. While the powers of all these positions are 
minimal, the public advocate and comptroller are perhaps most worth noting. Filling 
an ombudsman role, the public advocate investigates public complaints about city
105 City of New York, (2003), The City o f  New York Executive Budget: Year 2003 - Budget Summary, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2002a/stafifreducuction.html, p. 37.
106 Brecher, C. & Horton, R. with Cropf, R. & Mead, D.M. (1993), Power Failure: New York City Politics and 
Policy Since 1960, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 50-1.
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services and assesses whether agencies are responsive to the public. The comptroller 
audits and examines all matters relating to city finances and conducts performance 
analysis to ensure governmental efficiency.107 The five borough presidents act as local 
representatives and help prepare the budget.
The most important check on the mayor is New York’s elected legislature -  
the city council. At least on paper, the current 51-member city council would appear 
as a strong counter to the mayor with its power to approve or reject the mayor’s 
budgetary proposals, control over the land-use and various other legislative functions. 
However, this has not always been the case, nor is the council even as a formidable 
check as a reading of the current City Charter may indicate. In fact, city council has 
been characterized as a ‘weak’ legislature in the past and although it has gained 
powers the mayor is still maintains the majority of executive and legislative power.108 
Historically council’s power has been limited. In addition to the mayor’s ability to 
veto measures approved by many of the powers currently held by council were shared 
in New York’s Board of Estimate council until it was abolished in 1989.
Created in 1902, the Board was composed of the mayor, council president, 
comptroller and the five borough presidents and was granted the power to adopt the 
city budgets, make most zoning and planning decisions and approve all city contracts 
over $10,000. According to John Mollenkopf, the Board of Estimate ‘largely eclipsed 
the city council’.109 In 1963, a charter amendment eliminated the Board of Estimate's 
control over a variety of legislative functions and for the first time full legislative 
authority was conferred on the council although the Board of Estimate continued to 
share budget-making power with mayor. In 1989 the US Supreme Court ruled that the
107 City of New York, (1998), The 1998-99 Green Book, New York: City of New York, pp. 20-3.
108 Brecher et al, (1993), Power Failure, p. 54.
109 Mollenkopf, J.H. (1992), A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall o f  the Koch Coalition in New York City 
Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 72.
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Board of Estimate violated the one-man, one-vote principle and abolition of the Board 
of Estimate was approved by popular referendum. The council then assumed many of 
its duties including land use and budget approval.110 The abolition of the Board of 
Estimate shows a gradual increase in the power of city council, especially since 1989. 
The most important check on the mayor’s executive powers, city council is the main 
venue for local policy debate and, if  New Yorkers are committed to democracy, 
should make decisions according to democratic principles. As elections hold the key 
to who participates in local debates, the process by which candidates are selected is 
discussed in detail below in preparation for empirical study.
3.2.2 -  Election Process
The prevoting stage of the New York City Council election races mainly pertains to 
the selection of candidates. To appear on the ballot candidates must be officially 
nominated, but affiliation with a political party is not necessary. Independent 
candidates are required to collect 2700 signatures that can be signed by any registered 
voter living within the appropriate district provided he or she has not already done so 
on behalf of another candidate. However the normal route for most candidates is to 
seek support for a recognized party. Parties must have governing committees, but with 
the exception of some broad guidelines they are free to conduct their affairs as they 
wish.111 Candidates who seek support of a party need 900 signatures from enrolled 
party members. If two or more candidates in the same district manage to gain the 
required number of signatures from members of the same party, a primary election is 
conducted.112 Although party organisations have weakened over the last few decades, 
because they control access to the ballot they can still play an important role in
110 Mollenkopf, J.H. (\992),A  Phoenix in the Ashes, 1992, p. 72.
111 State of New York (1998), Election Law, New York: State of New York, pp. 7-14.
112 State of New York, (1998), Election Law, pp.135-141.
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selecting who hold city council seats. According to Esther Fuchs, ‘complex election 
laws and the burdensome task of gathering signatures on nomination petitions have 
assured many party-backed local officials an advantage at the early stages of the 
campaign process. Fuchs doubts whether arcane election laws promote democracy, 
but claims that ‘they are often the last bastion of party influence in elections that are 
increasingly dominated by the media, paid political consultants, and municipal 
employee unions. ’113
The institutions connected to the voting stage of city structure how residents 
are identify which of the available candidates they prefer. In New York, as elsewhere 
in the United States, those wishing to cast a ballot must be registered -  a process that 
is voluntary as opposed to compulsory or even state initiated. All citizens of the 
United States are eligible to register if they are 18 years old by the date of the 
election, have lived at their present New York address for at least 30 days before an 
election, are not in jail or on parole for a felony conviction, and have not claimed the 
right to vote elsewhere. If for some reason the person cannot register, affidavit and 
absentee ballots are available. Those registered are informed by mail of poll locations 
and the voting process is mechanized.
During the voting stage candidates and parties take seriously. the task of 
marketing themselves and their platforms in order to gain votes. For example, in 1997 
$6,938,775 was spent on campaigning by 138 city council candidates -  an average of 
over $50,000 per contestant -  with some candidates spending over $200,000.114 These 
high expenditure levels have prompted election expense reforms that began in mid- 
1980s after incumbent mayor Ed Koch spent over $6 million in the 1985 mayoral
113 Fuchs, E.R. (1992), Mayors and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 234.
114 New York City Campaign Finance Board (1997), 1997 Candidates' Financial Summary, New York: New York 
City Campaign Finance Board.
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election. Three measures have been undertaken to reduce spending: voluntary 
contribution limits, voluntary spending limits and matching funds program. Matching 
funds are used to coax candidates to comply with voluntarily guidelines. According to 
the 2001 guidelines, council candidates who wish to receive matching funds must not 
receive a donation of over $2500 from a single source and no contributions from 
political committees that have not registered with the New York City Campaign 
Finance Board. In addition, a candidate may not spend more than $137,000 on 
election campaigning (and a similar amount on primary races). Finally, to receive 
matching funds the candidate must raise $5000 from 50 or more New York City 
residents. If all these hurdles are cleared, the candidate is eligible for four dollars for 
every dollar raised up to $250 per contributor -  for a maximum in $1,000 in public 
funds per contributor ($250 x 4). For example, a $1000 contribution from a single 
resident is worth $2000 to a candidate -  $1000 for the original contribution plus four 
dollars in matching funds for every dollar up to the first $250 contributed.115
Finally, postvoting stage institutions structure how votes are translated into 
council seats. From 1949 to 1961 New Yorkers elected 25 city councillors through a 
single-member plurality system. In 1961 the City Charter was amended to allow ten 
more councillors to be elected on the basis of plurality from five two-member 
constituencies. Elections for these 10 new positions were held in 1963. According to 
Brecher et al, these positions were created so that a single party could only hold one 
of these two seats in order that there would be a broader representation on council. As 
the institution was notorious for one-party domination, this measure ensured that at 
least five council seats would not be held by Democrats.116
115 New York City Campaign Finance Board (1997), 1997 Candidates’ Financial Summary.
116 Brecher et al, (1993), Power Failure, p. 52.
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Due to reapportionment ruling by order of the Supreme Court, two more 
single-member seats were added for the 1965 election (37 in total). The number of 
councillors elected in single-member ridings was raised to 33 for the 1973 election, 
however the results of this election were overturned as the Supreme Court ruled that 
the constituency boundaries used in 1973 violated the Voting Rights Act. Another set 
of elections was held in 1974 using different district boundaries to elect the 33, single­
member constituency councillors, although those councillors elected in the multi­
member districts in 1973 were not forced to run again. 1981 elections were postponed 
due to further challenges under the Voting Rights Act. When eventually held in 1982, 
35 single-member constituency seats were available. The multi-member seats were 
abolished prior to the 1982 election as they were found to violate the one-person, one- 
vote rule. 51 single-member district councillors were elected in 1991, 1993 and 1997.
3 .3  -  L o n d o n
Because o f its central importance to the fortunes of Britain and the Empire, London 
has always commanded sharp attention from UK central government. Over the years a 
variety of government structures were put in place to allow residents to deal with the 
problems associated with massive urbanization in the capital. Stemming from a 1854 
Royal Commission recommendation that what was then considered London be treated 
not as one giant mass, but as a ‘collection of communities’, 117 the Metropolitan Local 
Management Act 1855 brought with it the first of many two-tier metropolitan 
governance arrangements -  including an overarching Metropolitan Board of Works 
that coordinated decisions made by a variety of more localised authorities. This two- 
tier framework has always been central to debates about how to best govern the 
capital.
117 Boyne, T. (1994), Local Government in Britain, London: Penguin, p.108.
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Figure 7: London Boroughs
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In 1960 the Royal (Herbert) Commission on Local Government recommended 
a two-tier structure that would concentrate as much power as possible in the hands of 
lower-tier, borough councils -  except in the case where they could be better delivered 
by the overarching, upper tier authority. The resulting London Government Act 1963, 
established the Greater London Council (GLC) and merged the plethora o f other local 
parishes to form 32 local borough councils and the Corporation o f London.118 When 
the 100-member GLC began to aggressively collect new responsibilities and 
challenge the authority of the central government Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government abolished the upper-tier body by passing the new Local Government Act 
in 1985. Under new act many of the powers held by the GLC were transferred back to 
the London borough councils, although Thatcher also installed a number of sector 
specific bodies in an effort to control and coordinate local decisions. However almost 
as soon as the GLC was abolished, Thatcher’s (later John Major’s) Labour opposition 
promised to re-establish a regional authority in London, and once again gave
Boyne, (1994), Local Government in Britain, pp. 113-114.
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Londoners a regional voice with the Greater London Authority Act 2000. The new 
Act gives London a directly elected executive mayor and scrutinizing assembly that 
have responsibilities similar to those originally envisioned for the GLC.119
3.3.1 -  Governance Overview
London’s upper-tier levels of government have changed, or even disappeared, over 
the years but since 1964 the lower-level borough governments have remained mainly 
stable in square miles occupied, council size, and basic functions exercised. However, 
borough council powers have varied over the years. For example, London boroughs 
gained land-use planning powers when the GLC was abolished but have since lost 
power over local development with the creation of the GLA. The Conservative’s 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) regulation also restricted the freedom of 
local governments as has budget capping and New Labour’s ‘Best Value’ initiatives 
that significantly limit the discretionary power of councils. In addition, in thinking of 
governing ‘regimes’ -  that is long-lived policy agendas sustained by relatively 
informal coalitions of interests irrespective of institutional boundaries -  approaches to 
governance have often varied both over time and between boroughs.120 Currently 
London borough councils are in charge of functions typical of local governments 
everywhere -  including arts and recreation, art galleries, libraries, environmental 
health control, refuse disposal, rodent control, street cleaning, housing, licensing, 
planning, sewerage, social services, transport and highways, parking and traffic 
regulation. While local councils do not have a free hand in spending and are carefully 
monitored by various central government bodies it is crucial to remember that no 
matter how much central government tries to by-pass local councils, customizing
119 UK Government (1999), Greater London Authority Act, 1999, London: HMSO.
120 For more about London’s regimes see, Dowding, K., Dunleavy, P., King, D., Margetts, H. & Rydin, Y. (1999), 
‘Regime Politics in London Local Government’, Urban Affairs, Vol. 34:4, pp. 515-545. See also, Dowding, K. 
(2001), ‘Explaining Urban Regimes’, International Journal o f  Urban and Regional Affairs, Vol. 25.1, pp. 9-19.
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services and proper enforcement still require some degree of localised democratic 
decision-making.
From an institutional prospective, the decision-making process in a 21st 
Century borough would not be foreign to someone walking into the same town hall 35 
years ago. From 1964 to the present day most borough councils have used a common 
committee-style structure to render decisions, although this structure may soon 
change in some boroughs with the enactment of the Local Government Act 2000 -  an 
act that opens the door to shifting from committees to executive mayors.121 For the 
most part councils rely on a 19 century governance system in which councils 
delegate powers to committees. Almost without exception local councils conduct their 
activities as a council of all members who then delegate powers to sub-committees or 
individual officers. Council-as-a-whole meetings are infrequent so these sub­
committees do the vast majority of work although councils may conduct their work 
using different customs (i.e. monitoring sub-committees more or less vigorously). In a 
strongly partisan system the party that holds the majority or can form part of a 
coalition government generates and executes local policy. As explained in the next 
section, a party that holds the majority position is greatly influenced by the electoral 
system.
3.3.2 -  Election Process
The 32 London Boroughs that exist within the geographic area of Greater London 
were created under the London Government Act 1963, with the first elections held in 
May 1964. Originally held every third May, then extended to every fourth May under 
the Local Government Act, 1972, elections have been held in 1964, 1968, 1971, 1974, 
1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998. Each borough is broken into a number of
121 UK Government (1999), Local Government Act, 1999, London: HMSO.
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wards that can have single or multiple members, with each borough having a total of 
between 50 and 71 council members. From time to time, ward boundaries are redrawn 
by the Local Government Boundary Commission to ensure divisions accurately 
reflect population shifts.
In the prevoting stage those community members wishing to run for office 
must be at least 21 years of age and have lived in their respective borough for a year 
or more. However candidates are not required to secure a deposit to the local 
authority, but instead must produce written support from at least 10 people in the local 
area. In addition, each candidate must appoint an agent to oversee the tightly 
restricted election expenses. While local elections outside of London are sometimes 
non-partisan affairs, borough council elections are firmly dominated by political 
parties. For example, in the 1998 borough elections over 30 parties sponsored 
candidates and none of the 1917 seats were awarded to non-partisan candidates. 
Support from a local party is essential for success.122
Voting stage rules are more inclusive than those found in other cities. Not only 
can British citizens vote in local elections, but also any citizen of the Irish Republic 
and Commonwealth countries who reside in the respective borough. In addition a very 
small minority are directly excluded from registering to vote -  including the insane, 
prisoners and those who have previously violated electoral laws. Residents cannot 
vote unless they are included on the register, but unlike in New York, registration is 
undertaken by the local authority on an annual basis and great care is taken to ensure 
it is as complete and accurate as possible using a combination of postal reminders and 
door-to-door canvasses.123 One study claims that in London registers are between 73
122 London Research Centre (1998), London Borough Council Elections 7 May 1998, London: London Research 
Centre, p.xxii.
123 Railings, C. Thrasher, M., & Downe, J. (1996), Enhancing Local Electoral Turnout: A Guide to Current 
Practice and Future Reform, York: Joseph Rowntree, pp.5-16.
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and 97 percent accurate, and the number of complaints that the Elections Office 
receive on election day are always very small in number.124 Those who are unable to 
physically cast a ballot are allowed to vote by post or by proxy if living outside 
Britain at the time of the election. Election expenditure is tightly controlled during 
borough elections through the Representation o f the People Act. For example, in 1998 
candidates could only spend £205 plus four pence per elector.125
The multi-member wards mean that postvoting stage seat distribution is 
slightly different than the same exercise in single member constituencies. As each 
voter has as many votes as seats are available, in a ward with three seats each voter 
can -  although they are not required to -  cast up to three votes. Seats are then awarded 
by straight plurality system where the top three vote-getters are awarded council seats 
in three-seat wards, the top two vote getters are awarded positions in two-seat wards 
and so on. Clearly the idea here is for a party to win as many seats as possible so that 
they may secure a majority and have their resolutions passed with as little interference 
as possible from the opposition. In the event of non-majority or ‘hung councils’ 
coalitions are formed to pass policy resolutions.
3 .4  -  S t o c k h o l m
With a population of 750,000 Stockholm is much smaller than the two other study 
cities and while the country in which it is situated is not insignificant, Sweden can 
hardly be considered on par with the United States or Britain in terms of global 
power. Other than the fact that elections are conducted using a different system than 
those found in New York and London, some may not consider Stockholm deserving 
of the world city designation. But Stockholm is large - having a population close to
124 For electoral registration accuracy in London see London Borough of Ealing (1995), Committee report on 
Member-led Review o f  Electoral Registration, London: London Borough of Ealing and Railings, C., Thrasher, M., 
& Downe, J. (1996), Enhancing Local Electoral Turnout, p.8.
125 UK Government (1997), Representation o f  the People (Variation o f  Limits o f  Candidates’ Election Expenses) 
Order 1997, London: HMSO.
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one million in a region of 1.8 million inhabitants - and important to the nation in
tliwhich it sits. Having 13 century origins, the City of Stockholm is Sweden’s largest
municipality and contains just over nine percent of the country’s entire labour force.
As one quarter of. these workers take part in the financial sector Stockholm is
considered the country’s financial centre.126 Stockholm also has had a distinct
international impact. While Sweden’s relatively financial or military clout is hardly
noticeable on a global scale, it is with social innovation that Stockholm has caught the
world’s attention. Commenting on the city’s development between 1945 and 1980
Peter Hall states that:
Stockholm deserves its place (as a centre of innovation), not because it was a 
great city seeking to solve the problems of giantism, but because it was a 
small European capital city that -  albeit influenced by examples from other 
European democracies -  set a distinctly different course. Its originality lay in 
this: that its political leaders and its business elite and its bureaucrats, who 
constituted a very coherent group, began in the 1930s to try and create a 
different kind of society, one they called the Middle Way.127
Thus Stockholm’s world impact can be seen then in its position as a social 
democratic city. As the capital of Sweden, the city has long stood a somewhat as a 
Mecca for those looking for alternative to capitalism and unlike other major centres 
included in this study, public participation has always been a critical part of what Hall 
brands an attempt at a ‘social democratic utopia’. Even though the city has somewhat 
shifted away from its earlier economic goals as of late, citizen participation is still an 
integral part of local governance in Stockholm. Stockholm deserves world city 
designation in terms of its importance to Sweden and its international reputation and 
as an innovator in how citizens participate in their own governance.
126 Statistics Stockholm (2001), Stockholm ’01 Data Guide, Stockholm: Statistics Stockholm.
127 Hall, P. (1998), Cities in Civilization, London: Phoenix Giant, p. 843.
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3.4.1 -  Governance Overview
Granted a town Charter in 1250, Stockholm has followed a path similar to other large
tliSwedish municipalities. Overseen by sheriffs and governors until the 19 century, in 
1862 a new series of local government statutes established a city council as the new 
supreme decision-making body for the capital city. Soon after the city council was 
given the right to determine its own affairs and to undertake all activities beneficial to 
the common needs of the inhabitants. Like other large cities around the world, as the
tli20 century progressed the city came under pressure to deliver more and more 
services to a growing population. The city now delivers a wide range of services, 
some of which are mandatory and some of which are voluntary.
In contrast to cities like London, because of its strong constitutional-legal 
foundation and fiscal rights Stockholm City Council has much potential for 
discretionary action.128 As the primary piece of legislation governing the actions of 
local government, the Local Government Act contains little in the way of constraints 
in how local governments conduct their business. This freedom is reflected in taxation 
and expenditure. In Sweden local governments have the power to impose taxes on 
citizens that, in 1993, accounted for 55 percent of the local government expenditure. 
Again in contrast to more centralised systems, only around one-fifth of the council’s 
income comes central government grants.129 However, fiscal tightening has reduced 
this freedom in recent years and some observers claim that local governments have 
lost a significant amount of power.130 In its current structural form, the City of 
Stockholm is one of 26 municipal jurisdictions that make up Stockholm County, a 
region of 24,000 islands that cover 6500 km . An elected body of 149 members, the
128 Montin. S. & Elander, I. (1990) ‘Decentralization and Control: Central-Local Government Relations in 
Sweden’, Policy and Politics, Vol. 18:3, pp. 165-180, p. 29.
129 Haggroth, S. et al. (1993), Swedish Local Government: Traditions and Reforms, Stockholm: Swedish Institute, 
p. 74.
130 Montin. S. & Elander, I. (1990) ‘Decentralization and Control: Central-Local Government Relations in 
Sweden’, p. 47-48.
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county council is responsible for providing health care and public transportation, but 
has only limited input into regional planning in that it carries out surveys and offers 
proposals to municipalities on how land should be used.
The 101-member city council sits twice a month to pass resolutions on 
motions first considered by the city’s district councils, boards and committees. The 
13-member executive board represents all parties based on the proportion of seats 
held by political parties on the city council. The executive board drafts resolutions to 
be considered by the council as well as implements any decisions that the city council 
approves. In order to facilitate coalition building between political parties, the City of 
Stockholm also has council of mayors. A mayor and vice mayors (for a current total 
of eight) are appointed every four years by city council to oversee various 
administrative divisions. The mayor oversees the finance division as well as chairs the 
council of mayors and the executive board. Vice mayors oversee other divisions and 
are shadowed by a number of opposition vice mayors.
In addition to a number of special, city-wide committees that meet to discuss 
issues that affect the city as a whole (some of which can only make recommendations 
while others can make decisions), in 1997 Stockholm created and empowered 24 
(now 18) district councils that are responsible for most of services delivered by the 
city. Headed by a director, each of the decentralized district councils is composed of 
between 11 and 13 members taken from lists proposed by the various political parties 
and then formally appointed by city council. Many activities formerly under direction 
of city council -  including child care, comprehensive schooling, individual and family 
care, recreational and cultural activities, building permits, care for the disabled, 
consumer advice, street maintenance and care for the elderly -  have now been 
devolved to these councils. Now the majority of city expenditure -  61 percent in 1997
1 0 0
-  travels through these district councils, although because allocation is carefully 
controlled by city council and power still rests with this upper-tier body.
F igure 8: C ity  of S tockholm  (D istrict C ouncils B oundaries)
It is hoped that in addition to providing a picture o f how decisions are made in 
Stockholm, this brief summary will have conveyed to the reader the central place 
occupied by the elected city officials in the decision-making process. While unlimited 
power to raise taxes has waned somewhat over the years, Stockholm City Council still 
plays a central role in the lives of local residents. The most recent decentralisation 
reforms highlight the importance public participation holds in Sweden’s overall 
governance process. In fact, the key reason given for these new measures, that is to 
‘strengthen democracy by bringing the decision-making process -  and the decision 
makers -  closer to the inhabitants’, will do nothing to tarnish Stockholm’s reputation 
for seeking high levels of civic involvement.131
131 On this, see the City o f Stockholm web page at www.Stockholm.se.
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3.4.2 -  Election Process
Since 1921 local residents elected 100 members to the Stockholm City Council, until 
the number was increased to 101 in 1970. Elections are held on the same day as those 
at the national and county level and seats are awarded using a proportional 
representation system. With the exception of war years, elections were held every four 
years until 1970 when the period was shortened to three years, then changed back to 
four years in 1994. The National Tax Board is the central election authority. It 
compiles the electoral roles, plans and coordinates elections and is also responsible 
for calculating the distribution of seats between parties. The City of Stockholm also 
has an election committee that appoints electoral officers, ensures polling stations are 
provided, and provides provisional vote counts.132
The proportional representation system means that prevoting stage processes 
are much different than those used in the other three study cities. Council seats are 
divided among six multi-member constituencies, except in 1966, 1970 & 1973 when 
the city was divided into seven constituencies.133 Until 1998 elections were conducted 
using a ‘closed-list system’ where voters could only choose parties and not individual 
candidates and while a candidates’ name would be listed on various ballots to appeal 
to different constituencies, party caucuses ultimately awarded seats. This meant that 
candidates would have to gain the support of a party in order to gain a legislative 
position. While under the new ‘open-list’ system voters can express preferences for 
individual candidates, in order to be selected based on the new open list system an 
individual must gain five percent of his or her party’s votes in one constituency (eight
132 See, Riksskatteverket (1999), Vallagen: Val 99, Stockholm: Riksskatteverket.
133 Correspondence with Svante Renstrom. Elections Committee, Stockholm City Hall, 22 December, 1999.
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percent at the national level) and at least 100 votes. This limit ensures that parties still 
play a critical role in controlling who runs and who succeeds in local elections.134
Voting stage rules are similar to those in other locales. Local councillors were 
elected by land-holders until the early 20 century when the country adopted 
universal suffrage. In 1918 the law was changed to allow all men and women over the 
age of 23 the right to vote in council elections, although the voting age now stands at 
eighteen.135 Since 1976, non-citizens have been entitled to vote and to be elected to 
local councils provided as long as they are registered as residents at least three years 
before the election.136 Proxy voting is allowed and postal voting is widely used with 
about 35 percent of the participating voters voting through absentee ballots.137
At present there are no restrictions on the amounts political parties may spend 
during an election campaign, however the system is much different than those 
explored in New York, for example, due to the level of state subsidy available to 
parties.138 In the late 1960s, municipalities and county councils began to subsidize seat 
holding political parties so that they could more easily disseminate information to the 
voting public. All parties receive grant of roughly equal size, while those who holding 
a larger number of seats receive extra funds based on the number of seats held.139 
Enacted in 1972, there is no official control on how parties use their funds and as 
amounts are fixed, no accounting or reporting is required. In 1998 local councils 
funded parties a total of SEK500 million (£38.5 million). Put in place to reduce
134 The Riksdag: www.riksdagen.se/english/society/elections.asp.
135 Calmfors, H., Rabinovitz, F. & Alesch, D. (1968), Urban Government for Greater Stockholm, New York: 
Praeger, p. 34. See also, Stockholm City Council Web page.
136 Haggroth, S. et al. (1993), Swedish Local Government: Traditions and Reforms, p. 37.
137 www. aceproj ect. org/main/ engl ish/vc/vcy_se/default.htm
138 Great Britain. Committee on Standards in Public Life (1997), The Funding o f  Political Parties, London: 
HMSO, Appendix!: Survey of Foreign Countries.
139 Haggroth, S. et al. (1993), Swedish Local Government: Traditions and Reforms, p. 93.
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corruption, this funding scheme is sometimes seen to insulate councillors from voters, 
prompting calls for additional reforms.140
In the postvoting stage of national elections seats are distributed using a 
combination of constituency based seats and equalizing or top-up seats. In national 
elections over 90 percent (310) of the seats are awarded to candidates based on their 
standing in multi-member constituencies, with less than 10 percent (39) used to 
ensure that votes are translated into seats as fairly as possible. To win seats in the 
national parliament a party must gain at least four percent of all votes cast in the 
whole country -  unless it has a strong regional base and gains twelve percent or more 
of all votes cast in a single constituency. However for municipal councils, such as 
those in Stockholm, there are no equalization seats, nor is there any threshold for 
participation.141 National and municipal constituency seats are all distributed using the 
Modified Sainte-Lague, or adjusted odd-number method. Based on vote totals in each 
multimember constituency, each party’s vote total is initially divided by 1.4 -  with the 
party with the highest number of votes being awarded the first seat. That party’s vote 
total is then divided by three giving them a new total and the second place party 
(whose vote total is still only divided by 1.4) is awarded the next seat and then their 
vote total is divided by three. The process continues until a party has obtained a 
second seat, then their vote total is divided by five, then seven for their fourth seat and 
so on until all fixed constituency seats have been awarded.142 These rules ensure that 
parties receive roughly the same percentage of legislative seats as votes.
140 Great Britain. Committee on Standards in Public Life (1997), The Funding o f Political Parties, London: 
HMSO, Appendix I: Survey of Foreign Countries.
141 See, Riksskatteverket (1999), Vallagen: Val 99, Stockholm: Riksskatteverket.
142 See, Riksskatteverket (1999), Vallagen: Val 99.
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3.5 -  S u m m a ry
Assessing electoral performance sits at the core of empirical investigation conducted 
in the next three chapters. In evaluating how electoral rules affect the ability of 
community members to participate in the prevoting, voting and postvoting election 
stages it is hoped that it will be possible to confirm or deny the presence or absence of 
persistent losing in New York, London and Stockholm. Where the initial steps of this 
exercise seek to identify concentrated persistent absence caused by institutionalized 
discrimination, these steps can be completed by examining data from a single case. 
However the fourth step -  that requires proof of superior institutional arrangements 
before change is justified -  demands comparison with communities of a similar nature 
but with different institutional arrangements. This chapter has shown that the chosen 
cases are broadly similar in nature as they are large, developed cities of national and 
international importance, but they differ in how local officials are elected. In keeping 
other factors more or less constant but varying the key component under consideration 
it will be possible to draw some conclusions about the effect institutions have on 
electoral performance. Where the main aim of this study is to identify concentrated 
persistent absence due to institutionalized discrimination, the ability to compare cases 
will prove useful when suggesting how electoral performance can be improved.
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4 -  POSTVOTING: REJECTING DISPROPORTIONALITY
For those political scientists for whom evaluating electoral formulae is not a main 
professional pursuit, it is probably at least a hobby. Elections constitute a mainstay of 
the modem discipline, with the process of converting votes to seats being the 
centrepiece of this research. There has been a great deal of empirical discussion about 
how best to assess vote-to-seat translation, but, to follow on arguments made in 
Chapter 1, there is often a disconnect between the normative and empirical 
components of these investigations. A good number of sophisticated techniques have 
been employed to measure how much a formula distorts the translation of votes to 
seats, many of which are directly applicable to this study of elections in world cities. 
On the normative side most empiricists argue that the percentage of seats a party gains 
should be roughly equivalent to the number of votes it receives is standard fare of 
modem political writings. But it is often unclear as to what levels of vote-to-seat 
distortion are acceptable and, more seriously, when a system should be changed. As 
demonstrated by analysing electoral data from local council elections in New York, 
London and Stockholm, the theory of persistent losing provides a more defensible 
reasoning as to why an electoral formula should or should not be changed.
4 .1 -  E v a l u a t in g  E l ec t o r a l  F o r m u la e
The mles in the postvoting stage of election determine the line across which 
contestants must pass in order to win a place in the legislature. The theme by which 
this race is evaluated is critical in determining whether this line is or is not 
democratic. Some authors, such as Taagepera and Shugart, assert that ‘a main
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function of any electoral system is to preserve political stability in the face of 
potentially disruptive or paralysing disagreements on issues’.143 For these writers 
democracy and stability are close to synonymous and a main function of an electoral 
formula is to translate votes into seats in a way that does not dramatically upset the 
balance of power within a particular polity in order to ensure govemability.
Where it is perfectly proper to argue that different electoral systems may or 
may not promote stability, this evaluatory theme reveals nothing about whether the 
system is or is not democratic. As argued in Chapter 1, almost all modem democratic 
theorists maintain that political equality must be the theme by which collective 
decision-making processes, and thus electoral formula, are evaluated. Those holding 
political equality as democracy’s key premiss often appraise electoral formulae 
according to normative theme that falls along traditional utilitarian lines. Following 
Beitz’s ‘best result’ or ‘popular will’ theories that a system violates the principle of 
political equality if the result does not maximize overall welfare of a community or 
the will of the majority is distorted as it passes through the system. As also shown in 
previous chapters, in addition to all the problems pointed out by Dahl and others with 
the concept of traditional utilitarianism, the difficulties associated with measuring 
whether majority preferences are actually distorted in policy outcomes -  that is going 
beyond merely showing that voting preferences are not accurately translated into seats 
-  are difficult if not impossible to overcome. Electoral systems may be constructed so 
that votes are more or less accurately distributed but it would be extremely difficult to 
further establish whether outcomes accurately reflect initial preferences or, indeed, 
actually increase aggregate community welfare.
143 Taagepera, R. & Shugart, M.S. (1989), Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants o f  Electoral Systems, 
New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 63. Emphasis added. Note that the authors’ definition o f ‘electoral system’ 
is much narrower than the one used in this study and corresponds more to what is deemed here as the ‘electoral 
formula’.
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Chapter 2 proposed that persistent losing be substituted for traditional 
utilitarianism as the general rule by which to evaluate democracy as it avoids the 
normative pitfalls while at the same time offering a more operationalizable theory. 
Like past studies of proportionality, persistent losing is evaluated in the postvoting 
stage by assessing vote-to-seat translation and asking if an electoral formula 
demonstrates long-term bias against any particular community group. Unlike those 
following the traditional utilitarian logic, a system is not rejected because it somehow 
distorts how initial preferences are translated into final policies but rather because it 
imposes higher participation costs for some community members and not others. 
Viewing participation costs as the price paid to gain a legislative seat, under 
disproportional systems seats are systematically more expensive for some against 
whom the electoral formula works and thus reasonably rejected by this disadvantaged 
group. This chapter uses the four step process outlined in Chapter 2 to identify 
persistent losing in the postvoting stage of all three case cities.
4.2 -  Id en t ify in g  P e r siste n t  A bsence  in  T hree  W o r ld  C ities
The first step in the process of identifying whether of not postvoting stage 
arrangements can be reasonably rejected because of persistent losing is to check the 
overall participatory health of postvoting stage participation. To do so, participation 
could be examined from a number of perspectives. Determining whether or not votes 
are fairly translated to seats could be based on whether the formula adversely affects 
women or minorities or those based in certain geographic areas. However, the most 
common way of examining this electoral system aspect is from the perspectives of 
political parties and by testing disproportionality or how severely the electoral 
formula distorts the translation of votes to seats.
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A number of authors have devised methods by which to measure 
disproportionality. Starting with Douglas Rae’s index as presented in his 1967 The 
Political Consequences o f  Electoral Laws, authors such as Michael Gallagher, John 
Loosemoore, Victor J. Hanby and Arend Lijphart have all presented different 
variations of Rae’s original idea.144 As Arend Lijphart states, all measures ‘begin by 
noting the differences between the percentages of seats and the percentages of votes 
received by the different parties’, but disagreement arises as to ‘how these seat and 
vote share deviations should be aggregated.’145 Despite these different opinions about 
aggregation, studies by Lijphart and Anckar point out that the results from the 
different measures closely correlate and indices are ‘highly interrelated’.146 Because 
most of similarity of outputs between most of these method, this study uses the 
technique used by UK Democratic Audit which the team claims is ‘the most widely 
used formula for calculating DV’ and that used to generate much of the analysis 
contained in the 1998 Independent (Jenkins) Commission on the Voting System.147 
DV scores express the fraction of elected members who are not entitled to their seats 
in a legislature in terms of their party’s share of the total votes cast within a particular 
political community.148 According to Dunleavy and Margetts, the generated statistic 
provides a measure of a legislatures’ overall representativeness, ‘ranging from zero
144 See Rae, D.W. (1971), The Political Consequences o f  Electoral Laws, New Haven: Yale; Loosemore, J. & 
Hanby, V.J. (1971), ‘The-Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion: Some Analytic Expressions for Electoral 
Systems’, British Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 1, pp.467-77; Gallagher, M. (1991), ‘Proportionality, 
Disproportionality and Electoral Systems’, Electoral Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 38-40; and Dunleavy, P. et al. (1997), 
Making Votes Count: Replaying the 1990s General Elections Under Alternative Electoral Systems, Essex: 
Democratic Audit of the United Kingdom, University of Essex. For a good discussion of the various pitfalls 
associated with each of these measures see Lijphart, A. (1994J, Electoral Systems and Party Systems, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 57-6.
145Lijphart, A. (1994), Electoral Systems, p. 58.
146 Anckar, C. (1997), ‘Determinants of Disproportionality and Wasted Votes’, Electoral Studies, Vol. 16: 4, 
pp.501-515, p. 503. For more evidence of correlation between the measurement measures see Lijphart, A. (1994), 
Electoral Systems, pp. 65-7.
147 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, pg. 56. See also, UK (1998), The (Jenkins) Report o f the 
Independent Commission on the Voting System, London: HMSO.
148 Dunleavy, P. Margetts, H. & Weir, S. (1998), The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain, London: 
Politico’s Publishing, p 10.
109
for perfect proportionality through to a maximum effective score around 50 percent in 
a liberal democracy.’149
Table 1: Deviation from Proportionality (DV) Scores in Three World Cities (1961-1998)
Year New York London Stockholm Year New York London Stockholm
1961 37.1% 1980
1962 3.2% 1981
1963 1982 25.7% 18.8% 5.2%
1964 14.4% 1983
1965 26.7% 1984
1966 4.3% 1985 12.2% 8.7%
1967 1986 12.0%
1968 16.9% 1987
1969 26.2% 1988 5.1%
1970 3.9% 1989 16.6%
1971 12.5% 1990 7.6%
1972 1991 20.2% 9.5%
1973 3.3% 1992
1974 25.1% 15.5% 1993 9.8%
1975 1994 11.6% 6.5%
1976 2.7% 1995
1977 20.2% 1996 6.6%
1978 7.3% 1997 13.1%
1979 4.7% 1998 12.5%
Avg. 21.2% 12.9% 5.3%
Table 1 contains the DV scores for city council elections in New York, 
London and Stockholm since 1961. A quick glance at the average score shows that at
21.2 percent New York has the worst overall record, followed by London and 
Stockholm. Figure 9 shows the data from Table 1 in graphic form in order to more 
clearly demonstrate longitudinal trends. The graph shows that while the New York 
electoral formula generates DV scores close to the 50 percent maximum specified by 
Dunleavy and Margetts, these distortions have declined over the years. In London 
scores have also fluctuated over the four decade study period, climbing to almost 19
149 Dunleavy, P. & Margetts, H. (1993), Disaggregating Indices o f  Democracy: Deviation from Proportionality 
and Relative Reduction in Parties, Paper to the European Consortium for Political Research Panel on ‘Measuring 
Democracy’, University of Leiden, 2-8 April, p. 8. DV is calculated using the following formula:
Where v; = proportion of votes won by party j 
S; = proportion of seats won by party j 
i= 1, n.
1 1 0
percent in 1982, but dipping to 7.3 percent in 1978. While Stockholm has the lowest 
overall average, the city’s DV scores have gradually increased over the years from a 
low of 2.7 percent in 1976 to a high of 9.5 percent in 1991.
Figure 9: D eviation from  P ro p o rtio n a lity  T ren d s in T h ree  W orld  C ities (1961-1998)
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The reader may be curious as to why fluctuation in DV occurs in all three 
cities despite the stability of their overall electoral system. As shown in Table 2, 
variation in Stockholm is mainly caused by the differing number o f parties competing 
in any one election. A quick glance shows that the elections in which competition is 
most fierce generate higher DV scores. For example, the DV in 1962 was 3.2 percent 
when only five parties competed for seats, compared to the 1991 DV score of 9.5 
percent when over nine parties fronted candidates for office. A more sophisticated 
explanation is offered by generating ‘effective number of party’ (ENP) scores that 
represent exactly how many parties are in a system based on their vote support. 
Developed by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera, a score of ‘2’ indicates a two 
party system in which both receive equally strong support from voters. A score o f ‘3’
111
represents a system in which three parties receive an equal number of votes and so
on.150 At 0.7 the Pearson Correlation Coefficient for DV and ENP scores is relatively 
high considering that support for individual parties can dramatically affect the 
relationship of these two statistics. Similar relationships will exist in London and New 
York where high DV scores will generally correlate with either a large number of 
parties with well-dispersed support from the electorate and low DV scores indicating 
the opposite.
T able 2: D istribu tion  of S tockholm  C ity C ouncil Votes (1962-1998)
Year MS C FL K AS V MG S ND Other DV ENP
1962 22.1% 2.1% 23.5% 46.6% 5.7% 3.2% 3.07
1966 22.9% 0.4% 27.7% 1.6% 37.7% 9.7% 4.3% 3.56
1970 16.9% 9.8% 21.0% 1.2% 42.5% 7.0%
...........
1.5% 3.9% 3.73
1973 23.2% 14.0% 11.7% 1.1% 39.4% 8.9% 1.7% 3.3% 3.99
1976 24.9% 11.4% 13.3% 1.0% 39.3% 8.9% 1.3% 2.7% 3.92
1979 29.0% 7.4% 10.3% 1.0% 37.4% 9.7% 4.2% 0.9% 4.7% 3.97
1982 32.2% 6.3% 5.1% 1.1% 39.2% 9.3% 0.6% 5.1% 0.9% 5.2% 3.62
1985 29.4% 2.9% 13.5% 0.9% 35.6% 8.8% 1.9% 5.5% 1.6% 8.7% 4.10
1988 27.5% 4.0% 12.6% 1.5% 34.0% 10.1% 2.4% 6.8% 1.2% 5.1% 4.46
1991 29.2% 3.5% 10.1% 3.8% 29.4% 8.0% 3.9% 4.2% 4.9% 3.0% 9.5% 5.06
1994 28.7% 5.4% 7.9% 2.1% 33.0% 9.2% 7.8% 3.4% 1.0% 1.5% 6.5% 4.61
1998 32.9% 2.1% 7.8% 6.4% 25.6% 12.3% 5.9% 4.4% 2.7% 6.6% 4.86
MS =Moderata Samlingspartiet K = Kristdemokratema
C = Centerpartiet O = Ovriga
FL = Folkpartiet Liberalema S = Stockholmspartiet
AS = Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokratema MG = Miljbpartiet De Grona 
V = Vansterpartiet ND = Ny Demokrati
The purpose for estimating deviation form proportionality is to determine the 
electoral formula fairness. As shown above, DV indicators demonstrate electoral 
efficiency, but interpretation of whether or not fairness has been achieved rests on 
normative judgements. Unfortunately the gap between normative and empirical 
components of most electoral studies renders difficult evaluations of electoral formula
150 For a detailed explanation o f ENP see Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns o f  Democracy, pp.65-9. The formula is:
ENP =
Where Sj = the proportion o f votes o f the i-th party.
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fairness as little exact guidance is provided. For example, in calculating national DV 
scores for Britain the UK Democratic Audit team found that the DV score produced 
by the electoral formula in the 1997 British General Election was 21 percent which 
means that ‘more than one in five MPs in the House of Commons are not entitled to 
their seats...’151 Overall, the DV scores in Britain ‘are amongst the largest on record 
among liberal democracies in the past 25 years. In Western Europe, PR (Proportional 
representation) systems commonly produce DV scores of 4-8 percent -  a level only 
briefly achieved in Britain during the two-party era of the 1950’s.’152 The Audit 
concludes that these DV scores ‘prove both that the electoral system fails to ensure 
that the composition of Parliament reflects voters’ party choices; and that it denies 
people votes of equal value,’ failures which violate two of the audit questions outlined 
in Chapter 1 of this study.153 But, as explained earlier, the reader is mainly left to 
determine for themselves what an appropriate DV score would be and, more 
importantly, precisely why high scores are unacceptable.
This gap between the normative and empirical components of evaluating 
electoral democracy is filled by the theory of persistent losing. Step 1 of the analytical 
framework demands that the possibility of persistent absence need be demonstrated in 
order to move to Step 2. High DV scores do not automatically indicate that a system 
can be judged as unfair, but rather only that further investigation is needed to 
determine whether or absence is concentrated among a particular group, and if  so, 
caused by rules that impose higher participation costs on this groups of absentees than 
would another configuration of rules. Thus, as there is a slight possibility that 
electoral formula punishes one party more than another in Stockholm, and a strong
Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, p. 57.
152 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, p. 58.
153 Weir, S. & Beetham, D. (1999), Political Power, pp.58-9.
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possibility of this effect in New York and London, the study proceeds to Step 2 in all 
three cases.
4.3 -  Id en t ify in g  Pe r sist e n t  L o sing  in  T hree  W o r l d  C ities
This section attempts to discover if persistent absence is concentrated by determining 
if particular parties are disadvantaged over time. Where in the previous section 
comparison was immediately possible, due to the level of detail required for the next 
step of the process, each city is examined on an individual basis. Starting with 
Stockholm, and then moving to New York and London, this section attempts to 
determine if some parties are more disadvantaged than others due to disproportionate 
seat distribution. The key to Step 2 investigations is to determine if one party suffers 
due to disproportionality or whether the distorting effects of the electoral system are 
more or less randomly distributed. In the first case, the process moves to Step 3, in the 
later the electoral system cannot be reasonably rejected and the electoral system 
deemed fair -  at least according to this avenue of investigation.
Step 2 requires determining whether or not an individual party has suffered 
from disproportionality more than others. This too requires measures commonly 
undertaken by those assessing electoral systems. For example, the Jenkins 
Commission makes two references to the effect on the British single-member plurality 
electoral system on parties. First, the Commission cites evidence demonstrating the 
system’s ‘defective’ tendency to under-reward votes cast for third parties. The second 
observation regards the system’s tendency to develop Tong term periods of bias 
against one or other of the two main parties (Conservative and Labour).’154 The 
Commission goes onto state that this effect ‘must be held as a count against the 
system’, and further, ‘[i]t is moreover a bias which could not by definition occur in a
154 UK (1998), The (Jenkins) Report, paragraph 40.
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fully proportional system and which would be reduced by any significant move in that 
direction.’155 The Commission supplies no normative substantiation as to why the 
disproportional effects of the electoral system must be seen as negative, but rather 
connects facts to principles in a mostly intuitive manner. However, as will be shortly 
demonstrated, there are some synergies between the Jenkins assertions and the theory 
of persistent losing. One relates to how the Jenkins Commission has identified ‘long­
term biases’ as problematic. This would seem to nicely tie with the key premiss of 
systematic disadvantage and discrimination over the long term, although these links 
need to be examined in more detail in each city as done below.
4.3.1 -  Stockholm
Stockholm differs greatly from the other two cities as votes are translated into seats 
using a system that was designed to distribute seats proportionally. As shown above, 
there is on average just over only five percent distortion in Stockholm, with almost 95 
percent of city councillors deserving of their seats. But low DV scores do not 
automatically indicate that a system is fair to all parties. Determining postvoting stage 
fairness requires moving beyond aggregate scores and investigating from the 
perspective of all who might reasonably reject the electoral formula.
Table 3 demonstrates electoral formula distortion on a party-by-party basis. 
These figures show how each party has fared during the translation process by 
subtracting seat shares from vote shares. For example, in 1998 Moderata 
Samlingspartiet gained two percent more seats that they deserved, while Centerpartiet 
received two percent fewer seats that its vote share. Calculating vote-to-seat 
discrepancy scores in this manner allows each party to be treated equally as it does 
not allow take in number of votes or seats gained by each party. There is no attempt to
155 UK (1998), The (Jenkins) Report, paragraph 43.
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tell how many, if any, more votes Moderata Samlingspartiet receives than 
Centerpartiet, but only if the seat distribution is fair for all parties.
T able 3: Stockholm  C ity C ouncil V ote-Seat D iscrepancy (1962-1998)
Y ear MS C F L AS......... V KJ..........j O S M G ND
1962 1% -2% 0% 2% -1%
1966 1% 3% -3% 0% 0% -2%
1970 -1% 0% 1% 3% 0% -1% -2%
1973 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% -1% -2%
1976 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% -1%
-1%
-1%
1979 2% -2% 2% 1% 0% -1% -1%
1982 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% -1% -1% -2% -1%
1985 3% -3% 0% 4% 1% -1% -2% -2% -2%
1988 0% 1% 0% 2% 1% -1% -1% 1% -2%
1991 3% -3% 2% 3% 1% -1% -3% -1% -2% 1%
1994 0% 0% 1% 4% 2% -2% -2% -1% 0% -1%
1998 2% -2% 1% 3% 1% 0% 3% -1% 0%
A verage 1% -1% 0% 2% 1% -1% -1% -1% -1% 0%
Negative Distortions 
Average Party Support
1
27%
5
6%
1
14%
0
37%
1
9%
10
2%
9
2%
6
5%
4
4%
1
3%
MS = Moderata Samlingspartiet
C = Centerpartiet
FL = Folkpartiet Liberalerna
AS = Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokraterna
V = V&nsterpartiet
K = Kristdemokratema 
O = Other
S = Stockholmspartiet 
M G = Miljopartiet De GrOna 
ND = Ny Demokrati
The ‘negative distortions’ row totals the number of negative distortions 
experienced by each party over the life of the electoral system. These scores show that 
Kristdemokratema has received less than its fair share of votes in 10 of the 11 city 
council elections between 1966 and 1998. Other parties have received less than their 
fair share on nine of ten occasions, Stockholmspartiet six of the seven most recent 
elections, Centerpartiet in five of 12 elections, Miljopartiet De Grona in four of six, 
where Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokratema has never been shorted seats and the other 
parties in only one instance.
These results convey that Arbetarepartiet-Socialdemokratema is the only party 
that has not suffered under these electoral arrangements and thus their rejection of the 
system would be unreasonable and, in fact, irrational. Although they have experienced
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disadvantage, the parties who have only suffered one negative distortion cannot 
reasonably reject the electoral formula as this negative aspect is not persistent. 
However, that four distinct parties have suffered negative distortions at least thrice 
proves that absence is concentrated among a particular group of community members. 
The three instances establish a pattern of absence and provide enough proof to move 
to the next steps in the process through which persistent losers are identified.
Step 3 requires that persistent absentees be shown to incur higher participation 
costs than those who are absent less than three times. Table 3 confirms the Jenkins 
assertions that electoral formula distortion usually favours large and punishes small 
parties - even in the Stockholm’s highly proportional system. In this city all parties 
receiving average support of nine percent or over are rewarded with undeserved seats 
where those with lower than nine percent winning average receive fewer seats than 
they deserve. Because the electoral system systematically punishes smaller parties and 
these same parties can claim that they are persistently absent due to institutionalized 
discrimination. Step 4 requires proof that less discriminatory institutions exist. As 
explained in Chapter 3, this discrepancy could in fact be addressed by adopting 
measures already existent at the national level. In Swedish national elections 10 
percent of all seats are reserved to ensure parties receive their fair share. Bias against 
smaller parties would be lessened or eradicated if this measure could be adopted at the 
local level.
Small parties contesting elections for Stockholm city council between 1962 
and 1998 are persistent losers because they have been shown to meet the conditions of 
all four stages by which it has been proposed electoral fairness be assessed. As such, 
they could reasonably call for this stage of the electoral system to be changed. But it 
is very possible that they might not do so. As explained in Evaluation and
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Optimization o f Electoral Systems, ‘whatever the combination of formula and 
electoral district size, some distortion between quota of votes and seats will always 
exist....’156 This fact, combined with the almost negligible levels of vote-to-seat 
distortion suffered by small parties might deter these organizations from calling for 
change. Efforts might be better spent soliciting votes than expending the immense 
energy required to gain one or two extra seats in any one election. However, 
according to the theory of persistent losing, this choice not to pursue change must be 
made by the persistent losers themselves, not dictated by those who benefit from the 
system. As shown below, those in smaller parties in Sweden might be even less 
inclined to tinker with the electoral system after viewing results in New York and 
London.
4.3.2-N ew  York
As explained in Chapter 3, while New York is still divided into five boroughs, the city 
has a single council of now 51 members that decides policy city-wide. A total of 30 
parties have competed in the 11 New York City Council elections between 1961 and 
1997. These include the dominant Democratic Party and their Republican rivals, and 
fringe parties such as Wheel of Progress, Staten Island Secession, Flower and 
Independent Capital Punishment parties. As shown in Table 4, The Democrats have 
dominated the council during the entire period, with only the Republicans offering 
any sort of challenge to the Democrats lock on city council.
156 di Cortona, P., Manzi, C., Pennisi, A., Ricca, F., & Simeone, B. (1999), Evaluation and Optimization o f  
Electoral Systems, Philadelphia: SIAM Monographs on Discrete Mathematics and Applications, p. 44.
T able 4: Seat D istribu tion  -  New Y ork  C ity C ouncil (1961-1997)
Y ear T otal D em ocratic R epublican L ibera l C onservative
Seats Seats Seats Seats Seats
1961 25 23 2 0 0
1965 37 30 7 o 0
1969 37 27 * 3 7 0
1973 10 5 4 1 0
1974 33 32 1 0 0
1977 43 37 4 1 1
1982 35 35 0 0 0
1985 35 34 1 0 0
1989 35 34 1 0 0
1991 51 46 5 0 0
1993 51 45 6 0 0
1997 51 44 7 0 0
T otal 443 392 41 9 1
T able 5: New Y ork  C ity  C ouncil V ote-Seat D iscrepancy (1961-1997)
Year Democratic Republican Liberal Conservative O ther
1961 37.1% -25.9% -11.2% 0.0%
1965 26.7% -11.9% -7.8% -7.0%  -0.1%
1969 26.2% -9.1% -8.4% -8.6% -0.1%
1974 25.1% -18.3% -4.0% -2.7%  0.0%
1977 20.2% -9.6% -8.2% -2.2%  -0.2%
1982 25.7% -20.7% -2.4% -2.0%  -0.5%
1985 12.2% -9.1% -1.0% -1.3%  -0.9%
1989 16.6% -13.0% -1.1% -1.1%  -1.4%
1991 20.2% -10.8% -4.6% -2.6%  -2.2%
1993 10.1% -7.7% -0.4% -1.0%  -0.4%
1997 13.1% -8.0% -0.9% -1.9%  -2.3%
A verage 21.2% -13.1% -4.6% -2.8%  -0 .7%
Negative Distortions 0 11 11 10 9
Average Party Support 68.3% 21.5% 6.5% 3.0%  0.8%
As shown earlier, deviation from proportionality has been shown to be high in 
America’s largest city averaging 21.9 percent and reaching a high 37.1 percent in 
1961. As shown in Table 5, part of the reason why Democrats have such a firm grip 
on the city is that the electoral formula works in their favour. In terms of vote-to-seat 
discrepancy, the Democratic Party has enjoyed a 21.2 percent positive bias since 
1961, and has always been awarded a good deal higher percentage of seats that it has 
deserved. All other parties have suffered at the hands on the single-member plurality
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system. None more so than the Republicans. While the where electoral formula has 
disadvantaged the Liberals and Conservatives over the years, the bias against the 
Republicans has been at times massive -  such as in 1961 where the party was 
awarded 26 percent fewer seats than it deserved.
These biases are also reflected in the number of year-by-year negative 
distQrtions. Where the Democratic Party has never been disadvantaged, the 
Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives have been burdened in every election they 
have contested -  well over the minimum three occurances. It would be hard to find a 
more convincing example of concentrated persistent absence due to institutionalized 
discrimination as not only are the disadvantaged clearly identifiable, the bias has been 
consistent and extreme. In addition, because this condition is easily remedied through 
even the rudimentary attempts to render the system more proportional in how votes- 
are-translated to seats, the Republicans, Liberals, Conservatives and some long 
standing other parties would be reasonable i n . rejecting the postvoting stage 
arrangements in the city.
4.3.3 -  London
The last 25 years has seen an enormous amount of election activity surrounding the 
control of local borough councils in London. In the 10 elections since 1964, over 
55,000 candidates have participated in contests for just under 19,000 seats in 
London’s 32 boroughs.157 As shown in Table 6, Labour has been the most successful 
party, winning almost half the available council seats. The Conservatives are a close 
second, with Liberal candidates making up ground in recent years. There have also 
been a few independent representatives from those from fringe parties who have won
157 See Appendix 1 for data sources. The data used for London comes from electronic records complied by the 
London Research Center. In the few cases where electronic data is inconsistent with that which is published the 
electronic version has been used. However, while this inconsistency introduces a slight chance of error, due the 
sheernumber of candidates and votes the distortion effect is much less than one percent and should be considered 
insignificant.
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positions on council, but for the most part local decisions are made by Labour and 
Conservatives -  with Liberals often being not much more than irritants to these 
governing parties. While the number of seats available has slightly increased over 
time, the electoral system has remained more or less intact since it was first installed 
in 1964.
T able 6: Seat D istribu tion  -  London B orough C ouncils (1964-1998)
Y ear T otal L ab o u r C onservative  L ib e ra l O th e r
1964 1859 1112 667 16 64
1968 1863 350 1438 10 65
1971 1863 1221 597 9 36
1974 1867 1090 713 27 37
1978 1908 882 960 30 36
1982 1914 781 980 124 29
1986 1914 957 685 249 23
1990 1914 925 731 233 25
1994 1917 1043 519 323 32
1998 1917 1050 538 301 28
T otal 18936 9411 7828 1322 375
T able 7: London Borough C ouncils V ote-Seat D iscrepancy (1964-1998)
Year L abour Conservatives Liberals O ther
1964 14.4% -3.4% - 10.3% -0.7%
1968 -9.3% 16.9% -6.8% -0.8%
-1.3%1971 12.5% -7.4%
-3.6%
-3.7%
1974 15.5% -10.8% -1.1%
1978 6.6% 0.7% -4.9% -2.5%
1982 10.4% 8.4% -17.7% -1.0%
1986 12.0% -0.3% -10.9% -0.8%
1990 7.6% -1.7% -2.7% -3.2%
1994 11.6% -5.0% -5.0% -1.6%
1998 12.5% -5.0% -5.0% -2.6%
A verage 9.2% -0.1% -7.5% -1.6%
Negative Distortions 1 7 10 10......................................... 1
Average Party Support 40.5 41.5 14.5 3.5
In the first section of this chapter it was shown that London’s average DV 
score is almost 13 percent -  meaning that almost one in eight councillors do not 
deserve their seats. It was also argued that this level of deviation from proportionality 
on its own is not enough to condemn the electoral formula, but it is enough to prompt
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second stage persistent losing evaluations. As with Stockholm and New York, this is 
accomplished by comparing vote-to-seat discrepancy on a party by party basis over 
time. Table 7 illustrates how the electoral formula has functioned over time in 
London. Here vote shares and seat shares distortions have been calculated for each 
party for each of the ten elections between 1964 and 1998. On average, Labour has 
benefited most winning an average 9.2 percent more seats than deserved and up to 
15.5 percent extra seats. The Conservative Party has almost been awarded as many 
seats as they deserve on average, and in one election benefited from an almost 17 
percent positive distortion. Liberals in London have suffered the most under the 
current electoral arrangements, being awarded 7.5 percent fewer seats than they 
deserve. ‘Other’ parties also fare badly under these arrangements.
Moving from average scores to instances of under-representation for each 
party during each election; all parities have won less than deserved seats at one time 
or another. Labour has had one negative vote-to-seat score, the Conservative Party 
seven, where the Liberals and Other parties have been on the negative side of things 
in every election since 1964. Recalling that discrimination must be systematic and 
concentrated, all but the Labour party demonstrate at least three instances of absence. 
Moving forward, Step 3 requires that persistent absentees be subject to rules to which 
non-absentees are not. Here, as with Stockholm and New York, it appears that the 
multi-member plurality system employed in London boroughs benefits large parties at 
the expense of those receiving fewer votes. Step 4 is also fulfilled as it has already 
been shown that a more proportional electoral formula would remedy this situation. 
As all four steps have been answered in the positive, Conservatives, Liberals and 
supporters of other small parties can be classified as persistent losers.
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Readers might object to using aggregate scores by which to judge electoral 
arrangements in London as, although based on the same rules, the city is really a 
collection of 32 electoral systems with different party systems local issues. In fact, as 
Dunleavy and Margetts state in their study of national level elections in the UK, ‘even 
the deviation from proportionality score for Britain as a whole does not tell the whole 
story. This figure is almost misleadingly low if  compared with other countries, 
because areas of pro-Conservative deviation in the south east are partly offset by areas 
of pro-Labour deviation in Scotland and the North.’158 Thus it is worth disaggregating 
postvoting stage results to see how London-wide results translate to the borough level.
T able 8: W andsw orth  V ote-Seat D iscrepancy (1964-1998)
Y ear L ab o u r C onservatives L ibera ls  O th e r  DV
1964 25% -16% -7% -2% 25%
1968 -12% 17% -4% -1% 17%
1971 28% -27% -1% -1% 28%
1974 28% -18% -9% -1% 28%
1978 -1% 7% -4% -2% 7%
1982 6% 11% -17% -1% 18%
1986 4% 7% -11% -1% 12%
1990 -18% 24% -3% -3% 24%
1994 -14% 24% -9% -1% 24%
1998 -19% 29% -9% -1% 29%
A verage 3% 6% -7% -1% 21%
N egative D istortions 5 3 10 10
A verage P arty  S u p p o rt 44% 47% 7% 1% .
Table 8 uses the same methods as used above to examine data from the 
London Borough of Wandsworth. Starting with the average DV score at the far right 
of the table, at 21 percent the average deviation from proportionality in Wandsworth 
is much higher than the London-wide average of 12.9 percent. DV is higher still in 
individual elections, reaching 29 percent in 1998 where the London-wide average has 
never climbed above 18.8 percent. Even from this brief glimpse, it would appear that
158 Dunleavy, P. Margetts, H. & Weir, S. (1998), The Politico’s Guide to Electoral Reform in Britain, p. 10.
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Dunleavy and Margetts’ observation about British national elections hold at the local 
level. The table also shows that as with London-wide elections, large parties benefit to 
the expense of smaller parties. On a year-by-year basis, all parties have suffered 
negative vote-to seat distortions more than three times. These results, coupled with the 
information already revealed about the electoral formula, indicates that all parties can 
reasonably reject the electoral system used in Wandsworth they are victims of 
systematic disadvantage. It is unclear whether all parties would actually choose to 
reject a system in which all suffer, albeit at different levels, but under the theory of 
persistent losing the option is open to all.
4.4 -  D isc ussio n
The preceding sections have explored postvoting electoral institutions cast in the light 
of the theory of persistent losing. Examining how fairly the electoral formula 
translates vote-to-seats from the perspective of political parties revealed that more 
than one civic party in each of the study cities would be reasonable in rejecting the 
institutions under which the competition for votes takes place. Whether or not parties 
that have experienced at least three incidents of persistent absence in Stockholm 
would reject the electoral formula is questionable as the distortions are so minor as to 
be practically insignificant. However, that the system discriminates against a 
particular party over the long-term is enough to justify this absent group’s calls for 
change. The case for changing New York’s single-member plurality system is much 
clearer as all except the dominant party unfairly suffers from the vote-to-seat 
distortion in this city. The same can be said for London’s multi-member plurality 
system, although it was shown that evaluations should be conducted borough by 
borough and not just based on city-wide scores.
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Where some may be surprised that smaller parties are justified in challenging
Stockholm’s electoral formula, others have drawn the conclusion that plurality
systems reward larger parties at the expense of smaller parties. As cited above, the
Jenkins Commission stated that plurality electoral formulae are highly disproportional
systems under which smaller parties are often continuously at a disadvantage. Some
authors have even expressed similar concerns about British local elections. For
example, in ‘An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain’, British local elections
specialists Colin Railings and Michael Thrasher state ‘[t]he first past the post electoral
system has a tendency to overreward the largest party in its share of seats,
simultaneously penalising other parties. Each of the main parties could cite examples
of gross electoral unfairness in 1998.’159
Although the empirical findings may be similar to those in other studies, what
differentiates this study from others is that the numerical investigations are based on a
more fully developed consideration of electoral democracy. The theory of persistent
losing provides detailed reasons as to why certain aspects of the electoral system are
beipg assessed and why results might be considered normatively relevant. Returning
to Railings and Thrasher, at the end of their audit the authors state that in contrast to
the more proportional national electoral system proposed by the Jenkins Commission,
‘the method used to elect local authorities looks outdated and entirely inappropriate to
the needs of a healthy democracy. ’160
But for all their high quality empirical work, the question remains as to why 
%
Railings and Thrasher would want us to believe the local plurality system is 
‘inappropriate’. As presented in Chapter 1, Beitz indicates that authors have to choose 
one of three established normative paths: the unrefined ‘simple view’ that democracy
159 Railings, C. and Thrasher, M. (1999), ‘An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain: The Evidence from Local 
Elections’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 52: 1, pp.58-76, p. 71.
160 Railings, C. & Thrasher, M. (1999), ‘An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain’, p. 75.
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and participation are synonymous; the idea that electoral processes should maximize 
social welfare and generate the ‘best result’; or, that electoral formula should aid a 
community in realizing its ‘popular will’ in as an efficient way as possible. However, 
the authors do not present any normative reason why readers should support their 
assertions. In fact, they expressly avoid entering the normative aspect of examining 
electoral democracy by stating that ‘it is a moot point whether democracy exists when 
the composition of a local authority fails to reflect local expression of partisan 
support.’161
Whether or not disproportionality undermines democracy is certainly 
debatable, but it is a debate that must be undertaken before claims of 
‘appropriateness’ are made. In fact, it is a debate that must be had before empirical 
work is even attempted. For example, if Railings and Thrasher decide that they 
support traditional utilitarianism and feel that that public policy should reflect the 
popular will of the community, then they need to employ methods by to assess 
whether or not policy outcomes reflect the initial preferences of the community. Such 
an assessment may have nothing to do with how votes are translated to seats as it is 
perfectly possible that even massively disproportional electoral systems will still 
manage to generate policy that satisfy a community’s general will. Thus if popular 
will is the normative foundation on which rests the work of Railings and Thrasher, 
then they have employed inappropriate methods by which to measure their core 
premiss.
This thesis rests on a moral principle developed as a counter to utilitarianism. 
The only author to have used Thomas Scanlon’s reasonable rejection as a rule by 
which to assess electoral systems is Charles Beitz. As already shown Beitz’s approach
161 Railings, C. & Thrasher, M. (1999), ‘An Audit of Local Democracy in Britain’, p. 72.
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to this issue significantly differs from the one used in this study. Instead of evaluating 
performance in a standardized way, Beitz’s empirical work involves a general 
comparison of proportional representation (including Single Transferable Vote and 
List systems) and district representation systems (mainly single member plurality). 
From this comparison Beitz feels he has produced enough evidence to state that that 
PR systems produce 4 a kind of equality in which there is no general reason to take an 
interest,’ and that ‘considerations of fairness do not always favour proportional 
systems.’162
The results from local elections in Stockholm substantiate Beitz’s second point 
that PR systems are not always fair. But his first and larger point strays from the core 
reasoning behind Scanlon’s idea of reasonable rejection. There is a strong reason to 
take interest in electoral formulae that do not afford all voters an equal share of 
control over legislative seats as this bias has been shown to affect small parties more 
than parties that receive a higher percentage of voter support. In order to uphold 
Rawls’ initial vision of justice as fairness and Scanlon and Barry’s additions, 
decision-making must be structured in such a way that the characteristics of the 
parties involved have no effect on the ability to participate in the decision-making 
process. This is precisely why proportionality is an important aspect to consider as the 
bias is not random, but affects an identifiable community segment.
Readers might also want to contemplate the idea that proportionality can be 
extended beyond political parties to other types of community groups. For example, 
instead of determining whether or not some parties need more votes to elect members 
than others, the same analytical framework could be used to determine whether or not 
certain minority groups or women can claim persistent loser status. The ability of, say,
162 Beitz, C. (1989), Political Equality, p. 140.
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women to be elected in New York City Council elections will depend on how 
electoral boundaries are drawn, the constituencies where parties choose to support 
these types of candidates and how the electoral formula distributes votes. As is shown 
in Chapter 6, these considerations also involve proportionality -  albeit from a 
different perspective.
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to use the theory of persistent losing to test one 
of the most studied areas in political science with the hope that the theory and its 
accompanying framework would provide a more coherent method by which to 
evaluate electoral democracy. Demonstrating that electoral systems in all three cities 
could be reasonably rejected by differing numbers of political parties shows that the 
electoral fairness is difficult to achieve. Despite being more-or-less designed to 
achieve this end, even Stockholm’s more proportional electoral formula produces 
persistent losers. New York and London’s systems do not even come close to treating 
all who contest elections fairly. The next chapter continues to apply the analytical 
framework, but moves to examine the voting stage fairness. While the specific 
methodologies and groups that are considered might differ, the general rule by which 
electoral fairness is evaluated remains constant.
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5 -  VOTING: REJECTING ELECTORAL WASTELANDS
As there would perhaps be little resistance to the claim that casting ballots is the most 
central voting stage action, this chapter exclusively explores voter participation by 
following the four-step process outlined in Chapter 2. Step 1 of the analytical process 
requires that longitudinal voting turnout scores be calculated to test whether the 
possibility of persistent absence exists within one or more of the case cities. If so, 
Step 2 requires additional testing to determine if low turnout rates are concentrated 
among a particular group. If one community group is prone to low turnout, then 
before the group’s rejection of the electoral system can be deemed unreasonable it 
must be shown that participation is hindered by discriminatory rules (Step 3) and that 
less discriminatory institutional arrangements exist (Step 4).
This chapter begins by calculating voter turnout rates for the four study cities. 
It shows that only Stockholm has sufficient rates to avoid persistent losing whereas 
New York and London suffer from consistently low levels of voter participation. 
While it would be ideal to test turnout results from all three cities, as the next three 
steps are much more difficult due to the possible sources and combinations of data, 
Step 2, 3 and 4 tests are limited to London. London is a good first test case for the 
theory of persistent losing as the city has a long and consistent history of low voter 
turnout and a large data set that allows for in-depth exploration that provides a 
detailed example of how persistent losing can be identified in similar political 
communities and generalizable observations about voter participation.
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A detailed examination of turnout rates in London’s 750+ wards shows that 
where there are great variations in turnout levels between wards during any single 
election, turnout rates in any single ward are stable over time. That some wards have 
consistently low turnout rates allows the study to move from Step 2 to Step 3, as 
persistent losing is shown to be concentrated among particular geographic groups. In 
searching for institutional factors that may be causing persistently low turnout in 
specific wards three multivariate regression models are used to test a variety of social 
and institutional factors commonly associated with voter participation in 2212 of 
London’s ward races. These tests show race closeness -  calculated by determining the 
gap between the lowest placed winner and highest placed loser in London’s multi­
member wards -  has a significant impact on voting turnout. A standard rational choice 
explanation of voter participation connects concentrated persistent absence and 
institutionalized discrimination. Here it is argued that those living in wards where 
races are not close are unfairly disadvantaged by London’s multi-member plurality 
system as there are few incentives for British political parties to expend scarce 
resources in constituencies in which they hardly ever win seats. The lower level of 
resources spent in unwinnable wards makes information more expensive for the 
resident population to obtain and forces them to expend more effort to participate in 
elections than those living in more competitive, resource-rich wards. That similar 
‘electoral wastelands’ are not created under other types of electoral systems provides 
the final evidence needed for those living in non-competitive, resource-starved wards 
to reject the current system.
5 .1 -  T estin g  fo r  P e r siste n t  A bsen c e
The first step used to identify persistent losing is to establish the possibility of 
persistent absence. If a strong possibility of persistent absence cannot be demonstrated
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then the investigation need not continue and the system deemed highly democratic. 
As shown in the last chapter, the general framework used to test for persistent losing 
needs customizing for each election stage. In concentrating on voter participation it is 
proposed that all that need be shown in Step 1 is that a large proportion of the voting 
age population is absent from the polling booth from election to election as such 
results indicate the possibility that a group or groups of people are absent from most 
or every election.
Obviously the lower the overall level of turnout the higher the chance of 
persistent absence, although according to the theory of persistent losing on their own 
these low levels of turnout do not provide enough evidence to declare reasonable 
rejection due to persistent losing. To fully earn the designation low turnout must be 
concentrated within one community and not randomly distributed. This argument, that 
high rates of turnout guarantee that the electoral system is fair but that low rates do 
not necessarily mean that a system is unfair, provides another view of the traditional 
debate surrounding the importance of voter participation during elections. On the one 
side sit those who state that poor turnout automatically signifies critical community 
disengagement, while on the other those who argue that low turnout rates should not 
be troubling as they signify contentment with the system.163 The theory of persistent 
losing takes a position between these two poles asserting that low rates are only 
problematic if they are concentrated among a particular segment of the community 
and caused by avoidable institutionalized discrimination. As such, high turnout rates 
are always viewed positively where low rates are not always seen as problematic.
163 For arguments as to the importance of higher turnout, see, for example, Lijphart, A. (1997), 'Unequal 
Participation: Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, American Political Science Review, Vol. 91:1, March, pp. 355- 
368. For arguments against, see, for example, Bollen, K. (1980), 'Issues in the Comparative Measurement of 
Political Democracy', American Sociological Review, Vol. 45 (June), pp. 370-390 and, Bollen, K. (1993), 'Liberal 
Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-National Measures', American Journal o f  Political Science, 
Vol. 37:4 (Nov.), pp. 1207-1230.
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Table 9: Voter Turnout in Three World Cities (1961-1998)
Year New York Stockholm London Year New York 
(cont’d)
Stockholm
(cont’d)
London
(cont’d)
1961 .43% 1980
1962 69% 1981
1963 1982 31% 8 6 % 43%
1964 32% 1983
1965 49% 1984
1966 73% 1985 2 0 % 84%
1967 1986 45%
1968 32% 1987
1969 45% 1988 80%
1970 80% 1989 33%
1971 37% 1990 46%
1972 1991 1 1 % 80%
1973 81% 1992
1974 31% 34% 1993 33%
1975 1994 80% 42%
1976 87% 1995
1977 26% 1996
1978 42% 1997 25%
1979 85% 1998 76% 32%
Avg. 32% 80% 38%
Table 9 displays voting-age turnout trends in New York, London and 
Stockholm.164 The graph shows that voters in Stockholm consistently turn out to vote 
at much higher rate than those in the three other cities. Averaging above 80 percent, 
the rates during local elections in Sweden’s capital city are more than double those in 
New York and London. Except for two early elections, turnout in Stockholm has 
never dipped under the 80 percent average, where turnout in New York has never 
climber above 49 percent and rates in London have remained at or under 46 percent 
throughout the study period.
Shown diagrammatically in Figure 10, consistently low turnout rates in New 
York and London indicate that there is a very strong probability that some voters are 
persistently absent from the voting stage during local elections in these cities. For 
example, imagining that New York’s population stays relatively static and that turnout
164 See Appendix 3 for reasons why turnout is calculated using voting age as the denominator as opposed to 
registered voters or total population.
132
in each election matches the actual average of 32 percent, if a completely different 
group of citizens voted in every election it would take four elections (16 years) to 
ensure all community members cast votes. A more realistic scenario reflects the 
common assertion that some groups (i.e. those of high socio-economic status) are 
more likely to vote than others. Thus there is a strong possibility that some or even 
most of the original 32 percent will turn out in every election and that most o f the 
non-participating 68 percent will stay home in subsequent elections. In this case 
concentrated persistent absence is almost guaranteed.
F igure 10: V oter T u rn o u t in T h ree  W orld  C ities (1961-1998)
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However, low rates alone do not mean that community members can 
reasonably reject their respective electoral systems. Under the theory of persistent 
losing the electoral system can only be rejected if  long-term absence is due to 
institutionalised discrimination that has an identifiable remedy. If the rules governing 
elections raise costs to the point of exclusivity for some community members and not 
for others, then those who are prohibitively burdened can reasonably reject the
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existing arrangements if less prohibitive arrangements can be substituted. In the last 
chapter it was shown how electoral formulae can punish particular political parties 
and how this systemic disadvantage could be corrected by changing to more 
proportional systems. However identifying what institutions may be discriminatory 
during the voting stage or why voters are absent is a much more difficult task due to 
the large number of variables that can affect turnout and the perspectives from which 
this activity can be viewed. Thus the next section examines voter turnout in one city -  
London -  in detail. This single case study not only seeks to explain patterns of 
participation in one of the most important world cities, but as London’s electoral 
system is similar to those in New York there is an opportunity to make more 
generalized assertions about the findings. As shown above, there is little reason to 
believe that voting stage persistent losing exists in Stockholm, and even if patterns of 
absence could be identified and attributed to institutionalized discrimination, this 
discrimination is bound to be so . slight that disadvantaged groups may choose to 
continue to participate under there rules, much like the results demonstrated in the last 
chapter.
Where identifying long-term voter turnout trends and the possibility of 
persistent absence is a fairly uncomplicated procedure, establishing whether or not 
persistent absence is concentrated and caused by biased rules is much more difficult. 
Obviously laws that specifically excluded groups from the voting process -  such as 
women, various minorities or non-propertied classes -  blatantly produce persistent 
losers, but less overtly discriminatory rules can also have a strong negative influence 
on electoral participation. The types of rules that increase participation costs and 
lower rates o f involvement may include special registration requirements such as poll 
taxes or literacy tests or conditions such as lack of choice or absence of adequate
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levels of information.165 In terms of lack of choice, electoral rules that place unfair 
burdens on certain types of candidates may cause some community members with 
corresponding views to participate less than others as few or no candidates reflect the 
preferences of non-participants. Likewise, if  it could be shown that some community 
members participate less than others because electoral rules consistently and unfairly 
increase the amount of effort needed to collect information about candidates, policies 
and platforms then persistent loser status might also be eventually claimed. However 
thorough investigation is needed as a lack of choice or information might be caused 
by a fickle community and not institutional bias.
Step 2 of the general analytical framework demands proof of concentrated 
persistent absence. It is at this stage that the huge range of possible study options 
becomes apparent as a larger community can be divided into any number of 
subgroups. Moreover, being one of the most studied subjects in the field of political 
science there are a number of methodological approaches that could be used to study 
voting stage participation. For example, voter turnout can be examined as an 
individual phenomenon or in the aggregate. That is, the dependent variable could be 
individuals answering ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to survey questions or it could be based on 
information elicited from actual ballot counts. Both techniques have been used 
throughout the years so it is a matter of deciding which is better for this particular 
study, but the choice is important as the dependent variable determines what statistics 
may be used as independent variables and what can be inferred from test results. As 
this chapter presents an initial look at persistent losing and is not tied to a specific 
community group there is some flexibility in the choice of approach.
165 For a discussion of choice and its intrinsic value, see Dowding, K. (1992), 'Choice: Its Increase and its Value', 
British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 22:3, pp. 301-314.
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This study uses aggregate level data gathered from actual ballot counts instead
of survey data for two reasons. First, although many studies use individual survey 
data generated from national election studies in Britain, the United States, Canada and 
elsewhere, there is good reason to be suspicious about the accuracy of these types of 
surveys. For example, the turnout rates reported in these surveys is always much 
higher than the official turnout rates. Among other things, these inaccuracies distort, 
sometimes greatly, estimates as to the characteristics of voters and non-voters. In a 
detailed study of these rates, Barry C. Burden states:
Despite their promise, surveys such as the NES (National Election Study) routinely 
overestimate national voter turnout by worrisome amounts... .High turnout estimates 
are due to such things as the undersampling of nonvoters, the mobilizing effects of 
preelection surveys on respondents, and infamous misreports. What had gone 
undocumented is the growing severity of this bias....In 1952, the NES overestimated 
official voter turnout in the presidential election by 11 percentage points. This is 
serious error, but it has more than doubled since then. The 1996 NES turnout 
estimate is almost 24 points higher than official voter turnout. Indeed the bias grew 
rather steadily over this 45-year time period with just few exceptions. 166
Second, even if it were possible to avoid the problems indicated by Burden, 
individual level data may tell us very little about who is or is not prone to vote. In one 
of the most thorough voting behaviour studies to date, John Matsusaka and Filip Palda 
use logistical regression analysis to examine how over 35 variables affect the 
behaviour of over 6,000 individual voters in the four Canadian National elections held 
between 1979 and 1988.167 While the authors find that frequently cited variables such 
as age and education affect can help predict who will vote and who will abstain, they 
suggest that even when a stringent variable such as previous behaviour is included in
166 See, Burden, B.C. (2000) ‘Voter Turnout and the National Election Studies’, Political Analysis, Vol. 8:4, 
(Autumn), pp.389-98, pp.3 89-90. Emphasis in original. For further discussion of this problem see Harbaugh, W.T. 
(1996), ‘If People Vote Because the Like To, Why do so Many of Them Lie?’, Public Choice, Vol. 89, pp.63-76.
167 Like Burden, Matsusaka and Palda state that regression coefficients may be biased because self-reported rates 
exceed actual turnout rates. They indicate in their study that in 1979 the actual turnout rates was 76 percent while 
91 percent of their sample reported voting. In 1980, 1984 and 1988 the actual rates were 69 percent, 75 percent and 
75 percent while the respective reported rates were 90 percent, 87 percent and 90 percent. On average turnout rate 
has been inflated by just Under 16 percent in all four elections. In other words, at a minimum the voting behavior 
o f one in five of those surveyed has been recorded inaccurately. However the rate could be much higher if we 
consider normal error associated with these samples and the fact that some voters may report not voting when they 
have actually voted to avoid participating in the survey. Matsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F. (1999), 'Voter Turnout: How 
Much Can We Explain?', Public Choice, Vol.98, pp. 431-446, pp. 433-4.
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• 0 • • •the analysis, low R scores indicate that the most tightly specified models are of little
use and ‘voting must be approached as a fundamentally random behaviour’.168 
Matsusaka and Palda conclude that ‘despite the inclusion of a large number of 
theoretically relevant variables, the logits have almost no predictive power’ and that 
‘the estimated models leave a large part of the voting story untold.’169 The authors’ 
main finding is that ‘the inability to predict who votes appears to come from non- 
stationary factors’ and that for the most part, ‘turnout is driven by idiosyncratic costs 
like the weather, the traffic, personal health and so on. The diversity of these costs and 
the difficultly in measuring them may mean that predicting who votes is ultimately 
unfeasible.’170
In combination, the work of Burden, Matsusaka and Palda not only indicates 
that individual level data about voter turnout is often of dubious validity, but that even 
when used it explains very little. After explaining the inability of their tests to explain 
the behaviour of individual voters Matsusaka and Palda state that the way forward 
may lay with studying aggregate voting behaviour -  the route taken in this chapter. 
The authors suggest that using statistics from electoral districts as the dependent 
variable should eliminate the problem of individual idiosyncrasies and raise the 
explanatory power of the models. In addition, aggregate data is not subject to the 
same level of error as the individual level data as it is based on actual behaviour (i.e. 
counting ballots) rather than asking people if they did or did not vote.
168 Matsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F. (1999), 'Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain?', p. 442.
169 Individual variables include: age, education in years, family income, martial status, gender, religious affiliation, 
church attendance, union membership, length of residence, primary language used at home, employment status and 
if the person Was contacted before or during the election by a campaign worker. Aggregate (district) level variables 
include: winner’s margin of victory, proportion of the community that have high school education, proportion of 
the community that are employed, population growth, average male income, per capita campaign spending, 
aggregate turnout rate, and regional location of the district.
170 Matsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F. (1999), 'Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain?', p. 442.
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However aggregate data has its own pitfalls such as the ‘ecological fallacy’ 
problem.171 That is, one has to be careful not to make inferences about individual 
behaviour when using a dependent variable that describes the behaviour of a 
particular group of people. Aggregate data necessarily combines the behaviour of a 
number of people within a particular geographic area so, no matter how small, this 
aggregation can never be used to explain why individuals do or do not vote, but only 
allows inferential information about group tendencies to be generated. For example, if 
a survey of 1000 registered voters within a city of 100,000 reveals that the rich vote 
and the poor abstain it can then be inferred that income should play a prominent role 
when trying to predict who or who will not vote the future. If, on the other hand, the 
city is broken into 100 districts and it is found that voting is low in districts that 
contain a disproportionately high level of poor people it cannot be stated with any 
certainty that on an individual level the poor are less inclined to vote than the rich. 
Rather it can only be claimed that turnout rates tend to be lower in districts with 
higher levels of impoverishment. To avoid the ecological fallacy problem inferences 
should only be made about the geographic areas from which data is collected and not 
individuals within these areas. This limitation should not be seen as problematic as 
concentrated persistent absence can still be confirmed by exploring variations in 
participation levels between specific electoral districts.
Before proceeding to the London data, an overview of how specific tests relate 
to the general analytical framework should help the reader better understand 
generated results. After summarizing a number of descriptive statistics about the 32 
London boroughs, the first statistical test attempts to establish whether low voter 
turnout is a relatively random phenomenon or a long-term ward characteristic.
171 Matsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F. (1993), ‘The Downsian Voter meets the Ecological Fallacy’, Public Choice, Vol. 
77, pp.855-878.
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Showing that some wards usually have lower turnout indicates that persistent absence 
is concentrated geographically and allows the study to move to the Step 3 process in 
which institutional features that may be creating these patterns are explored. 
Discovering what factors may cause some wards to have consistently low turnout 
rates requires establishing what institutional and/or social factors are common to 
wards with low turnout rates but not found in those with higher turnout levels. 
Although such a discovery is insufficient to establish causality, it nevertheless allows 
for deeper investigation as to why such factors may contribute to perpetually low 
participation rates. If a causal link can be established through more thorough probing 
and superior institutional arrangements found, then those living in wards with low 
levels of participation can make a strong case for rejecting the existing electoral 
arrangements.
5.2 -  C o n c en t r a te d  P er siste n t  A b sen c e  in  L o n d o n
Since 1964 local policy in Greater London has been enacted by 32 borough councils 
and the City of London as well as a number of region-wide bodies. While the borough 
council configuration has remained stable since 1964, regional government 
institutions have significantly varied. Regional decisions were made by the Greater 
London Council from 1964 until it was abolished in 1986. The collection of boards 
and agencies that replaced the GLC were themselves replaced by the new Greater 
London Authority in 2000. Where the Greater London Assembly is now elected using 
a mixed proportional representation system, Londoners have always used a multi­
member plurality system to elect local borough councillors every four years -  except 
between 1968 and 1974 when elections were held every three years. Under the multi­
member plurality system each borough is divided into wards containing between one 
and four council seats.
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Tests for persistent losing are conducted on data from four of the most recent 
London borough elections -  1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998.172 Using data from four 
elections allow patterns and trends to be accurately established without overburdening 
the study with too much data. These four elections have been chosen as they reflect 
the current state of local politics in London and also correspond to other types of data 
available for regression testing.
Table 10: Ward Turnout Rate Correlations (1986-1998)
1 Turnout 1998 Turnout 1994 Turnout 1990 Turnout 1986
Turnout 1998 Correlation! 1.000 .742 .648 .576
N. 737 737 736 736
Turnout 1994 i Correlation! .742 1.000 .817 .6 8 6
N 737 738 737 737
Turnout 1990 j Correlation! .648 .817 1.000 .801
| Nl 736 737 737 736
Turnout 1986 ! Correlation! .576 .6 8 6 ! .801 1.000
I Nj 736 737| 736 737
Attempting to identify concentrated persistent losing in London Borough 
elections using aggregate turnout levels from each ward requires that some proof can 
be offered that the turnout rates are not random but consistent from election to 
election.173 Using turnout data to test turnout rate consistency from the up-to 736 
wards in which races were conducted, Table 10 shows that there is a high correlation 
between turnout rates from year to year across London -  almost 75 percent between 
1994 and 1998, and over 80 percent between 1994 and 1990 and 1990 and 1986.174 
Thus where the overall turnout rate across London may change significantly from
172 Data from the 2002 election are not yet available.
173 Due to data constraints these tests are conducted using a turnout rate figure that is calculated using the number 
of registered voters as a denominator. While not as accurate as figures calculated using voting-age population, 
rates are still highly comparable.
174 Some wards could not .be included in the longitudinal analysis due to boundary changes.
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election to election, but when examined individually wards with low turnouts tend to 
have low turnouts over time.175
Table 11: Percentage Turnout in Ten London Borough Wards (1986-1998)
Ward 1998 +/- 1994 +/- 1990 +/- 1986 I +/- ]
Ruskin 53 18 56 1 0 58 1 0 55 ! 10 !
Eltham Park 53 18 60 14 62 14 61 I 16 |
Coulsdon East 51 16 48 2 4 9 1 50 ! 5 |
Palewell 51 16 61 15 64 16 65 | 20 !
Darwin 50 15 53 7 54 6 50 1 5 I
! ! ............ ;........ .... ]
City wide Average 35 0 46 0 48 0 45 0 !
• |
Thamesmead East 2 1 -14 36 - 1 0 33 -15 36 1 -9 |
River 2 1 -14 34 -12 ! 33 -16 31 I -14 |
Arsenal 19 -16 38 - 8  | 39 -9 38 i -7 !
Nightingale 19 -16 38 - 8  | 42 - 6 43 ] -2 1
Thamesmead Moorings 18 -17 35 -11 41 - 8 40 -5 1
Further to this point, Table 11 displays long-term turnout rates from the five 
wards with the highest and lowest turnout rates in 1998. The table shows that the 
wards with the highest turnout in 1998 have been above average in every election 
since 1986. Ruskin has never fallen below ten percent above the citywide average, 
Eltham Park never lower than 18 percent below average, Coulsdon East never below 
one percent, Palewell never below 15 percent and Darwin never below five percent. 
Among wards with the lowest turnout rates in 1998, Thameshead Moorings has never 
climbed above five percent below the citywide average, turnout in Nightingale has 
never risen above two percent below average, Arsenal never above negative seven 
percent, River never above negative 12 percent and Thameshead East never above 
nine percent under the citywide average. While this is a small sample of the total 
number of wards, the data confirms the earlier correlations demonstrating that turnout 
rates are consistent within each ward.
175 Colin Railings and Michael Thrasher have found similar relationships in an analysis of the 1981, 1985 and 
1989 county council elections results in England and Metropolitan borough council elections between 1982-1988.
‘.. .there is a high correlation between turnout in a ward at one election with turnout in the same word at the 
preceding election.’ See, Railings, C. & Thrasher, M. (1990), ‘Turnout in English Local Elections -  An Aggregate 
Analysis with Electoral and Contextual Data’, Electoral Studies, Vol 9:2, pp, 79-90, p. 82.
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That persistent absence is concentrated in certain wards contradicts the work 
of others who study local elections in Britain. In perhaps the most famous study of 
local election turnout in Britain, William L. Miller presents evidence that he claims 
proves ‘local turnout behaviour does vary over time, and the electorate is not divided 
into regular local election voters and regular election abstainers.’176 In addition he 
finds -  as did Matsusaka and Palda -  that ‘voter turnout is remarkably unpredictable, 
unstructured and unpattemed.’177 Based on data gathered from a panel of 745 people 
interviewed once in November 1985 and once in May 1996, Miller’s surveyed each 
panel member asking if they remembered voting in the previous election and then 
testing these responses against participants’ socio-economic and attitudinal traits.
There are number of reasons why Miller’s work should be questioned. First, it 
is likely that Miller’s survey data is highly inaccurate. Although he deems it as 
acceptable, Miller himself demonstrates that of those who responded to his survey, 54 
percent reported voting in the 1985 county elections, although official records state 
that only 42 percent actually cast ballots -  a difference of 12 percent.178 Coupled with 
regular error rates associated with sampled survey further skew the accuracy of 
Miller’s evidence. In addition, Miller’s overall methodology is suspect. For example, 
although his dependent variable is dichotomous, he uses stepwise regression method 
to test his hypothesis. In the first instance, when using the ordinary least squares 
regression method (which is the basis of stepwise regressions) on a dichotomous 
dependent variable the distribution of residual error can be heteroscedastic, resulting 
in inaccurate significance tests and distorted standard errors.179 In addition, while the 
stepwise regression method was perhaps in vogue in the 1970s, it has generally fallen
176 Miller, W. (1988,), Irrelevant Elections?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 91. Emphasis in original.
177 Miller, W. (1988), Irrelevant Elections?, p. 122.
178 Miller, W. (1988), Irrelevant Elections?, p. 80.
179 For more information on techniques that should be used to measure dichotomous variables such as logits and 
probits, see Gujarati, D.N., (1995), ‘Regression on Dummy Dependent Variable: The LPM, Logit, Probit and Tobit 
Models’, in Basic Econometrics, (New York: Mcgraw Hill), pp.540-83.
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into disuse. Using an automatic algorithm to decipher which variables are or are not 
important is not the most accurate method by which to assess data, and according to 
Judd and McClelland, ‘It is our experience and strong belief that better models and a 
better understanding of one's data result from focussed data analysis, guided by 
substantive theory.’180
In sum, not only does the data presented in this chapter counter traditional 
assumptions about voting behaviour in local British elections, they also demonstrate 
that because some wards exhibit consistent patterns of low voter turnout and some do 
not there is evidence that persistent absence is concentrated among people living in 
particular geographic areas. These results should concern local democrats as they 
establish the second of four steps needed to confirm that the current electoral laws 
produce persistent losers. However, whether these consistently low rates are caused 
by systemic flaws and not some other reason need be established before people living 
in wards with low turnout rates can be shown to be reasonable in their rejection of the 
current electoral system.
5.3 -  T e s t in g  f o r  I n s t i t u t io n a l i z e d  D is c r im in a t io n  in  L o n d o n
Unlike in the last chapter where it was fairly simple to connect how electoral formulae 
are sometimes biased to disadvantage some parties over others, testing for 
institutionalized discrimination during the voting stage is not as straightforward. In 
order for those living in wards with consistently low turnouts to reasonably reject the 
current electoral system it must be demonstrated that electoral rules unfairly increase 
their participation costs. Identifying which rules may or may not discriminate is 
complicated by the fact that turnout differences between London borough wards are 
accompanied by significant demographic variations. Wards have different socio­
180 Judd, C. M. & McClelland, G. H. (1989), Data Analysis: A Model Comparison Approach, New York: Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, p. 204.
economic and demographic characteristics that may have an impact on participation 
rates.
Multivariate regression is one method to test how much a dependent variable 
such as variation in voter turnout is affected by more than one independent variable. 
In using multivariate regression this chapter develops a series of models that each 
include of range of variables commonly cited as having an effect on voter turnout and 
tests these models in 750+ ward elections held across all 32 London boroughs. While 
independent variables often include socio-economic characteristics such as age or 
income, of most importance for this chapter is to discover variables explicitly linked 
with institutional bias or those connected to the rules through which elections are 
conducted.
Table 12: Regression Variables
# Variable Measure Type
Turnout % of ballots cast by registered voters Dependent
1 Benefit % of ward population collecting benefits Socio-Economic
3 60+ % of population sixty years of age or over Socio-Economic
2 Labour % of total votes cast for Labour Party Socio-Economic
4 Mobility % of total ballots cast by post Socio-Economic
5 Tax Band ‘D’ taxation rate (1990 Poll Tax). Socio-Economic
6 Change % of council seats changed from previous election Socio-Economic
7 Control % of council seats held by largest party Institutional
8 Impact Number of registered voters per seat Institutional
9 Intensity Number of candidates per seat Institutional
1 0 Closeness % of lowest winner’s votes gained by highest placed loser Institutional
Table 12 lists the variables used in this chapter to explain variation in voter
turnout. To give a better account of demographic variation between wards variables 
one to six represent standard socio-economic characteristics that other studies have 
shoVvn to affect voting behaviour.181 These variables are included to control for 
differences between wards so as to better identify the effects of those variables
181 For an overview of the impact o f socio-economic status has on voter turnout see Lijphart, A. (1999) ‘Unequal 
Participation: America’s Unresolved Dilemma’, pp.2-5. For more detailed American work in this area see 
Bingham Powell Jr., G. (1986), American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 80, pp. 17-43; Wolfinger, R.E. and Rosenstone, S.J. (1980), Who Votes? New Haven: Yale 
University Press; and, Verba, S. & Nie, N. (1972), Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social 
Equality, New York: Harper & Row.
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specifically connected to electoral rules. As people with lower incomes tend to vote 
less than with those with higher incomes ‘benefit’ assesses the economic well-being 
in each ward by measuring the percentage of the population receiving government 
assistance. As more mature voters have been shown to participate at higher rates than 
younger community members, ‘60+’ measures the percentage of the population aged 
60 or over. Representing the percentage of votes cast for the Labour Party, ‘Labour’ 
also indicates socio-economic status as those of lower income tend to vote for this 
party and thus higher support for Labour should correlate with lower voter turnout 
rates.182 Measured by the percentage of local voters mailing in ballots, ‘mobility’ 
signifies transience within the community. Wards with high levels of mobility should 
have lower rates of turnout as transient community members have less knowledge of, 
or connection with, the local community. ‘Tax’ measures the local government tax 
rates with the hypothesis being that high turnout rates will accompany high tax rates 
because community members paying higher taxes have more at stake. Finally, 
‘change’ represents the volatility of the electorate and depicts the percentage of seats 
that have changed since the last election. A high percentage indicates a volatile 
electorate who might be more inclined to participate.
The remaining four variables are of most interest to this study as they describe 
characteristics argued to be affected electoral system rules. ‘Control’ describes the 
size of the largest party on council for the entire borough. Turnout would be expected 
to be lower in boroughs where one council has a large majority and there is little 
chance for the partisan nature of the council to change. As the number of seats held by 
each party is affected by the electoral formula, the size of the majority can be a direct 
result of disproportionality. Building from the work of Anthony Downs ‘impact’
182 For using Labour Party vote as an indication of socio-economic status see Whitely, P.F. & Seyd, P. (1994), 
‘Local Party Campaigning and Electoral Mobilization in Britain’, Journal o f  Politics, Vol. 56:1, pp.242-52.
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reflects the idea that rational self-interested, utility maximizing community members 
are more likely to vote the more their vote is worth.183 This indicator is determined by 
calculating the number of registered voters against which the individual voter will 
compete.184 This variable depends exclusively on the rules by which govern the size of 
the wards, if it can be shown, for example, that wards with the lowest turnout rates are 
also hold the largest population then this evidence would build the case for persistent 
losing. ‘Intensity’ indicates the number of candidates running in the ward with the 
hypothesis being that information costs are reduced during more intense races simply 
because there are more candidates knocking on doors. As this number can also be 
directly affected by electoral formulae that serve to reduce the number of parties 
competing for office, it is considered an institutional effect.185 Finally, ‘closeness’ 
measures the margin between the votes cast for the lowest winner and highest loser in 
London’s multimember wards. The idea here is that parties are apt to spend more 
resources promoting their interests in wards where races are close and less in wards 
they have no chance of winning. Resource targeting by parties lessens costs for voters 
in wards with close races that, in turn, boosts turnout.186
183 See Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory o f  Democracy, New York: Harper Collins. For an alternate 
interpretation of rational voting behavior see Schuessler, A. (2000), A Logic o f Expressive Choice, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. Downs’ theory has served as a base for hundreds of studies since posited in the later 
1950s. For example, in exploring just a single strand of the Downsian theory - that the closer the race the higher 
the incentive to vote (following the assumption that the voter has better the chance of casting the decisive vote) - 
there have been almost 30 papers published in the most prominent political science journals. For a listing of these 
articles see Grofman, B. Collet, C. & Griffen, R. (1995), ‘Analysing the Tumout-Competition Link with Aggregate 
Cross-Sectional Data’, Public Choice, Vol.95, pp.233-46.
184 Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory o f  Democracy. See also Fain, J. and Dworkin, J.B. (1993), 
‘Determinants of Voter Participation: Some Simulation Results’, Public Choice, Vol. 77, pp. 823-834.
185 On this see, Rae, D. (1971), The Political Consequences o f Electoral Laws, New Haven: Yale University Press; 
Riker, W. (1976), ‘The Number of Political Parties: A Re-examination of Duverger’s Law’, Comparative 
Politics, Vol. 9:1, pp. 93-106; and, Grofman, B. and Lijphart, A. (eds). (1986), Electoral Laws and Their Political 
Consequences, New York: Agathon Press.
186 This effect is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
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Table 13: Mean and Hi/Low Ward Statistics for London Boroughs (1990-1998)
1998 (n=758) 1994 (n=759) 1990 (n=756)
Mean Hi Low Mean Hi Low Mean Hi Low
Turnout 35% 53% 18% 46% 67% 20% 48% 69% 18%
Benefit 8.2% 19.3% 0.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
60+ 17% 30% 7% 18% 31% 9% 19% 32% 9%
Labour 43% 87% 5% 43% 91% 6% 40% 87% 4%
Mobility ' 2.7% 0.09% 0% 1.6% 7.4% 0.1% 1.2% 4.9% 0.1%
Tax £701 £912 £322 £546 £687 £342 £375 £573 £150
Change 12% 100% 0% 16% 100% 0% 13% 100% 0%
Control 66% 98% 38% 66% 96% 38% 65% 100% 44%
Impact 2608 4736 1420 2598 5037 1286 2534 4532 1254
Intensity 3.0 5.5 1.3 3.0 5.0 1.5 3.0 6.5 1.5
Closeness 60.3% 99.9% 14.8% 59.7% 99.9% 11.6% 62.0% 99.9% 9.3%
Table 13 provides descriptive information about all variables mentioned above 
for London borough elections between 1990 and 1998. Starting with the dependent 
variable, mean voter participation rates from all three elections are under 50 percent. 
However, as shown earlier, high and low statistics show a significant variation 
between wards -  some having turnout rates as low as 18 percent others climbing to 
almost 70 percent. The table also shows that there is great variation between wards 
within any particular year in all independent variable categories. Some wards have a 
large proportion on the population on benefit some do not. Some wards have a large 
number of senior residents. Labour dominates some wards while in others they gain 
almost no support. Some have much higher tax rates than others, Depending in what 
ward they live, residents have varying levels of impact during elections, chances to 
affect which party controls council and ability to elect challengers. Ward races also 
vary greatly in intensity and closeness. These wide variations between wards further 
justify using multivariate analysis to examine the causes of voter turnout.
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Table 14: Multivariate Analysis of 1998 Turnout Rates (Model 1)
Coefficients t-value Significance Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 1 11.565 . 0 0 0
Closeness .307 10.144 . 0 0 0 .750 1.333
Labour Vote -.288 ! -7.481 . 0 0 0 .465 2.152
Benefit -.243 1 -6.529 . 0 0 0 .497 2 .0 1 1
60+ .153 1 4.916 . 0 0 0 .713 1.402
Mobility -.118 1 -4.017 . 0 0 0 .798 1.253
Change .089 3.084 .0 0 2 .819 1 .2 2 1
Tax .058 2.094 .037 .911 1.097
Intensity .046 1.533 .126 .754 1.325
Control 1 .031 I .977 .329 .703 1.422
Impact .0 0 1 I .033 .974 .786 1.272
Adj. R2 .49
Observations ! 736
Table 14 contains results from the first model used in this study to test the 
effect of all ten variables in non-acclaimed wards during the 1998 local borough 
elections. Ranked by coefficient scores, the most significant variable associated with 
high turnout rates is ‘closeness’, although wards with older populations, those in 
which seats changed hands in previous elections and higher tax rates also correlate 
with higher participation rates. Turnout is lower in wards where Labour is popular, 
where a large proportion of the population collects benefits and where the population 
is more mobile. Race intensity, the strength of the largest party and the population 
size of a particular ward appear to have no effect on turnout levels (over 0.05 
significance level). Overall these factors explain 49 percent (adjusted R value) of the 
turnout variation between wards in the 1998 borough elections. Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) scores confirms the absence of multicollinearity within the data and the 
data shows no indication of heteroscedasticity.187
187 According to Andy Field, ‘If the largest VIF is greater than 10 then there is there is cause for concern.’ In 
addition, Tolerance below .01 indicates a serious problem.’ There would appear that there is no collinearity within 
the data as the highest VIF score is 2.152 and no tolerance score is below .465. See, Field, A. (2002), Discovering 
Statistics Using SPSS fo r  Windows, London: Sage, p. 153. See Appendix 4 for residual scatterplots confirming 
homescedasticity in all three models.
148
It is worth trying to improve Model 1 by adding extra variables as the adjusted 
R2 (0.49) of this first model is modest. As suggested by Matsusaka and Palda, adding 
a variable that controls for behaviour from the previous election may improve the 
ability to explain variations in voting turnout.188 The idea here is that the 1994 turnout 
levels should be influenced by many of the same measured and unmeasured variables 
found in 1998 -  thus increasing the predictive value of the model. However, adding 
more ‘stringent’ control variables is likely to absorb much of the explanatory power 
of variables currently included as factors such as income deprivation, number of 
registered voters and age distribution since these will have changed very little over the 
four year period.189 Stringent controls often diminish the explanatory power of even 
the strongest independent variable.
Table 15: Multivariate Analysis of 1998 Turnout Rates (Model 2)
Coefficients t-value Significance Tolerance VIF
(Constant) 3.786 . 0 0 0
Turnout 1994 ' .556 22.469 . 0 0 0 .663 1.509
Labour Vote -.316 -10.687 . 0 0 0 .464 2.156
Closeness .169 7.040 . 0 0 0 .701 1.426
Mobility -.087 -3.859 . 0 0 0 .795 1.257
Tax 0.70 3.324 .0 0 1 .911 1.098
Change______
60+
.060 2 . 6 8 6 .007 .816 1.225
.051 2.089 .037 . 6 8 8 1.453
Intensity .018 .791 .429 .752 1.329
Benefit -.006 -.188 .851 .438 2.285
Control -.003 -.107 .915 .700 1.428
Impact -.002 -.090 .928 .786 1.272
|
Adj. R2 I -7 0
Observations
As shown in Table 15, including 1994 turnout levels has considerably 
improved the overall explanatory power of the model to 0.70. By including this 
variable 70 percent of the variation in turnout rates amongst wards can be explained.
188 Matsusaka, J.G. & Palda, F. (1999), 'Voter Turnout: How Much Can We Explain?1.
189 Whiteley, P.F. & Seyd, P. (1994), ‘Local Party Campaigning and Electoral Mobilization in Britain’, pp.242-52.
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The variable with the most predictive value is Labour followed by closeness. While 
statistically significant, mobility has a very slight negative impact on turnout, higher 
tax rates have a slightly positive impact on participation levels and does the number of 
seats that changed hands between parties and the proportion of mature residents living 
in the ward. With low t-values, the sheer number of candidates running for council 
positions, the number of people collecting benefit, the size of council majority and the 
ward population, have no significant impact on voter turnout. As with Model 1, VIF 
scores confirm the absence of multicollinearity within the data and there is no 
indication of heteroscedasticity.
Table 16: Multivariate Analysis Turnout Rates (Model 3:1990-1998)
Coefficients t-value Significance Tolerance VIF
(Constant) : 18.876 .0 0 0
Previous Turnout .452 31.231 . 0 0 0 .730 1.369
Tax (1998 £) -.346 -25.356 . 0 0 0 .823 1.215
Mobility .243 17.849 .0 0 0 .826 1 .2 1 0
Closeness J07 7.452 .0 0 0 .738 1.354
Change .091 6.663 . 0 0 0 .817 1.224
Labour Vote -.071 -.4782 . 0 0 0 .698 1.432
60+ .063 4.460 . 0 0 0 .771 1.297
|
Adi R' . 6 6  1
Observations 2 2 1 2  I
To determine whether these conditions are consistent over time exploration 
must be extended beyond single set of election results. To do so the variables shown 
to be significant in Model 2 are tested against ward turnout levels from 1994 and 
1990. Including three years of electoral data establishes a trend that will allow the 
long-term impacts of the included variables to be assessed. Table 16 demonstrates the 
results from tests conducted from 2212 ward races held between 1990 and 1998. 
Where the overall explanatory power of the model drops from 0.70 to 0.66 it 
demonstrates that at least some of the lessons learned from earlier models carry over 
all three elections. All included variables are statistically significant although the
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coefficient values have changed considerably. As with the previous models, low VIF 
rates, high tolerance levels and residual plots show no indication of multicollinearity 
or heteroscedasticity. As expected, previous turnout rates are the best predictor of 
future rates. However, where the percentage of support for Labour was the second 
strongest predictor in Model 2, the coefficient value of -.071 in Model 3 suggests this 
factor has much less impact on turnout in 1994 and 1990 elections. As demonstrated 
by their low coefficient values, the explanatory power of change in the partisan nature 
of council and the proportion of older residents have relatively little impact on turnout 
levels.
Not only do tax rates and mobility provide more explanatory power of 
variation in turnout than in the previous two models, as indicted by their coefficients 
their effect is surprising. First, high taxation rates appear to have a negative impact on 
voter participation since 1990. This goes against long-held economic theory that high 
tax rates cause residents to act, such as described by Tiebout.190 The results from 
Model 3 indicate that higher tax rates correlate with less activity as demonstrated by 
lower turnout rates. Where more investigation would be required to explain why this 
might be occurring in London, one explanation is that higher tax rates bring with them 
improved levels of local service. Thus higher tax rates perhaps raise the levels of 
service which in turn increases satisfaction among residents and lessens the desire 
unelect local councillors. But this is purely speculative and would have to best tested 
in much more detail -  perhaps by using customer satisfaction surveys or other such 
information -  before such conclusions could be concretely drawn. As this variable has 
little direct effect oh tests for persistent losing it is not discussed further.
190 See, Tiebout, C. (1956), 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', Journal o f  Political Economy. Vol 64, pp.416- 
424. For an exploration of this theory in the British context see Dowding, K., and John, P. (1996), 'Exiting 
Behavior under Tiebout Conditions: Towards a Predictive Model', Public Choice, Vol. 88, pp.393-406 and 
Dowding, K., John, P., Mergoupis, T. and Van Vugt, M. (2000), 'Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Analytic and Empirical 
Developments', European Journal o f  Political Research, Vol. 37, pp.469-495.
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The mobility coefficient present another puzzle as the expected impact is that 
higher mobility leads to lower turnout as new residents have less connection with and 
knowledge of the local community. However the results from Model 3 would seem to 
indicate the opposite -  that high mobility leads to higher rates of participation. One 
possible explanation is that the indicator has been mis-specified. The reader will recall 
that mobility is measured by the percentage of total ballots cast by post by absent 
local residents. Where it was assumed that this would serve as a good measure of 
mobility, the other possibility is this activity could be undertaken in wards in which 
residents are conscientious in casting ballots while absent during an election. If this 
were the case then high scores would indicate residents have a strong connection with 
the local community -  so much so that they expend the extra efforts to cast postal 
ballots. As with taxation rates, this possibility would require more investigation, but it 
is discussed no further since it does not affect the overall pursuit of factors that may 
cause persistent losing.
The only institutional variable of significance from Model 3 is closeness. 
Where its explanatory power has been reduced, its impact is important to explore in 
detail as it demonstrates that the amount of information available to voters affects 
their (non-) voting behaviour -  a condition that helps build the case for 
institutionalized discrimination. The closeness coefficient indicates that turnout is 
higher in wards where races between candidates are tight, but more importantly that in 
wards where races are not close turnout is lower. These findings are similar to those 
found by other authors, including Railings and Thrasher who in their multivariate 
regression study of English county and Metropolitan Borough Councils state that 
‘[e] lectors in ‘safe’ seats ARE less likely to vote than those in ‘marginal’ ones -  all
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other things being equal...’.191 While the debate still rages in the United States
whether race closeness affects voter turnout, results similar to those found in Model 3 
and Railings and Thrasher have been generated for British National Elections by 
Denver and Hands who argue ‘the relationship between marginality and turnout over 
Britain as a whole has been positive and significant.’192
Acknowledging that there may be no general law relating closeness and 
turnout, the evidence Rawlings and Thrasher and Denver and Hands provide enough 
evidence to suggest, that Model 3 results are accurate. There is also plenty of evidence 
indicating that higher turnout rates occur during close races because parties expend 
more resources in constituencies with winnable seats and conserve resources in 
constituencies where their candidate has little chance of winning. For example, in 
their study of canvassing and polling-day activity upon the results of local 
government elections, Bochel and Hands found that ‘thorough canvassing before 
polling day and “knocking up” on the day produced an appreciable increase in 
turnout,’ but that parties will not bother to expend a much energy in ‘hopeless’ wards 
-  or those in which the party have no chance of winning.193 This work provides 
enough evidence to argue that people living in wards with consistently low turnout
191 Railings, C. & Thrasher, M. (1990), ‘Turnout in English Local Elections’, p. 89. This statement is based on 
regressions on a series of 800+ metropolitan borough elections. In the 1987 election the authors were able to 
generate an R2 value of 57.4 using a model in which marginality was shown to be significant with a standardized 
coefficient of 0.40.
192 While John Matsusaka states that ‘no fewer than 25 papers have been published which test if people are more 
likely to vote in close elections. Most o f them found positive correlation between turnout and closeness’, in his 
study the author finds ‘no evidence that turnout is higher in close elections’. See, Matsusaka, J. (1993), ‘Election 
Closeness and Voter Turnout: Evidence from California Ballot Propositions’, Public Choice, Vol.76, pp. 313-334. 
Denver, D. & Hands, H. (1974), ‘Marginality and Turnout in British General Elections’, British Journal o f  
Political Science, Vol. 4:1, Jan, pp. 17-35, p. 35.
193 See Blochel, J. & Denver, D. (1972), The Impact of the Campaign on the Results of Local Government 
Elections, British Journal o f  Political Science, Vol. 2:2, Apr, pp. 239-244, p. 239. This the cycle o f low- 
winnability and under-investment is a relatively constant trait in British local elections has been recognized by a 
number of authors. See, for example, Dyer, M. & Jordan, G. (1985), ‘Who Votes in Aberdeen? Marked Electoral 
Registers as a Data Source’, Strathclyde Papers in Government, No. 42, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde; Hill, 
D. (1967), ‘Leeds’ in Sharpe, J. (ed.) Voting in Cities, London: Macmillian; and, Railings C. and Thrasher, M. 
(2000), Local Elections in Britain, London: Routledge. For national level studies also exploring this relationship 
see, Denver, D. & Hands, G. (1992), ‘Constituency Campaigning’, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 45, pp.528-44; 
Kavanaugh, D.A. (1970), Constituency Electioneering in Britain, London: Longman; Miller, W.L. (1977), 
Electoral Dynamics, London: Macmillan; and Pimlott, B. (1972), ‘Does Local Party Organization Matter?’, British 
Jourrlal o f Political Science, Vol. 2, pp.381-83.
153
and where races are not close can reasonably reject the electoral formula. To clarify, 
the plurality electoral formula used in London’s borough elections creates ‘safe’ seats 
in which one or another party is virtually assured victory election after election. 
Because seats are unwinnable, opposition parties will not expend the same level of 
resources that they would in a ward in which they have a better chance of winning. 
Because parties spend fewer resources, information is more expensive for voters, and 
because of these higher costs, turnout is consistently lower.
Table 17: Correlations of Previous Race Closeness (1986-1998)
j Closeness 1998 Closeness 1994 Closeness 1990 Closeness 1986
Closeness 1998 ! R 1 1 .0 0 0 .656 | .446 .363
N j 737 737 ! 736 735
Closeness 1994 I R I .656 1 .0 0 0 ! .565 .397
N | 736 738 | 737 736
Closeness 1990 1 R | .446 .565
ooo
i .690
.N 1 736 737 i 737 735
Closeness 1986 I R ! .363 .397 .690 1 .0 0 0
N 1 735 736 ! 735 736
That parties target resources in response to the incentives and disincentives 
built into the electoral system might not be too objectionable if this behaviour was 
random. But, as shown in Table 17, race closeness is a stable ward characteristic and 
uncompetitive wards tend to remain uncompetitive over the long term. Between 1994 
and 1998, 66 percent of the 736 wards examined in the study had consistently high or 
low closeness rates. Between 1990 and 1994 57 percent of wards had similar 
closeness rates and between 1986 and 1990 the 69 percent of the rates were similar. 
That non-competitiveness is a stable ward characteristic that information costs will be 
consistently higher in some wards as rational parties will target fewer resources in 
wards where races are unwinnable over the long term. That this pattern of expenditure 
is directly related to how the electoral system rewards parties with seats ties electoral
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system design to resources allocation, low turnout and, ultimately, institutionalized 
discrimination completes Step 3 of the four persistent losing tests.
This discriminatory cycle of low turnout due to lower resource allocation that 
prompted a particular ward’s unwinability could be broken if  the incentives that drive 
party behaviour were changed. As parties are inevitably influenced by the game in 
which they compete, if the game is weighted so that wards with close races demand 
more resources than those in which races are not close, then this is how parties will 
structure their strategies. In London Borough elections, votes in wards with close 
races are simply worth more to the parties and thus are pursued with more vigour. The 
resulting pursuit starts the chain reaction that eventually leads to the perpetual absence 
of a large proportion of voters in some wards. However, if all votes were important to 
parties, they would have to change their strategy to incorporate these new incentives. 
Changing the incentive structure -  such as instituting a system of proportional 
representation where all votes are important to the fortunes of the party -  would be a 
good start in eliminating the existing ‘electoral wastelands’. That such alternatives 
exist fulfils the final test needed to declare the London Borough electoral system 
unfair as it creates persistent losers.
5.4 -  C o n c lu s io n s
The purpose of this chapter was to apply the theory of persistent losing to three world 
cities in an attempt to determine the level of voting stage democracy in the four case 
cities. Step 1 of the four step analytical framework revealed that only in Stockholm 
were voter turnout rates of a sufficient level to reassure those living in the city that the 
chances of persistent losing were minimal. The low turnout levels found in New York 
and London raise the spectre of persistent absence and enough evidence to move onto 
Step 2.
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Due to complexity of tests required, Step 2 tests were conducted on data from 
London Boroughs elections only. In exploring patterns of turnout at the ward level the 
statistics presented in the chapter showed that counter to previous studies of voter 
participation in London some groups are persistently absent from the voting stage as 
some wards demonstrate consistently low voter turnout rates. This discovery of a 
geographically-based pattern of low turnout prompted a move to Step 3 in which 
multivariate regression analysis was used to identify persistent absence due to 
institutionalized discrimination. Building a series of models based on various 
demographic and institutional variables tests on 2212 ward contests showed that 
socio-economic variables such as mobility, tax rates, the percentage of older residents 
and support for the Labour Party significantly impacted on turnout rates.
Based on Anthony’s Downs’ assertion that high information costs reduce 
participation, race closeness was also shown to be a statistically significant variable in 
all models. This finding is important as when tied to strategies used by parties to 
maximise their success under particular electoral arrangements. Because closeness is 
consistent from year to year in a majority of wards provides evidence that information 
is more costly for those living in non-competitive wards -  a situation directly caused 
by incentives particular to the plurality electoral system. As these incentives could be 
changed by switching to a different electoral system -  such as proportional 
representation where all votes were of equal importance to parties -  those living in 
non-competitive wards, or electoral wastelands, can claim persistent loser status.
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6 -  PREVOTING: REJECTING SELECTION BIAS
The empirical section of this thesis has so far provided examples of how the theory of 
persistent losing can be applied to evaluating electoral system performance from the 
perspective of different community groups in three world cities. Chapter 4 examined 
how vote-to-seat translation affects parties in the postvoting election stage. Chapter 5 
looked at issues of non-participation in the voting stage and why geographically based 
groups in London could be considered persistent losers. This final empirical chapter 
traces the fate of women in New York, London and Stockholm across all three 
electoral stages. As the reader will discover, prevoting is the most important election 
stage to evaluate when attempting to explain why women are underrepresented in 
local legislatures and whether or not a system can be reasonably rejected. The chapter 
concludes that it is unlikely that women would reject Stockholm’s electoral system as 
what systematic disadvantage may exist is only slight. Although women are 
persistently absent from New York City Council the current rules cannot be rejected 
as there is no evidence linking this absence to discrimination within the current 
electoral system. Only in London can women’s concentrated persistent absence be 
shown to be caused by institutionalized discrimination.
6.1 -  W o m e n , S o c ie t y  a n d  L e g isla tiv e  R e pr e sen t a t io n
Once scarce, statistics describing the gender of leadership positions are now available 
for many spheres of life. As such, inter- and intra-sector comparisons of women’s 
success rates are now common and studies have moved from a mere counting of 
heads, to assessing pay-rates and rate and level of promotion within public and private
157
sector organizations. That women generally hold far fewer important posts than men 
has been confirmed in a number of empirical studies.194
F igure 11: W om en in E u ropean  Union L egislatures
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Source: The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics -  http://www.un.org. ‘Sub-ministers’ includes deputy or 
assistant ministers or the equivalent, secretary of State or permanent secretary or the equivalent and deputy of State 
or director of government or the equivalent.
Using European Union countries as an example, Figure 11 demonstrates the 
proportion of women elected to, and holding ministerial posts within, the legislatures 
of the 15 member states. In some countries the percentage of legislators and ministers 
is high -  such as in the Nordic region, while in others the percentages are low, such as 
in Greece, Italy and France. In some countries percentages are inconsistent, such as 
Germany where of the percentage of legislators is high, but the number of these 
women selected to hold cabinet posts is low. Moving to the core subject o f this thesis, 
Figure 11 might raise suspicions that women are underrepresented on local councils. 
However this is currently impossible to determine with any certainty as data on this 
subject is scarce or non-existent in many countries. As Darcy, Welch and Clark state,
194 See Sivard, R. L. (1985), Women: A World Survey, Washington, D.C.: World Priorities; United Nations (1995), 
The World's Women, 1995: Trends and Statistics, New York: United Nations; Inter-Parliamentary Union (1991), 
Distribution o f  Seats Between Men and Women in Motional Parliaments: Statistical Data from  1945 to 30 June 
1991, Geneve: The Union; and, Seager, J. (1997), State o f  Women in the World Atlas, London: Penguin.
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this lack of data is especially true for federal countries such as the United States 
‘because there are tens of thousands of local governments across the United States 
(and)...no centralized, comprehensive records that provide information about who is 
elected to city governing boards (councils), let alone to those of other local units.’195 
As with other data used in this thesis, the lack of centralised records at the local level 
requires case-by-case data collection and assessment.
F igure 12: P ro p o rtio n  o f W om en C ouncillo rs in N ordic C o u n tries  (1945-1990)
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Source: Adapted from data in Bystydzienski, J. M. (1995), Women in Electoral Politics: Lessons from  Norway, 
Westport: Praeger,.pg. 14.
However there are some countries that do collect and disseminate information 
about women in local government. As shown in Figure 12, women's representation on 
local councils in five Nordic countries has risen significantly since the mid-1940s. 
Women made considerable gains during the 20th century, moving from holding five 
percent or less of council positions in the 1940s to over 30 percent in some countries 
in the 1990s. These upward trends mirror those at the national level where, according
195 Darcy, R., Welch, S. & Clark, J. (1994), Women, Elections & Representation, Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 
p. 30.
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to Karvonen and Selle, ‘By the early 1990s, the proportion of women in Scandinavian
parliaments was more than 30 percent throughout the region.’196
Many would interpret the upward trend of electing women legislators in local
Nordic councils as a positive sign and one to be followed in other countries as it
marks a move toward legislatures mirroring society. That is, as women make up half
of the population they should have about half the available positions. Arguments for
mirroring can be traced to John Stuart Mill, with the basic assumption being that
because representatives tend to raise issues and vote for options preferred by those of
similar characteristics legislatures must be adequately balanced if these
representatives are to reflect the general will of society.197 Anne Phillips offers a more
refined view of this idea:
The ‘interests’ of pensioners or the long-term unemployed can perhaps be 
championed by those who fall into neither category, but the ‘perspectives’ of 
women or black Americans must surely be carried by representatives who are 
female or black. 198
Whether it is interests or perspectives, the case for equal gender representation 
usually flows from the argument that men and women legislators will generally 
endorse measures that will benefit their respective gender. Thus for women’s views to 
receive full consideration during decision-making processes the proportion of women 
holding legislative seats should reflect that of the wider community. There is indeed 
some evidence that suggests that women legislators hold different views than their 
male colleagues. For example, in her study of the Canadian House of Commons 
Lynda Erickson has found that, ‘...women (legislators) tend to be most different than 
men on issues explicitly related to women. In particular, women and men divide most
196 Karvonen, L. & Selle, P. (1995), Women in Nordic Politics: Closing the Gap, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing 
Company, p.4.
197 Mill, J.S. (1964), Representative Government, London: Dent.
198 Phillips, A. quoted in Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment: Gender Race and Class in the 
British Parliament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 94.
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clearly on questions of access to the political sphere....this is an issue on which 
women of all backgrounds do share a common interest.'199
At first glance it might appear that those concerned with democracy and 
political equality should support mirroring because in at least some cases women best 
represent the views of other women. However, when the reasoning behind gender- 
balanced legislatures is traced to its roots this argument becomes less convincing. 
Legislative mirroring is often defended using traditional utilitarian arguments in that 
gaining a number of seats equal to their proportion of the population will somehow 
ensure that women’s utility is maximized during the larger, community-wide utility 
maximization processes. Those demanding mirroring presume that the only way for 
women’s wants and desires to be accurately reflected is if their proportion of 
legislative votes is of equal strength to their proportion of the population.200 But as 
shown in earlier chapters, the difficulties associated with providing evidence that 
mirroring actually maximizes women’s utility is compounded by adding the 
additional problem of substantiating the claim that like accurately represent the views 
of like.
Instead of basing arguments for more balanced legislatures on claims that are 
impossible to measure in any detail this thesis proposes a less complicated line of 
reasoning. Women -  or other community groups -  are justified in demanding rule 
changes merely by showing that their legislative absence is due to unfair participation 
costs that render them persistent losers. Following the principle of persistent losing, 
women do not have to demonstrate women’s interests better or more accurately than 
men, but merely that rules by which elections are conducted are unfair. The rest of 
this chapter demonstrates how this idea can be applied to the three study cities.
199 Erickson, L. (1997), 'Might More Women Make a Difference? Gender, Party and Ideology Among Canada's 
Parliamentary Candidates', Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol.30:4, pp. 663-668, p. 686
200 For hints at this argument see Phillips, A. (1993), Democracy and Difference, Cambridge: Polity Press, Ch. 5.
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6.2 -  A n a l y t i c a l  C o n s id e r a t io n s
While the underlying theory used in this thesis differs from past studies, for
methodological reasons it is worth examining how other authors have investigated the
issue of women’s legislative absence. Conducted for the United Nations Educational
Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1955, Maurice Duverger’s The
Political Role o f  Women offers a good starting point. Duverger examines empirical
evidence from a number of countries in an attempt to discover patterns of behaviour
among women voters as well as rates and causes of non-participation in various
aspects of political life. Of most pertinence to this study is Duverger’s finding that not
only are few women nominated for office or later elected, but that the proportion of
women candidates is higher than the proportion of women elected.201 He demonstrates
that this gap is not so much caused by widespread opposition to women candidates by
the electorate, but rather because male-dominated parties seldom put women in
winnable seats or at the top of party lists because ‘they are afraid of losing support if
they act otherwise.’202 In explaining the status quo Duverger places as much of the
blame on women as he does men:
The small part played by women in politics merely reflects and results from 
the secondary place to which they are still assigned by the customs and • 
attitudes of our society and which their education and training tend to make 
them accept that natural order of things. Purely political (i.e. institutional) 
reforms are effective here only so far as they tend gradually to modify this 
situation.. .It is probably still more important to fight against the deeply- 
rooted belief in the natural inferiority of women.. .There is no more an 
inferior sex than there are inferior races or inferior classes. But there is a sex, 
and there are classes and races, which have come to believe in their 
inferiority because they have been persuaded of it in justification of their 
subordinate position in society.203
In sum, Duverger suggests three reasons why women might be 
underrepresented in political office: (1) widespread voter prejudice against women;
201 Duverger, M. (1955), The Political Role o f  Women, Paris: UNESCO, p.87.
202 Duverger, M. (1955), The Political Role o f  Women, p. 89.
203 Duverger, M. (1955), The Political Role o f  Women, p. 130.
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(2) prejudice against women within the political parties acting as gatekeepers to the
electoral arena; (3) a general reluctance of women to stand for office. All three
explanations are based on the idea that while women have the right to vote and run for
office they have yet to accept, and be accepted into, the masculine world of politics:
While women have, legally, ceased to be minors, they still have the mentality 
of minors in many fields and, particularly in politics, they usually accept 
paternalism on the part of men. The man -  husband, fiance, lover or myth -  is 
the mediator between them and the political world .204
The work of Duverger represents a valuable early contribution to the study of 
women in elections as it provides some idea as how to begin an investigation of 
women’s under-representation in politics. Duverger’s three explanations as to why 
women are absent from political sphere suggests direct social bias on the part of 
voters, parties and women themselves. That is, absence can be blamed on party 
members or voters who are prejudiced against women or that women’s personal 
characteristics, values or interests somehow conflict with the desire to stand for office. 
In these instances voters and parties are reluctant to support women candidates and 
women are reluctant to come forward because they believe women are inferior to 
men. This bias can be reflective of ‘positive or negative judgements of people on the 
basis of characteristics seen as common to their group, rather than as individuals,’ and 
does not only imply that discriminators may feel that some candidates are grossly 
inferior, but rather that men may be just slightly better suited for the particular job.205 
In other cases, direct social bias may result when women, as Duverger found, feel 
they are inferior and less worthy than males to make decisions.
The reader may be asking how evidence of social bias ties in with the idea of 
institutionalised discrimination. Further, what is the point to studying institutions if it 
can be shown that women hold less than their share of seats because of widespread
204 Duverger, M. (1955), The Political Role o f  Women, p.129.
205 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, p. 107.
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social bias by voters, parties or women themselves? An example may provide a partial 
answer of how such results link with the theory of persistent losing. Many authors 
correlate relatively high percentages of women legislators with proportional 
representation formulae using multi-member constituencies.206 The explanation 
usually offered is that unlike single-member district systems, multi-member districts 
do not force voters and parties into zero-sum, man-woman games. Thus multi­
member districts should help women win seats as they allow voters and parties to 
hedge their bets and choose both men and women.207 These findings and ideas have 
prompted some authors to make rather grand claims about the role played by electoral 
systems, such as Wilma Rule who categorizes electoral systems as ‘friendly’ or 
‘unfriendly’ depending on the proportion of women are elected. With little substantive 
investigation, Rule deems ‘Party-list Proportional Representation’ the most women 
friendly and ‘Alternative Vote’ as the most unfriendly.208
Leaving aside the countless other institutional variables that could be at play 
and the mostly unsubstantiated claims made in some studies, the key concept for 
readers to remember is that while electoral systems may aggravate (single-member 
zero-sum game) or ease (multi-member bet-hedging) the effects of social bias, at the 
core the problem still rests the fact that voters, parties and/or women are biased 
against women. All things being equal, if there were no social bias against women 
electoral rules would have no impact on the number of women elected to office. 
However the fact that under-representation always stems from social bias does not
206 See, for example, Rule, W. (1987), 'Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women’s Opportunity for 
Election to Parliament in 23 Democracies', Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 40, pp.477-98; Rule, W. (1994), 
‘Parliaments of, by, and for the People’, in Rule, W. & Zimmerman, J.F. (eds), Electoral Systems in Comparative 
Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities, Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 15-30; Norris, P. (2000), 
Women’s Representation and Electoral Systems in Rose, R. (ed.), Encyclopedia o f  Electoral Systems, Washington, 
D.C.: QC Press; Lijphart, A. (1994), Electoral Systems and Party Systems', Matland, R. (1993), 'Institutional 
Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The Case of Norway', Journal o f  Politics, 
Vol. 55: 3, pp.737-755.
207 Matland, R. (1993), 'Institutional Variables Affecting Female Representation in National Legislatures: The 
Case of Norway', p.738.
208 Rule, W. (1994), ‘Parliaments of, by, and for the People’, pp.27-8.
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mean that institutions have no independent impact on women’s legislative success. It 
is possible for rules and structures to directly discriminate against women in subtle 
and not-so-subtle manners. Pre-suffrage rules directly excluding women from voting 
provides example of not-so-subtle discrimination, but as shown in other chapters, in 
the modem era institutional bias is more refined and difficult to identify. This study 
attempts to detect rules that allow prejudiced members of society to discriminate 
against women on a consistent basis. As with the last two chapters, persistent losing 
provides the theoretical base from which to proceed. It has been previously argued 
that decision-making must be assessed on the basis of how well it promotes the 
premiss of equality. Accordingly, a decision-making process can only be considered 
as promoting equality if it cannot be reasonably rejected by any community member 
bound by the decisions made, with members who are permanently or almost 
permanently . disadvantaged during the decision-making process due to 
institutionalised discrimination deemed reasonable in their rejection of a particular set 
of institutional arrangements.
In identifying whether women can reasonably reject decision-making 
institutions in any of the case cities, it is necessary to customize this investigation of 
women as persistent losers. In addition to employing different statistics, Step 1 in the 
process is abandoned. Instead of assessing the general participatory health of a 
community as when looking at vote-to-seat proportionality or turnout, it is possible to 
move directly to assessing whether women are persistently absent from various 
electoral stages because a specific community group has already been identified as the 
core subject of study. This chapter also differs as it allows the fortunes of this single 
group to be traced through the three election stages giving a complete picture of 
where exactly women are disadvantaged during in the election process. The remainder
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of this chapter asks if women are persistently absent from local councils (Step 2); if 
so, if the persistent absence is due to institutionalized discrimination (Step 3); and, if 
so, if superior alternatives arrangements exist (step 4). If convincing answers can be 
found to all three questions in a single city then women can reject the offending 
electoral rules.
6.3 -  W o m e n ’s P e r siste n t  A bsen c e  in T h r ee  W o r ld  C ities
Before attempting to identify if higher costs are imposed on women during local 
elections it is first necessary to determine if women less frequently than men win seats 
in Stockholm, London and New York. While the statistics are the same as those used 
by those who argue that mirroring will increase the chance of maximizing women’s 
utility, this study follows a different reasoning for employing a similar measure. The 
theory of persistent losing demands that if it is found that over a series of elections 
women have not won a proportion of seats equal to their proportion of the population 
then they may have cause to reject the electoral system, but this is by no means 
guaranteed. In order to reject the current system evidence institutionalised 
discrimination -  rules that systematically hamper women more than men in the 
various election stages -  must also be identified.
Table 18 shows the percentage of women elected to local councils in 
Stockholm, New York and London boroughs. With an average of almost 40 percent 
over the 38 year period, Stockholm boasts the most balanced local legislature. Just 
over 20 percent of London Borough councillors have been women, while fewer than 
20 percent have been elected in New York. Scores from individual years range from 
25 to 48.5 percent in Stockholm, 16.6 to 28.7 percent in London, and zero to 29.4 
percent in New York.
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Table 18: Percentage of Women Seat Holders in Three World Cities (1961-1998)
Year Stockholm New York London Year Stockholm
(cont'd)
New York 
(cont'd)
London
(cont'd)
1961- 0 .0 % 1980
1962 27.0% 1981
1963 1982 46.5% 23.5% 2 1 .8 %
1964 16.6% 1983
1965 2.7% 1984
1966 25.0% 1985 43.6% 25.7%
1967 1986 24.8%
1968 18.5% 1987
1969 1 0 .8 % 1988 45.5%
1970 26.0% 1989 28.6%
1971 18.4% 1990 26.4%
1972 1991 48.5% 29.4%
1973 33.7% 1992
1974 9.1% 19.3% 1993 29.4%
1975 1994 47.5% 27.0%
1976 33.7% 1995
1977 14.0% 1996
1978 2 1 .0 % 1997 29.4%
1979 42.6% 1998 47.5% 28.7%
Avg. 38.9% 18.4% 2 2 .2 %
Figure 13 graphically demonstrates the percentage of women seat holders in 
local legislatures in the three world cities. Two trends become clear from looking at 
this graph. First, as time progresses women have been winning more of the overall 
percentage of seats in all three cities. This increase comes despite the relative stability 
of the electoral systems used in each city, hinting that it is a lessening of social bias in 
all cities might be driving change. In light of the rule that that three instances of bias 
need to be demonstrated in order to prove that absence is persistent, it appears that 
this is indeed the case in each city as women have never won their fair share of seats.
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F igure 13: P ercen tage of W om en Seat H olders in T h ree  W orld  C ities (1961-1998)
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Before moving on, it is worth considering these results in a more practical 
light. While formally women in Stockholm can be considered persistent absentees, the 
extent of the disadvantage is now so slight that women in this city might forgo the 
costs associated with challenging this bias as the gains would be minimal. This line of 
reasoning follows with the results from this city presented in Chapters 4 and 5. As the 
rules currently stand in the city, most political parties in Stockholm have voluntarily 
adopted quota systems by which neither men nor women can gain more than 60 
percent of the seats available to that particular party. The Social Democratic party has 
even gone further and guaranteed that women will be offered half the positions won 
under the once closed, now open, list proportional representation system.209 In other 
words the system in Stockholm is not prefect, but serious efforts have been made to 
address the gender underrepresentation and it may be enough for women to accept a 
slight imbalance. This is certainly not the case in New York and London where the
♦  Stockholm 
■  New York 
A London
209 Bystydzienski, J. (1995), Women in Electoral Politics: Lessons from Norway, Westport: Praeger, Chapter 2.
results so-lopsidedly favour men. The current arrangements would well be worth 
challenging if it can be shown that absence is indeed caused by discriminatory 
institutional arrangements. In light of these considerations, the rest of the chapter 
confines further detailed investigation to examining women’s persistent absence in 
New York and London.
6.4 -  P er sist e n t  L o sin g  in  N ew  Y o r k
As shown from the statistics above, a good deal fewer women than men have secured 
seats on New York City Council since 1961. These figures also show the gap between 
the number of seats women have secured and to which they should have secured 
under a fair system has significantly decreased in recent years. But the current level of 
representation indicates that women are still persistently absent from New York City 
council, a result that under the theory of persistent losing requires further 
investigation. Where the previous two chapters focussed on a single voting stage, 
because this investigation is limited to a single social group it is possible to trace the 
fate of women through all three voting stages in America’s largest city. The next three 
subsections examine how women are treated in the postvoting, voting and prevoting 
stage in order to identify discriminatory rules.
6.4.1 -  Postvoting Stage
As previously mentioned, one reason why women may be persistently absent from 
local councils in New York is the parties whom they represent choose to place women 
candidates in constituencies in which they have little or no chance of winning. There 
may be a variety reasons for this practice -  from straightforward belief that women 
are inferior to men, to softer bias that men might be slightly more capable 
representatives than women thus leading parties to favour male candidates. To do so, 
party executives exploit selection rules to render their favoured result. Whatever the
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reason, if it can be shown that over the long-term nomination process has been used to 
distort a party’s candidate gender balance to the point that they cause persistent 
absence shown earlier, then women would be reasonable in rejecting these rules.
Table 19: Women's Vote-to-Seat Proportionality in New York (1961-1997)
Year % Women Seat Holders % Votes Cast for Women Difference
1961 0.0% 2.1% -2.1%
1965 2.7% 6.4% -3.7%
1969 10.8% 14.6% -3.8%
1974 9.1% 13.8% -4.7%
1977 14.0% 13.1% 0.8%
1982 23.5% 21.8% 1.7%
1985 | 25.7% 26.4% -0.7%
1989 | • 28.6% 34.2% -5.6%
1991 29.4% 28.4% 1.0%
1993 29.4% 27.9% 1.5%
1997 29.4% 28.1% 1.3%
Avg. 18.4% 19.7% - 1.3%
As shown in Table 19, to test if women are more likely than men to be placed 
in seats they cannot win, ‘vote-to-seat proportionality’ is examined. To do so, the 
percentage of total seats won by women is subtracted from the percentage of total 
votes secured. Negative percentages are expected if women more-often-than-men run 
in constituencies where they cannot win as the votes received by women are less often 
converted into seats. Results will be positive if women are more-often-than-men 
placed in safe seats. Table 19 demonstrates that rules have allowed women candidates 
to be placed at a disadvantage more than three times since 1961, a result that indicates 
that women are persistently absent due to institutionalized discrimination. However, 
because these discrepancies have not been of huge burden and because they have all 
but disappeared in recent years, if asked, women candidates in New York may not 
choose to challenge the current rules even if it was possible to implement fairer
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institutional arrangements. As such, the investigation continues on to voting stage 
investigations.
6.4.2 -  Voting Stage
The most likely source of bias against women in the voting stage would come from 
voters who, for whatever reason, are reluctant to cast votes for women candidates. 
There are three sources of information that can aid in identifying voter hostility 
toward women: survey-based evidence; focus group based evidence and actual 
election results. A variety of studies on this topic have been based on survey evidence 
provided by the National Election Survey, Gallup Organisation or the General Society 
Survey in the. United States. Here voters are asked questions such as if they would 
vote for women candidates for various positions, if they prefer male or female 
candidates, if women are less suited for office than men, etc. For example, since 1937 
the Gallup Organization has asked Americans if they would vote for a female 
presidential candidate. While in the 1930s only one in three respondents answered in 
the positive, recent polls show that now more than nine in ten respondents state they 
would vote for a woman for president.210 Likewise, since the early 1950s the National 
Election Survey has asked ‘If your party nominated a woman for president, would you 
vote for her if she were qualified for the job?’. Where early surveys reported that 
almost 20 per cent of respondents would not vote for a woman for president, the 
percentage has fallen to less than 10 percent in recent surveys.211
Although a great deal of resources have been invested in the above surveys 
and results have shed light a variety of important topics including perceptions of 
women in electoral politics, the reliability of their results is questionable. For
210 Cook, E.A. (1998), “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates”, in Thomas, S. & Wilcox, C., Women and Elective 
Office, New York, Oxford-University Press, pp.56-72, p. 58.
211 Fox, R.L. (1997), Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections, Thousand Oaks: Sage, p. 145.
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example, there is a good chance that the answers provided by respondents do not 
reflect their actual viewpoints in that they are reluctant to admit prejudice against 
women. As shown earlier in this study, the turnout rates reported in National Election 
Surveys in the late 1990s are almost 25 percent higher than officially recorded rates, 
indicating skewed sampling, faulty memory or outright lying on the part of 
respondents.212 Following on these calculations one could assume that the actual rate 
of those who are prejudiced against women could be a good deal higher. According to 
Fox, another reason to be sceptical of survey results is that ‘many voters may possess 
gender biases of which they are not aware’.213 Being unaware of chauvinism could 
lead to reports of non-bias when bias is present.
Focus group information is less widely used, but still a possible source of 
information about bias in the electorate. In these tests, participants are presented with 
various images of candidates and asked how they feel about fitness for office. 
Questioning small groups allows researchers to refine their questions in order to test 
their hypothesises more thoroughly, and allows researchers to gauge not only overtly 
negative reactions to women candidates but also more thoroughly test for biases of 
which the participants may be unaware. However, these tests can only produce broad 
generalisations about how electorate feel about women candidates and cannot 
accurately reproduce the actual election environment that includes a huge number of 
variables that can influence the voting behaviour. As Cook states, these hypothetical 
situations are only so useful in helping us understand voting behaviour as in the end 
‘the only votes that count are cast in real elections.’214
212 Burden, B. (2000), ‘Voter Turnout and the National Election Studies’.
213 Fox, R.L. (1997), Gender Dynamics in Congressional Elections, p. 145.
214 Cook, E.A. (1998), “Voter Reaction to Women Candidates”, in Thomas, S. & Wilcox, C., Women and Elective 
Office, p. 62.
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The final way of determining whether the electorate is biased against women 
is through the use of electoral data. A number of authors have used election results to 
determine if women and men have equal chance of success when running for office. 
For example, Seltzer, Newman & Leighton examined the name, seat sought, year, 
party, sex, incumbency status, and success rates for 61,603 candidates running in US 
state, congressional, senate, and gubernatorial elections since 1972 in order to 
compare success rates of women and men in all these races. In the end, they found 
that in like categories ‘[a] candidates’ sex does not affect his or her chances of 
winning an election.’215 Darcy, Welch and Clark use similar data to check the success 
rates of new male and female candidates in three US states between 1950 and 1980. 
The authors checked the mean proportion of votes for each gender category on a 
decade-by-decade basis finding that ‘...in general elections in the mid-1970s, the 
voter reluctance to support female candidates, as observed in the 1950s and 1960s, 
had all but disappeared.’216 As with the study by Seltzer, Newman & Leighton, in 
Women Representation and Elections Darcy, Welch and Clark conclude that in their 
study states ‘voter hostility cannot account for the lack of female representation in 
state legislatures today... .’217
Using election data eliminates the problems of (sometimes very significant) 
inaccuracy and reliance on hypothetical situations suffered by the reliance on survey
or focus group data. However, this does not mean that studies such those by Seltzer,
Newman & Leighton, and Darcy, Welch and Clark do not suffer from their own 
inadequacies. For example, because of the large number and complex interaction of 
variables that could affect voters’ final decisions of whom to support, it is very
215 Seltzer, R.A. (1997), Sex as A Political Variable: Women as Candidates & Voters in U.S. Elections, Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, p.79.
216 Darcy, R, Welch, S. & Clark, J. (1994), Women, Elections & Representation, p. 65.
217 Darcy, R, Welch, S. & Clark, J. (1994), Women, Elections & Representation, p. 67.
173
difficult, if not impossible to gauge what has influenced a voter to support or not 
support a particular candidate. Although the above studies are impressive, it would be 
a mistake to read too much into their results and the best that can be expected is to 
broadly identify trends in a particular community. Bearing in mind this caveat, the 
general idea of using actual election data to assess whether a particular community is 
or is not biased against women is perhaps the best available.
Table 20: Candidate-Share-to-Seat-Share Proportionality in New York (1961-1997)
Year % Votes Cast for Women % Women Candidates Difference
1 1961 2 .1% 4.2% -2 .1%
1 1965 6.4% 7.0% -0.5%
| 1969 14.6% 8.5% 6 .0 %
1 1974 13.8% 29.5% -15.7%
| 1 9 7 7  | 13.1% 18.3% -5.1%
| 1982 2 1 .8 % 23.3% -1.5%
I 1985 | 26.4% 23.0% 3.4%
| 1989 | 34.2% 26.6% 7.6%
1991 28.4% 29.3% -0.9%
1 1993 | 27.9% 25.0% 2.9%
| 1997 . 28.1% 27.0% 1 .1%
j Avg. 19.7% | 2 0 .1 % -0.4%
This study does not rely on success rates to identify voter bias in New York, 
but rather uses actual votes cast for all women candidates during council elections -  
not just those who are eventually elected. The approach then is to identify if the 
percentage of votes cast for women matches the percentage of candidates who are 
women. As shown in Table 20, in 1997 women comprised 27 percent of the total 
candidates running for office and received 28.1 percent of the total votes cast 
indicating that there was very little chance that the voters in that particular community 
are biased against women in that year. However, as seen in 1977, if 18.3 percent of 
women candidates receive only 15.1 percent of the votes cast, the 5.1 percent 
differential indicates there is a good chance that some bias against women exists
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within the community. This method of calculating gender bias within a particular 
community of voters can perhaps be criticized as too simple. For example, allowances 
for such as incumbency, party affiliation and candidate experience have been included 
in other studies as they can play a major role in gaining voter support.218 However, the 
idea here is simply to try and rule out bias -  represented by positive scores. If bias is 
found to exist then other techniques will be needed to try and determine scale and 
depth.
Figure 14: C and ida te-S hare -to -V o te -S hare  P ropo rtiona lity  (1961-1997)
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Figure 14 demonstrates candidate-share-to-vote-share proportionality in New 
York City Council elections between 1961 and 1997 in graphical form. While there is 
some discrepancy from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, New York voters appear as 
prepared to vote for women candidates as they are from candidates that are men. The 
worst year (1974) can perhaps be explained away by the fact that the election was 
held during the Equal Rights Amendment struggles that prompted a surge in the 
number of women candidates, but did not result in a corresponding surge in support
218 See Darcy, R, Welch, S. & Clark, J. (1994), Women, Elections & Representation, p. 65. and Seltzer, R.A. 
(1997), Sex as A Political Variable: Women as Candidates & Voters in U.S. Elections, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
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from voters. As with postvoting stage results, because women have been placed at a 
disadvantage more than three times they could reject this system as biased if superior 
electoral arrangements were found to exist. However, as recent results provide no 
evidence of voting bias and that overall bias has been minor women might choose to 
accept the current system as the costs of bringing about change would most little 
exceed whatever small gains might be made.
6.4.3 -  Prevoting Stage
As shown in the second section of this chapter, fewer than 20 percent of New York 
City Councillors elected since 1961 have been women. Where women have been 
shown to be at a slight disadvantage in the postvoting and voting stages investigations 
it was argued that women would be unlikely to reject the current electoral 
arrangements as the level of bias is slim and has all but disappeared in recent years. 
Because the bias in these stages cannot explain the continual lows numbers of women 
who are elected to office, prevoting stage investigations are necessary.
Table 21 shows the difference between the percentage of women seat holders 
and the percentage of women candidates in New York City Council races. While the 
overall average indicates that women hold slightly less than their fair share of the 
seats, negative figures only existed in the early years shown above and has since the 
turned positive. In sum, Table 21 demonstrates that if the percentage of women 
running for office increases, so too does the percentage of seats they hold. In fact, if
•y
the extraordinary surge of candidates in 1974 is removed there is a remarkable fit (R 
0.95) between the two sets of figures -  indicating that women’s absence on council is 
due to a lack of women candidates running for these posts. Thus the answer to the 
riddle of why so few women run for office perhaps lies with how parties in New York 
select their candidates.
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Table 21: Women as Seat Holders and Candidates in New York (1961-1997)
Year Women Seat Holders Women Candidates Difference
1961 0 % 4% -4%
1965 3% 7% -4%
1969 1 1 % 9% 2 %
1974 9% 29% -2 0 %
1977 14% 18% -4%
1982 24% 23% 1%
1985 . 26% 23% 3%
1989 29% 27% 2 %
1991 29% 29% 0 %
1993 29% 25% 4%
1997 29% 27% 2 %
Avg. | 18.5% 2 0 .1 % -1 .6 %
R2 0.63 (0.95 without 1974 results)
Some authors believe that those who control party endorsements and resources 
can slow women’s entrance to, and progression within, the political sphere. Empirical 
investigations of this theme can be traced back to Sophonisa P. Breckenridge’s work 
of the early 1930s. In her study of 124 state legislators in the United States, 
Breckenridge found that women felt they were denied their fair share of nominations 
by the male dominated party elite.219 As previously shown, in the 1950s Duverger 
continued to explore this thesis, citing elite bias within parties as one of the main 
reasons for women’s under representation in European legislatures.220
New York has had some form of state run, primary-based candidate selection 
process since 1886. In this system a pre-general election vote is held through which 
party members choose who will represent them in the general election. Primaries were 
brought in to replace various types of party nomination process ranging from 
conventions to non-elective, direct appointments of candidates by local party leaders.
219 For a summary of this early study see Flammang, J. A. (1997), Women's Political Voice: How Women are 
Transforming the Practice and Study o f Politics, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 149-195.
220 For other studies in this area see, for example, Kirkpatrick, J.J. (1974), Political Women, New York: Basic 
Books and Stewart, D.W. (1980), The Women's Movement in Community Politics in the U.S.: The Role o f  Local 
Commissions on the Status o f  Women, New York: Pergamon.
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The current arrangements stem from a 1913 amendment to the law that required all 
wishing to become the official candidate of a particular party to gather a number of 
signatures from local party members.221 In order to participate in a party’s primary for 
a New York City council seat, potential contestants must collect 900 valid signatures 
from local party members.222 The primary system should make it more difficult for 
party elite to control which candidates are chosen to run for office as the selection 
process is state regulated and much more public. Where in systems where party elite 
choose candidates it is possible to imagine misogynist back room deals, selecting 
candidates through primaries contests would seem to leave little leeway for this type 
of corruption.
Table 22: Women as Party Primary Contestants and Winners (1982-1997)
Democrats Republican
Year
| Women j Women 
| Primary j Primary 
( Winners | Contestants
Difference
Women
Primary
Winners
Women
Primary
Contestants
Difference
1982 23%  1 30% -7% 16% 16% 0 %
1985 26%  ! 29% -3% 29% 27% 2 %
1989 29%  ! 22% 6 % 21% 21% 0 %
1991 37%  j 27% 1 1 % 18% 20% -1 %
1993 36%  i 35% 1 % 12% 12% 0 %
1997 34%  i 34% 0 % 14% 10% 4%
Average 31% 29% 1 % 18% 17% 1 %
In investigating possible bias during the prevoting stage, Table 22
demonstrates the difference between the percentage of women running and winning 
primary races for both major parties in New York. Looking first at the Democratic 
Party results, it would appear that where there may have been some bias against 
women in the early and mid-1980s, this bias has disappeared as women now win the 
same proportion of spots on party ballots as men. Over the six elections presented
221 See, for a historical summary of this process, Scarrow, H.A. (1983), Parties, Elections & Representation in the 
State o f  New York, New York; New York University Press.
222 New York State Board of Elections (1998), State o f  New York 1998 Election Law: Rules and Regulations, 
Albany: New York State Board of Elections, Sect. 6-136, pp. 135-6.
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here, women have comprised 29 percent of those who have stood in primaries to 
represent Democrats and 30 percent of those who went on the contest seats in the 
general election. There would appear to no consistent bias against women within the 
Democratic Party during primary races. The story is much the same within the 
Republican Party. 17 percent of the candidates coming forward in primary races have 
been women, and women have won 18 percent of the available candidate positions. 
Thus a lack of women standing as Republican Party candidates is not a result of bias 
within the party, but would rather appear to be caused by not enough women standing 
as contestants for primary races within the Republican Party. Overall, the data tell the 
following tale: the more women stand in primaries, the more that will go on to 
become candidates and -  consistent with the voting and postvoting evidence — the 
more will go on to hold council seats.
It would appear that if there any barriers to women holding council seats they 
are erected before primary races. There are a number of barriers that could be 
explored. For example, the 900 signatures required to join a primary race may pose 
more of a hindrance to women than men. Perhaps women may be less able to afford 
the costs of running in a primary race than men. Or, moving back to Duverger, 
perhaps then there are no real institutional barriers exploited by those who would 
rather see men elected than women, but rather women themselves are less prone to 
participate as candidates in local elections. Examining pre-primary attitudes in New 
York demands a different variety of data as what is under consideration is attitudes 
and not actions. The limited survey information available from New York would 
suggest that women do not feel that City Council is tremendously important for their 
city. For example, when asked ‘Do you think the City Council has real impact on the 
way the city is managed or do you think the City Council has no real impact on the
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way the city is managed?’, 38 percent of men asked replied that it ‘had real impact’, 
where only 30 percent o f women offered the same response.223 While this evidence 
does not prove that women are less likely to run for office than men, it is realistic to 
expect that only those who think the job is important would choose to run for office.
F igure 15: W om en’s A w areness o f New Y ork  C ity Politics (1993)
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As shown in Figure 15, polling data from the 1993 New York City Council 
Election shows that when asked how much attention they had paid to local election 
races, virtually the same percentage of women as men said the have paid ‘a lot of 
attention’ to local race in September and October.224 However, when asked much 
earlier in the election year far fewer women than men claimed they paid ‘a lot’ of 
attention. In October, 28 percent of both men and women felt they had paid ‘a lot’ of 
attention to races, but in May of the same year 15 percent of men and only eight 
percent of women felt they were paying ‘a lot’ of attention to the mayoral campaign. 
These figures indicate that in the crucial early period when a candidate makes up his
223 WCBS-TV News/The New York Times (1993), WCBS-TVNews/New York Times New York City Poll, (1993) 
New York: WCBS-TV News, May.
224 Question: ‘How much attention have you been able to pay to this year's campaign for mayor of New York City 
- a lot, some, not much, or no attention - so far?’
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or her mind to run for office women are paying much less attention than men to local 
politics.
Although the above evidence is not conclusive, it does provide some idea as to 
why fewer women are elected to New York City Council. Results from recent 
elections show that parties are not placing women more than men in unwinnable seats, 
nor are voters less disposed to vote for women than men. Since the early 1980s the 
primary process has shown no bias against women in races for candidacies for the two 
major parties in the city. However, it was shown that fewer women than men feel that 
city council positions impact their lives and that women become engaged in the local 
political process later than male community members. While it is possible to imagine 
that the method by which information is disseminated about elections is biased against 
women, such examinations are beyond the scope of this study. Thus, except for minor 
pre-1980s prevoting and voting stage biases that have all but disappeared in recent 
elections, women would not be reasonable in rejecting the current method by which 
councillors are elected in New York.
6.5 -  P er sist e n t  L osin g  in  L ondon
Women have never won more than 30 percent of the approximately 1900 available 
seats each election across the Greater London boroughs. Thus as in New York, the 
women of Greater London can be said to be persistently absent from local borough 
councils. In investigating persistence absence, this section follows the same route as 
the last. Starting with the postvoting election stage the fate of women is traced 
backward through the other two stages in order to try and determine why women are 
absent and if the current system can be rejected due to institutionalized 
discrimination.
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6.5.1 -  Postvoting Stage
As shown in New York, assessing women’s vote-to-seat proportionality is a good test 
of whether women more often than men run in unwinnable seats. Negative scores 
resulting from subtracting the percentage of votes cast for women from the number of 
seats won by women indicates that women are disproportionately gaining votes in 
areas in which they are not winning seats. As shown in Chapter 4, that vote-gainers 
are not awarded seats is commonplace in London’s plurality system, however 
consistently negative vote-to-seat ratio scores indicate an inequality in how seats are 
distributed between men and women.
Table 23: Women's Vote-to-Seat Proportionality in London (1961-1998)
Year % Winners Seat Holders %  Votes Cast for Women Difference
1964 16.57% 18.14% -1.58%
1968 18.52% 19.39% -0.87%
1971 18.36% 20.74% -2.38%
1974 19.34% 20.99% -1.65%
1978
1982
20.96% 22.73% -1.77%
21.79% 23.70% -1.92%
1986 24.76% 25.98% -1 .2 2 %
1990 26.38% 27.52% -1.14%
1994 26.97% 28.63% -1 .6 6 %
1998 • 28.69% 30.15% -1.46%
Avg. 22.23% 23.80% -1.56%
Table 23 demonstrates vote-to-seat proportionality in London. As with New
York, negative percentages indicate that more-often-than-not women are running in 
constituencies where they cannot win, positive percentages indicate women are more 
often-than-men running in safe seats. The average vote-to-seat ratio is -1.56 percent, 
indicating a slight overall bias against women. A disaggregated account of the data 
shows that in every election since 1964 women have been placed in unwinnable seats 
more often than men and have never won more than their fair share of seats in any of 
the ten elections.
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F igure 16: V ote to Seat P ro p o rtio n a lity  in London (1964-1998)
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Figure 16 diagrammatically shows the data from Table 6. It is clear that 
women are consistently awarded a smaller proportion of seats than their vote totals 
would indicate they deserve. For example, in 1998 women received 30.15 percent of 
the total votes cast, but only received 28.69 percent of the available seats for a vote- 
seats proportionality score of -  1.5 percent. If seats were awarded in exact proportion 
to the number of votes received elections women would have won 28 more seats in 
1998, 32 more seats in 1994 and 22 more seats in 1990. The only explanation for this 
disproportional score is that women candidates are more-often-than men situated in 
non-winning constituencies. That these negative scores have occurred more than three 
times under the current electoral arrangements help build the case for women as 
persistent losers.
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Table 24: Women Candidates by Party (1964-1998)
Year Labour Conservative Liberal Other
1964 2 0 % 2 2 % 2 0 % 14%
1968 2 2 % 2 1 % 25% 16%
1971 2 2 % 24% 26% 2 0 %
1974 2 2 % 24% 26% 28%
1978 24% 24% 35% 25%
1982 26% 26% 25% 24%
1986 27% 27% 29% 29%
1990 27% 29% 35% 30%
1994 27% 30% 35% 33%
1998 30% 32% 35% 32%
Avg. 25% 26% 29% 25%
One plausible explanation for the negative scores is that winning parties are 
not running the same proportion of women candidates as losing parties. However as 
shown in Table 24, it would appear that while as the winningest party Labour 
supports a slightly lower of proportion of women candidates than other parties, their 
overall average is close to on par with the other parties indicating that women 
candidates are not clambering to one party. Thus, the only other factor to consider is 
that women are systematically placed by one or all parties in wards in which the party 
they represent has little or no chance of winning. Such actions would be possible in 
London as party leaders greatly control which candidacies they will support and 
decide where various supportees will run -  unlike New York which uses a primary 
election to choose candidates. This topic of candidate selection is pursued in more 
detail during explorations of the prevoting stage.
6.5.2 -  Voting Stage
In attempting to explain women’s persistent absence from local borough councils, 
evidence has been presented that should at least raise the suspicion that selection 
processes are biased against women in some or all of the London boroughs. However 
even if this bias was proven beyond a shadow of a doubt it would still only explain a
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small proportion of missing women legislators and other reasons need to found to 
explain why women councillors are in short supply.
Table 25: Women's Candidate-to-Vote Proportionality in London (1964-1998)
Year % Votes Cast for Women J % Women Candidates Difference |
1964 1 18.14% | 20.04% -1.90% |
1968 j 19.39% i 21.60% -2 .2 1 % |
1971 20.74% ! 22.92% -2.19% j
1974 20.99% 24.07% -3.08% |
1978 22.73% I 25.97% -3.24% J
1982 23.70% | 25.47% -1.76% j
1986 25.98% 27.82% -1.84% I
1990 27.52% | 29.64% -2 .1 2 % |
1994 28.63% ] 30.66% -2.03% ~~1
1998 30.15% | 32.04% -1.89%
Avg. 23.80% 26.02% -2.23% j
In moving the investigation to the voting stage, Table 25 shows candidate-to- 
vote-proportionality by subtracting the percentage of women candidates from the 
percentage of votes cast for women. Negative scores indicate voter bias against 
women, where positive score indicates voters are more inclined to vote for women 
than men. As seen in 1998 for example, although 32.04 percent of the total candidates 
women candidates only collected. 30.15 percent of the vote for a score of -1.89 
percent. This score indicates that there is a good chance that some bias against women 
exists within the community. Table 25 shows that this negative bias has existed in 
every election since 1964, averaging -2.23 percent. Figure 17 diagrammatically 
presents data from Table 25. Here the bias trend is negative and consistent. As with 
the vote-to-seat ratio some slight bias should be expected in every election, but that 
the bias is consistently against women over the long term demonstrates non- 
randomness.
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F igure 17: C and ida te-to -V ote  P ropo rtiona lity  in London (1964-1998)
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There are two possible explanations for this long-term trend. The first is that 
voters are biased in that some people will just not vote for women. The second is 
connected to previous evidence. If it is assumed that women are placed in un- or less- 
friendly wards more often than men, then biased placement would be reflected in 
whom voters choose to support. Voters may not care if their representative is a man or 
a woman, but they do care which party the women represents. Since women are in 
unfriendly wards more often than men they will not only lose more often, they will 
also gain less overall support. It is safest to assume that both factors help explain 
negative candidate-to-vote scores, reinforcing the idea of selection bias at the same 
time providing warning that there still may be a slight social bias against women 
candidates. In the end however these negative scores explain only a small portion of 
women’s persistent absence and other factors need be examined.
6.5.3 -  Prevoting Stage
In attempting to explain women’s persistent absence from local borough councils in 
London the evidence reviewed so far would appear to suggest that parties are placing
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women in less-friendly wards and this biased placement leads to women gaining less 
seats than they deserve. Not only do parties make decisions as to where wpmen 
should run in the prevoting stage, but also -  and perhaps more important -  how many 
women will stand for the party. Thus it would appear that the prevoting stage is the 
most crucial to investigate if the mystery behind women’s persistent absence from 
London Borough councils is to be solved.
Table 26: Women as Winners and Candidates in London (1964-1998)
Year Winners Candidates Candidates-Winners j
1964 16.57% 20.04% -3.47% |
1968 18.52% 21.60% -3.08% j
1971 18.36% 22.92% -4.57% |
1974 19.34% 24.07% -4.74% j
1978 20.96% 25.97% -5.00% 1
1982 21.79% 25.47% -3.68% |
1986 24.76% 27.82% -3.06% ” 1
1990 26.38% 29.64% -3.26% |
1994 26.97% 30.66% -3.69% |
1998 28.69% 32.04% -3.35% 1
Avg. 22.23% 26.02% - 3.79% {
R2 0.97 J
Table 26 demonstrates more clearly what postvoting and voting stage data 
have already revealed about women in London. First, if the percentage of women
winners and the percentage of women who stand as candidates women is compared, 
the results demonstrate that women have been consistently disadvantaged over time. 
Comprising 26.02 percent of the candidates over the set of 10 elections, in winning 
only 22.23 percent of the seats women have been awarded 3.79 percent (288 in real 
terms) fewer seats than they deserve. Where the overall average is similar to that 
found in New York trend, what is differentiates results for New York and London is 
that women receive the negative score in every election. As explained previously, this 
persistent deficit is due to candidate-to-vote and vote-to-seat disproportionality.
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One other statistic from Table 26 is worth noting. Again, as in New York, the 
proportion of women candidates running for office and the proportion of women who 
win seats is highly correlated (R 0.97). This high score indicates that as the number 
of women who run for office increases, so too does the number of women who win 
seats. This statistic should bode well for women as the solution to persistent absence 
would seem to be merely increase the number of women entering local races. 
Although the other postvoting and voting stages do somewhat distort the number of 
women candidates who eventually win office, the single most important factor to 
address is the initial lack of women candidates.
As indicated from postvoting evidence, the first place to look for reasons why 
so few women enter the local election arena in London is the party selection process. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the Norris and Lovenduski examination of national level 
elections in Britain found that although only 13 percent of those who applied for 
Conservative Party candidacy were women, 15 percent of the Conservative Party’s 
candidates were women -  indicating a positive bias. For Labour, 37 percent of those 
who applied to be candidates were women, but only 27 percent of those applicants 
succeeded -  indicating a possible bias against women by party selectors.225 Using 
regression analysis, the authors find that while the Conservative party is biased 
against recruiting those 50 years and over, ‘no other social factors emerged as 
significant predictors of Conservative demand.’ As demonstrated above, while the 
Labour Party is biased against recruiting women candidates Norris and Lovenduski 
feel that ‘the most striking finding was that, in most respects candidates were very
similar to the total pool of applicants.’226 The authors probe further still by surveying
party ‘gatekeepers’ about their attitudes toward women, concluding that the attitudes
225 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, pp.l 15-118.
226 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, pp. 121-2.
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of those in charge of screening access to candidacies and other posts ‘are not the main 
reason for the lack of women in parliament.’227
Norris and Lovenduski’s results indicate that the party selection process does 
not unduly hamper women from gaining party candidacies. However while perhaps 
currently the best on record, the study presents only a snapshot of the happenings in 
Britain and therefore is of little use as a method for determining reasons for women’s 
persistent absence in London Borough elections as logistically it would impossible to 
replicate this study over time. But the study does have direct value to this thesis as 
Norris and Lovenduski produce significant evidence to show that major parties 
contesting national elections demonstrate little or no bias toward women applicants. 
As party constitutions apply to local level party procedures and those acting as 
gatekeepers at the national level also participate in the selection of local candidates, 
one would expect that bias is largely absent at the local level.
In moving toward a test of whether the candidate selection process is biased 
against women data in Figure 18 reveals that the increase in the number of women 
candidates in London borough elections has been a fairly consistent, cross-party 
phenomenon. By the thinnest of margins Liberals are the most women friendly party, 
followed by the Conservatives and Labour respectively. Other observers of local 
elections in Britain have found similar results. In their study of English shire districts 
from 1973-1995, Railings and Thrasher found that, ‘...although there are overall 
differences between the main parties, with women faring less well in the two main 
parties than in the Liberal/Liberal Democrat ‘third’ party, there is a remarkable 
uniformity in the rate of change.’228
227 Norris, P. & Lovenduski, J. (1995), Political Recruitment, pp. 142.
228 Railings, C. & Thrasher, M. (1997), Local Elections in Britain, p.72.
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That local parties in London have recently implemented policies to counter 
any bias by local party leaders provides some evidence that party leaders are aware 
there is some cause for concern. For example in the Labour Party where previously 
women would have to jump through three screening stages in order to stand as a 
candidate in local council elections -  a long-list screening by local party officials, a 
short-list screening by local and sometimes central party officials, and a vote by a 
quorum of local ward party members -  the process has recently been changed to allow 
potential candidates to avoid the initial long-list screening and move straight to short­
list screening. This change allows candidates who might be vetted by local party 
leaders to at least make it to the long-listing stage where the actions of local leaders 
are subject to scrutiny by outside party officials.229
229 Interview with Colin Ellar. Hounslow Labour Councillor, March 31, 2001.
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F igure 19: W om en C an d id a tes  in London B orough Elections (1964-1998)
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Figure 19 compares the percentage of women selected to stand as candidates 
from each of the 32 London boroughs. The top line on the graph represents the 
borough with the highest percentage women candidates, the lower line the boroughs 
with the lowest percentage of women candidates with the overall average represented 
by the middle line. Using results from 1998 to provide an example, in the most 
women friendly borough (Camden) 39 percent of candidates were women while in the 
least women-friendly borough (Tower Hamlets) women held a mere 22 percent of the 
available candidacies -  a difference o f 1.7 percent. Over the 10 election period, the 
average difference between the highest and lowest boroughs is 18 percent. Although 
elections are conducted under very similar conditions in each of 32 boroughs, Figure 
19 demonstrates that the percentage of women selected to stand for office varies 
considerably between boroughs. Where in a single election year over 40 percent of the 
candidates have been women in one borough, in the same election in another borough 
the percentage of women recruited is half this number. This discrepancy suggests that 
where the current rules do not preclude women from gaining nearly half the
191
candidacies, they also allow for women to be badly under-represented as candidates in 
some borough races.
That women have never gained candidate parity in any borough election and 
have been grossly under-represented in some races presents a strong indication of 
systematic disadvantage in the prevoting stage. The higher scores indicate that there 
are often enough women in the community ready and willing to come forward as 
candidates. The lower scores suggest that rules allow social bias within parties to 
impact negatively on who stands for office. Sceptics may disagree that the statistics 
represented in Figure 19 are noteworthy. After all, as different parties dominate 
different boroughs it is possible that the number of women recruits would vary as 
parties have varying selection requirements. An obvious test then would be to perform 
the same comparisons on the recruitment figures from a single party. Wide variation 
in the percentage of women selected to run as candidates between boroughs would 
suggest that rules of the game are structured so that social bias within parties plays a 
significant role in candidate recruitment.
Figure 20 shows the highest, lowest, and average proportion of women 
candidates running for the Labour Party in London boroughs over a 34 year period. 
To illustrate the general findings using 1998 results, in a year where women 
constituted 28 percent of Labour’s candidates, women held 42 percent of the Labour 
candidacies in the London Borough of Islington but only 16 percent in Tower 
Hamlets. This 26 percent difference indicates that where it was possible for selection 
committee to present a near-balanced slate of candidates in Islington, a short distance 
away the same candidate selection process managed only a 1/3 this percentage.
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F igure 20: W om en L ab o u r C an d id a tes  in London B orough E lections (1964-1998)
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Considering that these selections all take place within the same party, during 
the same election period, under the same electoral system, in light of the same 
national and regional issues, and even under the same climatic conditions, these 
extreme variations are indeed troubling. These findings strongly suggest that current 
rules do not protect women from social bias. The high levels of recruitment in some 
boroughs indicate that there is a strong desire among women to come forward and 
stand as Labour Party candidates. Low levels of recruitments in others suggest that 
either party recruitment committees are not making the efforts needed to recruit 
women candidates or worse, deliberately screening out women that come forward.
The end result is that the current recruitment process in London is failing 
women as it allows the social bias that exist within some party selection committees 
to negatively affect their chances of becoming councillors. As discussed earlier in the 
chapter, this lesson was learned long ago in New York and prompted the move to a 
primary selection process where recruitment was removed from the control of party 
cadres and placed in the hands of the much less biased mass party membership. Thus,
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because all four steps of the persistent losing framework have been answered in the 
affirmative that women seeking seats on London Borough councils can be considered 
persistently absent , due to a remediably institutional bias and would therefore be 
reasonable in rejecting the current arrangements by which candidates are selected in 
the prevoting stage.
6.6 -  C on clu sion s
This chapter has customized the general theory of persistent losing so it might be used 
to investigate the fate of women, in Stockholm New York and London. The first step 
of the analysis established that women could be considered persistently absent if they 
had gained less than their fair share of the council seats over a series of elections. In 
looking at the percentage of women elected to council it was found that only in 
Stockholm. City Council have women consistently obtained close to 50 percent 
representation. While there is still some bias present in the system, and women might 
well have a case to call for reforms, the bias may not be significant enough for women 
to demand change.
Further investigation is warranted in New York and London as women can be 
considered persistently absent from local legislatures and have never held more than 
30 percent of the available seats. In establishing whether the rules by which elections 
are conducted can be challenged as unreasonable the theory of persistent losing 
demands evidence that electoral institutions disadvantage women over the long term. 
In New York, postvoting and voting stage tests show where some bias did exist 
against women in the early easy of the study period, these biases have all but 
disappeared and, as in Stockholm, it is doubtful whether pressing for changes to 
electoral rules affecting these parts of the process would be worth the cost. It was also 
found that parties do not discriminate against women who present themselves as
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candidates during the prevoting stage. The main reason women are persistently absent 
from local contests in New York is because so few come forward during council 
races, a behaviour pattern that polling information suggests is due to women be less 
engaged with the local political process than men. When surveyed, women claim they 
are as active as men in following local elections close to voting day, but they less 
avidly follow local politics during the crucial period where they may or may not 
choose to put themselves as candidates. This evidence suggests that while women 
cannot reject any of the traditional components of the electoral system, it may be 
reasonable for them to challenge how information is distributed during elections if 
bias-can be shown to exist.
Evidence from this London suggests that parties choose women to run for 
seats in unwinnable wards more often than they do men. Although the negative vote- 
to-seat scores do not completely explain women’s absence, they serve as a harbinger 
for the other two stages. In the voting stage it was shown that since 1964, women’s 
candidate-to-vote proportionality scores have also been negative. While this could 
indicate that voters are biased against women candidates, it more likely portrays a 
combination of this factor and the fact that parties place women in unfavourable 
wards more often than men. However, as in New York, the most serious cause of 
persistent absence is the lack of women coming forward as candidates. As shown in 
prevoting stage analysis, an increase in the number of women winning seats almost 
correlates exactly with an increase in the number of women running for office. Thus 
the key to explaining why so few women stand for office would appear to lay with 
how parties select candidates. Although operating under almost exactly similar 
conditions, the number of women nominated to run for office not only varies 
extremely between boroughs, but also -  as shown through investigating the Labour
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Party -  within a single party. This variation indicates that rules allow social bias 
within some local selection committees to negatively affect the number of women 
standing for office. While like New York there may be bias in how information is 
distributed prior to elections, by all accounts it is political parties that are the main 
cause of women’s persistent absence in London races as women more-often-than-men 
are placed in unfavourable wards and have their candidacies impeded in certain 
boroughs.
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7 -  WORLD CITIES AND PERSISTENT LOSING
The previous six chapters have outlined a new analytical framework for electoral 
democracy and, using data from three world cities, demonstrated how this framework 
might be applied. This chapter summarizes empirical and theoretical lessons learned. 
Where Chapters 4, 5 and 6 offered statistical investigations according to particular 
election stages, the next section looks at Stockholm, London and New York on a case- 
by-case basis to offer the reader a slightly different view of these cities. The second 
section offers ideas about the theory of persistent losing, its limitations, and future 
applications.
7.1 -  W o rld  C ities
Much like the UK Democratic Audit’s approach to national level democracy 
discussed in Chapter 1, this study of democracy in world cities has proceeded on a 
case-by-case basis. While Step 4 of the analytical framework by which persistent 
losing is assessed requires comparison, the overall aim of the exercise is not to 
generate a rank listing of world cities, but rather to provide a detailed evaluation of a 
single case. The cases were assessed simultaneously during the prevoting, voting and 
postvoting stages to better demonstrate the flexibility of the approach and to give 
some idea of why some institutional arrangements might be considered superior to 
others. To provide an overview of each case, this section groups the findings from the 
three election stages on a city-by-city basis
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7.1.1 -  Stockholm
As this study has shown, the City of Stockholm takes local democracy seriously. The 
general participatory health of the system would seem high as the electoral system 
produces low deviation from proportionality scores, high voter turnout rates and near 
gender parity on the local council. But as shown in Chapter 4, despite low DV score, 
it is still possible for some community members to claim persistent losing status in 
Stockholm. A disaggregated investigation of the fate of local political parties 
demonstrated that the highly proportional electoral formula still continually and 
unnecessarily disadvantages smaller parties. This violates the theory of persistent 
losing and provides the justification needed for these small parties to challenge the 
current arrangements. However from a realistic perspective the disadvantage is so 
slight that it is unlikely that smaller parties would expend the resources necessary to 
try and bring about change.
The same logic holds for evidence presented in Chapter 5 and 6. As shown in 
Chapter 5, high voter turnout levels demonstrate very little chance that any group in 
the community is persistently absent from the electoral process. Even if the system is 
systematically biased against a particular group, this imbalance is likely to be too light 
to warrant expending the costs necessary for change. Chapter 6 demonstrated that 
women have achieved almost absolute parity on the city council indicates that what 
bias may have existed against women in the middle of the 20th century has all but 
been eliminated. The voluntary ‘zipper’ system that ensures women make up half the 
party lists has negated any bias that may have previously existed with the parties or 
voters. While women still might be able to make the case that they are persistent 
losers because they have won less than their share of seats on more than three
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occasions during the study person, the discrimination is so slight that it might not be 
worth their while demanding change.
In sum, from the perspective of the groups considered in this study, the City of 
Stockholm exhibits a high degree of electoral fairness and can serve as an example to 
other world cities. While the system is not perfect, the level of discrimination is so 
low as probably to go unchallenged by groups prone to systematic disadvantage. But 
this chapter provides evidence for only a few of many distinct community groups. To 
ensure that the current institutions are promoting maximum fairness levels the above 
tests should be continually reviewed and similar investigations undertaken from other 
perspectives.
7.1.2 -  London
The story of local elections in London boroughs is much different than those in 
Stockholm. The overall participatory health in all three election stages was shown to 
be low and the observed groups have been shown to be placed at sometimes severe 
disadvantage. In Chapter 4 it was shown that the electoral formula is highly 
disproportional -  especially when these scores as calculated on a borough-by-borough 
basis. On an aggregate level all but Labour Party supporters have been shown to be 
placed at a continuous disadvantage, and in some boroughs all parties could 
reasonable reject the electoral formula. That this institutionalized disadvantage could 
be easily remedied by moving to a more proportional electoral formula solidifies 
claims of persistent losing.
As shown in Chapter 5, voter turnout in London Boroughs is low enough to 
raise suspicions that some residents could be persistently absent from elections. 
However, this is not enough to justify rejecting local electoral system as it must also 
be shown that this long-term absence is due to electoral institutions imposing higher
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participation costs for some and not others. Ward level investigations showed that low 
turnout patterns are not random, and wards that have low participation rates in one 
election tend to have low rates in the next election. Further testing showed that a 
crucial factor in predicting turnout fates for all wards is the closeness of the ward race. 
This makes sense. Turnout should be expected to be higher in wards with close races 
as under the plurality system parties are only rewarded in wards where they win a 
majority of votes. Thus parties tend to expend more resources in wards in which they 
have a better chance of winning and the additional resources allocated by parties 
decrease information costs for residents. Accordingly, cost-benefit logic would lead 
us to expect turnout to increase in wards where information gathering costs are lower. 
In terms of persistent losing, as race closeness can be considered a consistent ward 
characteristic, those who reside in wards where races are never or nearly never close 
will continually incur higher information costs than those living in wards with close 
races. Based on this information, the current plurality system entrenches this high 
information-cost/low turnout pattern. As such, those living in relatively uncompetitive 
wards would be reasonable in rejecting the system as they face higher costs merely 
because of the incentives arbitrarily imposed by the electoral system.
In Chapter 6, women’s relationship with local electoral systems was explored 
in detail. Here again London boroughs fare badly. While postvoting and voting stage 
proportionality tests revealed slight bias against women, it was further shown that low 
participation rates can be mainly attributed to the actions of political parties and not 
widespread community bias against women candidates. It was further shown that 
activities in the prevoting stage offer the most significant explanation for persistent 
absence. In short, women are not winning seats because they are not standing as 
candidates. Moreover, this lack of women’s candidacy would seem to stem from a
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selection process in which the local party committees are in the worst case directly 
biased against women, or in the best case not as encouraging to their aspirations as 
those of men. Thus the current rules allow local selection committees to discriminate 
against women. As measures exist that would alleviate this bias, such as state-run 
primary races, women can be considered persistent losers and reasonably reject the 
current arrangements.
In sum, using the theory of persistent losing to evaluate the London borough 
electoral system yields a bleak message for those concerned about local democracy in 
one of the world’s most important cities. Under-rewarded parties, those in 
uncompetitive wards and women can reject components of the current system because 
the rules which bound these processes raise their participation costs to an unjustifiable 
level. While the purpose of this exercise is not to rank the case cities, one cannot help 
but comment that the dire results of the tests conducted in this study render London 
perhaps the least democratic city of three, or if not, certainly much less democratic 
than Stockholm.
7.1.3 -  New York
New York does not fare much better than London in this study. In Chapter 4 it was 
revealed that Republicans and other parties can reasonably reject the current single 
member plurality system as the votes collected by their candidates are almost always 
less likely than their Democratic Party rivals to be translated into seats. Low voter 
turnout rates shown in Chapter 5 indicate that there is a strong chance that some 
groups are persistently absent from local elections in the five-borough area. While in 
itself this is not enough to justify rejecting the electoral system, the lessons learned 
from the exploration of London should go some way to show that a similar 
exploration in New York might produce similar results. However, studies of low voter
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turnout in New York would not have to concentrate on geographical groups, they 
could instead investigate persistent absence along ethnic, class or gender lines to 
determine who is absent and why.
The findings of Chapter 6 should also alarm women in New York. While it 
was shown that women run in safe seats as, or sometimes even more, often than men 
and that voters are not biased against women candidates, as in London, the reason so 
few women hold city council seats is because so few run for office. Unlike London, 
this cannot be blamed on the selection process as those voting in local party primaries 
are not biased against women candidates. However, the lack of women candidates 
may be due to the lesser value women place on city council seats and/or the fact that 
they do not. pay as much attention to local elections as men at least in the crucial early 
stages of the race. While unfortunate, there is little to be done but prompt local 
election authorities and local parties to encourage more women to run for office. 
Unless different evidence is uncovered -  perhaps pertaining to a bias in how election 
recruitment information is distributed -  it appears that women cannot reject any part 
of New York’s local electoral system.
The evidence reviewed in this study provides some answers as to why New 
York might be more democratic than London. At least from the perspective of 
women, it would seem that primaries are better way to select women than secretive 
selection committees because they do not allow local bias to affect who runs for office 
in the community. However, New York’s electoral formula is not any better than 
London’s as it too discriminates against a specific party. It has yet to be established 
whether New York’s single-member plurality system causes participation costs to be 
higher for some geographically-based non-voters than others, but it is a good bet that
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the effects are similar to those in London. Based on all the above evidence New York 
would appear more democratic than London, but not much more democratic.
7.2 -  P e r s i s t e n t  L o s in g
So as much as this thesis is about elections in world cities, the value of the empirical 
findings entirely rest on the initial idea of democracy. It is hoped that the first two 
chapters of the thesis go some way in convincing readers that at the very least we 
need to rethink our previous views. Of those who support political equality as the core 
principle of democracy, only traditional utilitarians have offered a consistent rule by 
which decision-making can be evaluated. Once enjoying great support, adherence to 
traditional utilitarianism has waned over the years due to attacks from leading 
contemporary theorists such as John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon and Brian Barry who argue 
that this view of justice is deeply flawed. Others, such as Robert Dahl, who agree with 
traditional utilitarians that political equality is the core democratic principle, but who 
are also reluctant to fully endorse utility maximization as the only evaluatory rule 
have so far failed to produce a convincing alternative. This thesis proposes that 
Scanlon’s idea of reasonable rejection be used as a new foundation on which to 
evaluate political equal decision-making. By using the theory of persistent losing, one 
does not judge outputs by how accurately they reflect inputs, but rather by whether or 
not the decision-making process is fair. If all within a community can agree that the 
rules by which decisions are made are fair, in almost all cases they must accept the 
outcomes themselves as fair. This theory then would seem to fit well with the pluralist 
view that different groups within society negotiate the terms by which they will live. 
But it adds an extra-dimension that if the polity wishes to be seen as ‘democratic’, 
then only rules that are reasonable to all members bound by final decisions are to be 
accepted.
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This reliance on procedures does not mean that mean outcomes are completely 
disregarded. It is possible to imagine a polity where all agree to decision-making 
rules, but are so divided on particular issues that one group always triumphs over 
another. In this scenario, the costs are equal for to both groups to participate in the 
prevoting, voting and postvoting decision-making stages, but the policy outcomes 
always reflect the preferences of one group over another. Intuitively it would seem 
strange for us to expect those on the losing side of the process to constantly agree to 
outcomes that were always against their interests, although they might not reject the 
process by which the decisions were reached. So what is the rule to follow in this 
case? As Brian Barry agrees that sometimes outcomes do matter, especially if it 
means one segment of society is harmed.230 Returning to Scanlon, it would appear that 
in these cases the crucial condition of ‘unforced general agreement’ has been broken, 
in that the factions within the polity are too different to get along. If this is indeed the 
case, then there is no way that the factions can be brought under a single set of 
decision-making rules and separate communities will have to be formed. While an 
unstable solution, it would appear to be the only way to represent this vision of 
political equality.
There is obviously much more work to do on the cases included in this study 
before any claim can be made about overall levels of democracy, however it is also 
hoped that the reader has a much better idea of how electoral democracy does or does 
not work in these three cities. Future studies could go in a number of directions -  
either continuing to investigate elections in a larger number of world cities, or using 
the theory of persistent losing to investigate new decision-making spheres in large 
urban areas. However, the theory could also be moved to completely different settings
230 Barry, B. (1995), Justice as Impartiality, p. 93.
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such as nation-states or international organizations. Whatever the application, it 
should be clear that persistent losing in any form is an unsatisfactory state of affairs 
for any community wishing to consider itself highly democratic.
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APPENDIX 1 -  DATA SOURCES
New York
• General and Primary Election Data -  Source: New York City Board of Elections.
• Voting Age Population (1991-1997) -  Source: US Census data.
• Gender Statistics -  Manually calculated from New York City Board of Elections records 
London
• General and Primary Election Data -London Research Centre.
• Demographic Statistics -  Office of National Statistics.
•  Gender Statistics -  Manually calculated from London Research Centre records 
Stockholm
• General and Primary Election Data, Population and Gender Statistics -  City of Stockholm 
Elections Committee.
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APPENDIX 2 -  PARTY SUPPORT IN LONDON BOROUGHS
From the perspective of the electorate, races in most borough elections over the last 
35 years elections have been more or less predictable. As shown in Table 27, Labour 
runs candidates for almost every position in all wards and Conservatives contest all 
seats in almost every ward in the 32 boroughs. While Liberal candidates often make 
appearances in a large number of wards, their presence is inconsistent. Other parties -  
Green, British National Party, Communist, Ratepayers’ Associations, etc. -  or 
independents sometimes contest elections, but often they do not offer a full slate and 
their year to year appearances are unpredictable. These patterns are important to 
remember when determining how to calculate party vote shares in multi-member 
wards.
Table 27: Candidates in London Borough Elections (1964-1998)
1 Year
...... ....
Seats Cand Lab % Con % Lib % Other!%
1964 1859 5119 1858 99.9% 1675 90 1% 1158 62.3% 428 23 0%
11968 1863 4820 1843 98.9% 1732 93.0% 794 42.6% 451 24.2%
(1971 1863 4633 1860 99.8% 1745 93.7% 592 31.8% 436 23.4%
(1974 1867 5301 1866 99.9% 1714 91.8% 11271 68.1% 452 24.2%
11978 1908 5761 1907 99.9% 1829 95.9% [990 51.9% 1035 :54.2%
11982 1914 5980 1914 100.0% 1808 94.5% 11800 94.0% 451 23.6%
1986 1914 5992 1913 99.9% 1837 96.0% 1826 95.4% 416 (21.7%
(1990 1914 5782 1914 100.0% 1851 96.7% 1323 69.1% 694 36.3%
(1994 1917 5837 1917 100.0%! 1836 95.8% 1622 84.6% 462 (24.1%
1998 1917 5840 1917 100.0% 1805 94.2% 1580 82.4% 538 28.1%
i  Totals 18936 55065 18909)99.9% 17832 94.2%| 12956 68.4% 5363 28.3%
Calculating party vote shares in single member constituencies is simple. One 
merely divides the party’s vote share by the total number of votes cast. However 
popular candidates, extra parties and less-than-full slates of candidates can present 
difficulties when calculating vote shares in multi-member constituencies such as those
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present in all London Boroughs. Because of this, there have been three methods 
suggested by which to calculate vote shares: the aggregate method, the average 
method and the top vote-getter method. All three have the strengths and weaknesses, 
but the key is to determine which best reflects the strength of parties in London 
borough elections.
Using the aggregate method to determine the popularity of a party in an 
individual ward, the total number of votes cast for all candidates running under a 
particular party banner in a ward are divided by the total number of votes casts in that 
ward. Using the average method, the total number of votes cast for an individual party 
are divided by the number of candidates for that party, this number is then divided by 
the sum of the average scores for each party in that particular ward. Using the top 
vote-getter method, the vote total for the highest placed candidate in each ward is 
used as a numerator, while the sum of these top scores for each party is used as a 
denominator. The accuracy of these three measures in relation to the possible 
scenarios mentioned above is demonstrated below.
Table 28: Perfect Estimation Scenario
.................. 1.......... !.................. i............ ;................
Cand idate j  Votes i  Aggregate j Agg% | Average Avg % Top Top %
Lab 1000 3000 42% 1000 42% 1000 42%
Lab 11000 |
Lab j1000 |
33%Con 800 2400 ]33% 800 33% 800
Con |800 ! |
Con 800 ] |
LD |600 11800 |25% 1600 25% 600 25%
LD 1600 ! ! j  ]
LD |600 j ;] |
Total 7200 7200 ! 100% 12400............................. i..-................i........................ 100% 2400 100%
Table 28 shows the results of calculations using all three methods using a 
scenario where a full slate of candidates is run by the three major parties, with no 
other parties or independents contesting this ward. In this scenario, equal scores are
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assigned to the candidates from each party. While perhaps not exactly realistic, this 
type of result is reflective of what actually happens in some wards in London and 
there are few candidates put forwardby ‘other’ parties and voters tend to vote for a 
full slate of party candidates if available. Here the vote share calculations are the same 
no matter which method is used to do the calculations. Thus, in this scenario it is 
possible to use any of the three methods to generate an exact idea of party support in a 
particular ward.
T ab le  29: P o p u la r  C a n d id a te  S cenario
C a n d id a te  
L a b ............
........
V otes A ggregate A g g % | A verage A vg % T op T op  %
1200 |3200 43%  [ 1067 43% 1200 46%
L ab 1000 I
L ab 1000 ! ii
31%C on 800 [2400 32%  ]800 32% 800
C on oo o o |
C on 800 | i
LD '600 11800 24%  1600 24% 600 23%
LD 600 ! !
LD 600 j ij
T o ta l 7400 17400 100% |2467 100% 2600 100%
However as shown in Table 29, exceptions to the perfect scenario can produce 
varied results across the three vote share calculation methods. In this scenario 
everything is left the same as in the perfect scenario, except that one Labour candidate 
has received 200 more votes than his/her running mates. The top vote getter score 
jumps up higher than either the aggregate or average scores. While both of the later 
scores reflect an increase in Labour support, the top vote getter score over emphasises 
the extra votes cast for this one candidate. The inaccuracy here would perhaps be 
more noticeable in a five seat constituency where one candidate’s score is much 
higher than average. Thus the more the top vote getter scores strays from the average 
vote, the more this particular measure distorts party vote share scores. Under the 
above scenario, this is not the case for either the aggregate or average score methods.
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Table 30: One Additional Candidate from One Party Scenario
[Candidate Votes (Aggregate Agg% Average Avg % Top Top %
Lab 1000 3000 40% 1000 37% 1000 37%
[Lab 1000 |
[Lab 1000 |
I Con 800 2400 32% 800 30% 800 30%
[Con
oo00
[Con 800 |
LD 600 1800 24% 600 22% 600 22%
(LD 600 j
(LD 600 |
(Green 300 (300 4% 300 11% 300 11%
[Total 7500 [7500 100% 2700 100% 2700 100%
The calculations in Table 30 are again based on the perfect scenario -  with the 
exception that vote totals for a single Green Party candidate have been added. The 
effect of this addition in that although the single Green Party candidate has received a 
mere 300 out of 7500 votes cast, both the Aggregate and Top voter methods 
determine that this merits a vote share score of 11 percent, while the aggregate 
method awards a vote share score of four percent. This distortion by both the average 
and top-vote methods is due to the smaller denominator generated by both. It would 
appear that both overestimate the support of parties not running a full slate of 
candidates.
Table 31: One Additional Candidate from Three Parties Scenario
[Candidate Votes (Aggregate Agg% i Average Avg % Top jTop % |
(Lab 1000 13000 38% |1000 32% lOOOj 32% |
[Lab 1000 | i j ]
Lab 1000 !
----\... ....1i
i !
(Con 800 (2400 30% 800 25% 800 (25% |
(Con 800 | ” 1i
Con 800 ; • } j
LD 600 11800 23% [600 19% 600 j 19% |
LD 600 | I I
|l d 600 |
---- --1”.......— i[ ! i i
I Green 300 |300 4% 1300 10% 300 110% !
[BNP 250 (250 3% 250 8% 250 (8% |
[Comm 200 200 3% 200 6% 200 ]6% |
(Total 7950 |7950 100% (3150 100% 3150(100% \
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Table 31 builds on the findings from Table 30, adding two additional 
candidates from two other parties. Both these scores estimate that although they only 
collected 750 votes out of almost eight thousand cast, these three parties hold almost 
% of the vote share. Under the aggregate method this percentage is a mere 11 percent. 
What can be concluded from Tables 30 and 31 is that under these conditions the 
average and top-vote getter methods overestimate the popularity of small parties and 
underestimate the popularity of large parties while the aggregate method is less 
radical in its variance and is more reflective of actual vote shares under these types of 
conditions.
Table 32: Incomplete Slate for One Major Party Scenario
Candidate! Votes! Aggregate Agg%! Average Avg % Top Top %
Lab 1000 3000 45% 1000 42% 1000 42%
Lab 1000 I
Lab 1000 1 |
Con 800 2400 36% 800 33% 800 33%
Con 800 |
Con 800 |
LD 600 1200 18% 600 25% 600 25%
LD 600 |
Total 6600 16600 100% 2400 100% 2400 100%
Table 32 also reflects a scenario worth considering. In this scenario the Liberal 
Democrats have not presented full slates, running two instead of three candidates, 
while the other major parties have run full slates. Under these conditions it would 
appear that the aggregate method underestimates the voter support for the Liberal 
Democrats. If 600 voters support the first two Liberal Democrats it is most likely that 
these voters decided not to cast their third vote. If this is the case, then Lib Dem vote 
share would be better represented by average or top voter getter methods.
If none of the three techniques is accurate under all conditions, which should be 
used choose to calculate party vote shares in London Borough elections? In this study 
the aggregate method was chosen for two reasons. First, the most likely scenario,
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especially in later elections, is that three all major parties will run full slates of 
candidates with the occasional single fringe party or independent candidate also 
contesting the election. This scenario the aggregate method best reflects vote share 
scores.
Second, as shown above, all methods distort scores under certain scenarios 
The real question to ask is do we want to live with overestimation of small party 
support using average or top vote, getter scores or underestimation of major- party- 
with-incomplete-slate scores. For the purposes of this study where we are looking 
persistent losing it is perhaps best to err on the side of caution and rely on the latter. If 
we are to make the claim that the Liberals are persistently losing because they receive 
less than their fair share of seats, the claim is stronger if it is based on what is the best 
case scenario in terms of how the calculations are made. In other words, if  it is found 
that persistent losing is occurring even when the percentage of voters supporting 
Liberals is underestimated, acknowledging the underestimation bias in the formula 
only strengthens the claim.
212
APPENDIX 3 -  CALCULATING VOTER TURNOUT
In testing for the possibility of persistent absence in the voting stage it is important to 
use the most appropriate statistics as a dependent variable. In this study turnout is 
measured as a percentage of the number of votes cast divided by the voting age 
population -  the technique used by most scholars who compare turnout rates such as 
Ray Teixeira, Steven Rosenstone and Raymond Wolfmger.231 This technique stands in 
marked contrast to that used by most newspapers where turnout is calculated as 
ballots cast divided by registered voters or those such as Tatu Vanhanen, who divide 
votes casts by total population.232
F igure 21: P ercen tage o f V oting Age P opulation  R egistered  (1961-1998)
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231 Rosenstone, S. J. & Wolfmger, R. E. (1978), T he Effect o f Registration Laws on Voter Turnout', The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 72:1, March, pp. 22-45 and Teixeira, R. A. (1992), The Disappearing American 
Voter, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution.
232 Vanahanen, T. (1999), Prospects o f  Democracy.
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Using the statistics provided by dividing ballots by registered voters is 
dangerous when comparing polities. For example, those with very low registration 
rates reduce the denominator and inflate turnout rates while those with high 
registration rates increase the denominator and deflate turnout rates. Using total 
population as a denominator is also problematic. For example, polities with high 
numbers of young people will have inappropriately deflate turnout figures. Figure 21 
demonstrates that it would be a mistake to compare turnout levels calculated using 
registered voters as a denominator. In Stockholm and London nearly one hundred 
percent of those eligible are registered to vote, where in New York often half the 
eligible voters fail to be registered. Thus it is easy to see how using registered voters 
instead of voting age population as a denominator would greatly inflate turnout 
figures in US cities.233
233 Blais, et. al found that that 94 percent of the 63 countries studied restrict voting to those aged 18 and over (in 
Brazil it was 16 and as high as 21 in a number of other countries). See, Blais, A., Massicotte, L., & Yoshinaka, A. 
(2001) ‘Deciding Who has the Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis o f Election Laws ‘, Electoral Studies, Vol. 
20: 1, pp. 41-62.
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APPENDIX 4 -  TURNOUT MODELLING NOTES
The following scatterplots have been generated to test for heteroscedasticity in the 
three Models used to predict turnout in Chapter 5. As suggested by Gujarati, ‘[i]f 
there is no a priori or empirical information about the nature of heteroscedasticity, in 
practice one can do the regression analysis on the assumption that there is no 
heteroscedasticity and then do a post-mortem examination of the residual squared... 
to see if they exhibit any systematic pattern.’234 If there is no systematic pattern 
between predicted values and residual values when plotted on a scatterplot, then there 
is little chance heteroscedasticity is present in the data. According to Kleinbuam, et.al, 
‘variance heteroscedasticity must be considered only when the data show very 
obvious and significant departures from homogeneity. In general, mild departures will 
not have too adverse an effect on the results.’235 As shown below, the three residual 
scatterplots demonstrate no obvious patterns, thus the data in all models can be 
considered homoscedastic.236
234 Gujarati, D.N., (1995), Basic Econometrics, New York: Mcgraw Hill, p. 368.
235 Klienbaum, D., Kupper, L. & Muller, K. (1988), Applied Regression Analysis and Other Multivariable 
Methods, Boston: PWS-Kent, p. 108.
236 I would like to thank Dr. Robert Kozak, Lecturer in Statistics and Associate Professor, Faulty of Forestry, 
University of British Columbia for his help in testing the data for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity.
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F igure 22: S ca tte rp lo t o f M odel 1 R esiduals
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Turnout 1998
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F igure 23: S ca tte rp lo t o f M odel 2 R esiduals
Scatterplot 
Dependent Variable: Turnout 1998
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F igure 24: S ca tte rp lo t o f M odel 3 R esiduals
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